A critical process is unfolding following the airstrikes carried out by the United States and Israel against Iran, which rapidly evolved into a regional war. Although the 15-day ceasefire declared during a period of intensified clashes has provided a brief respite for the peoples of the region, debates continue over whether it signals a lasting peace or foreshadows greater devastation.
The economic and political costs of the war are being felt not only on the battlefield but also deeply within the internal dynamics of neighboring countries such as Turkey. In particular, Turkey’s sensitive “Peace Process” and its economic vulnerabilities are facing a new test amid this regional turbulence. To address the issue in all its dimensions, political scientist Dr. Hasan Kılıç spoke to ANF about the balance of power in the region, possible scenarios, and the implications for Turkish politics. Kılıç spoke to ANF about a wide range of issues, from the diplomatic foundations of the ceasefire to the future of the “Peace Process.”
The 15-day ceasefire declared between the United States and Iran is being interpreted as a postponed crisis rather than the complete elimination of the possibility of war. In light of this temporary ceasefire, do the three scenarios you previously outlined, namely Iran’s strengthening, weakening and losing, or regime change, still remain valid?
The war that began on February 28 has profoundly affected not only the warring parties but also the states that were directly and indirectly impacted. In addition, the growing anti-war sentiment among the public in the United States, as well as the fact that millions of people in Iran, Israel, and the Gulf countries have been affected by the conditions of war, has formed the basis for the declared ceasefire. In a situation where so many actors and populations are affected, yet no party is able to declare victory, the declaration of a ceasefire is a natural outcome.
During this ceasefire period, the parties will assess the extent of the destruction they have faced, the strength they still retain, the approaches of their allied forces, and the military and social psychology. They will attempt to measure the damage sustained by the opposing side. By doing so, they will decide whether the war will continue based on the gap between what they have measured and what they gain at the negotiating table. Therefore, it is not appropriate to pursue definitive judgments such as whether the ceasefire merely pauses the possibility of war or opens the door to a final agreement.
It is necessary to look at the broader picture. In the Middle East, not only an imperial game but also an economic-political and historical-social reality led to the establishment of a political order a century ago. Despite violations, wars, and tensions, this order has largely continued. What is at stake today is the transformation of that political order. This is occurring not merely because imperial powers desire it or because regional powers seek to achieve greater dominance, but rather as part of a search for a new order shaped by economic-political and historical-social realities. First and foremost, it should be stated that regardless of whether Iran wins or loses the war, the Middle East will not awaken to the same pre-February 28 reality.
What kind of transformation is likely to take place?
If Iran emerges as the winner, without achieving a direct military victory but through political and military resilience, several significant developments are likely to occur. First, United States bases in the region would be considered ineffective, as they can easily become targets and have failed to provide sufficient protection within the countries where they are located. Second, Iran’s emergence from the war with a moral victory would lead it to attribute greater significance to its role within the new power dynamics of the Middle East. Third, an architecture in the Middle East based on regional powers, dominated primarily by Iran and Israel, would become prevalent. This scenario could push both the Gulf countries and Turkey into a more marginal position within regional equations.
If, on the other hand, Iran were to lose the war and this defeat resulted in the complete collapse of the state, everyone should be prepared for a catastrophic scenario. The world would face a massive energy crisis. Migration from Iran to the West would be counted in the millions, and this movement would likely be compounded by additional migration flows originating from countries such as Afghanistan and Pakistan. In the event of Iran’s defeat, tensions between Turkey and Israel would intensify as both seek to fill the resulting power vacuum, since politics in the Middle East does not tolerate a vacuum.
If Iran were to lose and only a regime change occurred, the direction of the new regime would be crucial. Should the new leadership focus on building a democratic Iran, adopt a balanced and dialogue-oriented foreign policy, and allocate its resources to the welfare of its people, Iran could open the door to a democratic model in the Middle East. However, if the new regime were to evolve toward a pro-Western orientation, particularly aligned with the United Kingdom and the European Union, the first consequence would likely be a significant reduction in Turkey’s influence within Western regional policies. While a Western-aligned Iranian regime could rapidly improve its economy, it should not be forgotten that Russia and China would continue to act as spoiler actors, potentially reshuffling the geopolitical landscape.
Therefore, the ceasefire may either collapse or evolve into a lasting peace. Although wars may continue to be fought by armies, it is essential to recognize which geopolitical lines of power are engaged in struggle in the Middle East. In the message conveyed to the public by Mr. Öcalan through the delegation of the Peoples’ Equality and Democracy Party (DEM Party), the three lines he emphasized accurately explain the broader picture. Whether the war continues, pauses, or ends, the final outcome will ultimately be determined by the result of the struggle among these three lines.
Among these scenarios, and considering the possibility that the ceasefire may collapse, which one would most challenge Turkey’s internal political balance and particularly the “Peace Process”?
If the ceasefire collapses, it can be anticipated that the conflicts will resume with greater intensity. Such a development would directly affect almost every sphere of Turkey, from politics to the economy. Turkey was one of the most fragile countries and among the least prepared economically, politically, and psycho-politically for the war that began on its doorstep on February 28. Therefore, the continuation of the war could activate significant internal dynamics within Turkey.
