The Ahmet al-Sharaa–Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) administration has signed dozens of agreements with the Turkish state, Gulf countries, and Western nations within a year and a half, effectively opening Syria to foreign capital from airports and ports to bridges, oil fields, and energy infrastructure. Through these successive agreements, al-Sharaa (al-Jolani) has prioritized legitimizing his administration, securing international support, and consolidating his power, while the Syrian population continues to struggle with economic crisis, corruption, security problems, and instability.
In December 2024, al-Jolani advanced to Damascus with more than ten-armed groups and seized control of the administration. He first annulled the agreements signed during the period of Bashar al-Assad and subsequently turned toward Gulf and Western countries. Multi-million-dollar agreements signed with Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Jordan, the United States, France, and the Turkish state have emerged as part of a broader effort to gain regional and international legitimacy.
Financier of the Rojava occupation becomes al-Jolani’s new partner
Qatar, which became one of the primary financiers of the Turkish state’s 2018 occupation of Afrin (Efrîn), played a significant role in funding plans for demographic change and the transformation of the region into an “Arab Belt” under the guise of humanitarian aid. The Qatar Red Crescent Society (QRCS) and