First, and to some extent this also applies to the Gulf countries, it should be clearly stated that the economic effects of the Iran war will initially be tolerated by citizens within the framework of what may be called the “rationality of war.” However, as the war prolongs and its negative impacts reach an irreparable level, rising tension between the public and the government will become inevitable. During such a period, the government’s economic mismanagement will be voiced more strongly. Issues that have long been discussed but had limited impact, such as the so-called “gang of five,” corruption, waste, and guaranteed public projects, will gain greater significance. Consequently, the likelihood of internal dynamics in Turkey being affected will increase.
The escalation of operations targeting the Republican People’s Party (CHP) can also be evaluated within this framework. When a government decides to harm its rival, it acts either when it feels at its strongest or at its weakest. The March 19 Imamoğlu operation was carried out at a time when the government believed it could compensate for the anticipated economic damage. The current operations, however, are being conducted during a far more difficult period, as public attention is diverted elsewhere and the rival is fragmented by being pushed outside the ethical sphere.
The “Peace Process” has a foundational distinction from internal political tensions in Turkey. The Kurdish question is not on the same plane as efforts to eliminate systemic rivals. The founding codes of the Republic and of society, particularly within the framework of Turkish identity, have been shaped through the denial of the Kurdish question and the definition of the Kurd. To draw an analogy, internal systemic conflicts produce aftershocks, whereas historical developments related to the Kurdish question generate the consequences of a major earthquake. This distinction should be kept in mind.
Two main scenarios can be identified regarding the impact of the Iran war on the Peace Process. The first scenario involves the government terminating the process due to the effects of the war and initiating a witch hunt against Kurdish politics in Turkey. Such a move would not yield results similar to those of the 2015 period, as the Kurds in Syria, Iraq, and Iran must now be taken into account. Regional dynamics are no longer comparable to those of 2015. Numerous new conditions have emerged, including Turkey’s internal political dynamics and the nation-building process of the Kurds. Another important factor is the vast difference between Turkey’s economy in 2015 and its current state. Despite these considerations, could the government still end the process? Certainly, it could. However, predicting the consequences is politically impossible; this unpredictability constitutes the very mystical foundation of politics, outcomes cannot be fully foreseen, calculated, or predetermined.
The second scenario involves a decision to continue the Peace Process. Such a choice would require accelerating the process. This is not a period for a “wait-and-see” approach or for searching for “windows of opportunity.” Turkey’s main problem is that although the state’s strategic mindset can, to some extent, interpret the historical and social transformation occurring in the Middle East, the government continues to manage the process through correlations it establishes between conjunctural political developments and its own particular interests. In other words, the government remains focused not on the horizon shaped by the reality of a changing world and region, but on the horizon defined by the question of how it can achieve favorable results in the next election. There is a negative correlation between the success of the Peace Process and the government’s suspension of democracy and the rule of law.
You state that the conflict dynamics related to Iran will test the “Peace and Democratic Society Process” through the government’s approach to law and democracy. Considering the short-term diplomatic space created by the ceasefire, do you think this period presents an opportunity for steps toward a resolution process in Turkey, or will the fragility of the ceasefire and the possibility of renewed conflict push the government toward a more security-oriented approach?
One of the most frequently repeated and most misleading assumptions in Turkey is the notion that there is an inherent contradiction between security and freedom. If the state abandons viewing Kurds as a threat and instead recognizes them as equal partners, this misconception of a contradiction between security and freedom would disappear. The subject of the state’s security concerns has historically been the Kurds, and this remains the case today. Therefore, steps must be taken to advance the Peace and Democratic Society Process in a way that breaks this misconception. As long as the freedom–security dilemma continues to be constructed from a perspective that perceives Kurds as a threat, the possibility of a renewed conflict will always persist.
To state it clearly, the implementation of anti-democratic practices across Turkey, particularly those targeting the CHP, and the suspension of the rule of law by turning the judiciary into a political decision-making authority create barriers to the Peace and Democratic Society Process. This is because the process fundamentally envisions and demands the expansion of the democratic political sphere and the guarantee of the right to engage in politics. The February 27 Call is not limited to the recognition of Kurdish rights or the Kurdish language. Rather, it is a call for ensuring the democratic political sphere through legal guarantees and for establishing the right to political participation. Once these conditions are met, the resolution of all aspects of the Kurdish question will take place within the sphere of democratic political struggle.
If the Kurdish question is being negotiated with the aim of resolving it within a democratically guaranteed political sphere, how can the violation of that same sphere through actions directed at other political actors be explained? Peace can indeed be expressed through ethical values, but this alone is not sufficient; it represents a comprehensive program of democratic politics.
On the other hand, the ceasefire may create a sense of relief in the markets and among the public in the short term. However, the possibility of renewed conflict keeps economic vulnerabilities alive. How do you foresee this dual situation influencing voter behavior and the axis of political debates in Turkey? To what extent would the perception of a crisis stemming from foreign policy affect this?
The public tends to tolerate economic vulnerabilities to a certain extent when there is a perception of a foreign policy crisis, particularly in the presence of the reality of war. A rational stance is generally adopted in response to the realities and impacts of war. However, this can only continue up to a point. If the war deepens and economic fragility moves toward a full-blown crisis, both voter behavior and citizen behavior will be affected. Voter behavior can be defined in terms of electoral preferences, while citizen behavior can be understood through the development of democratic forms of protest. The government attempts to take economic measures whenever it has the capacity to do so and supports these efforts with political operations targeting the opposition. Therefore, the situation you are asking about is, in fact, already unfolding continuously within Turkish politics today.
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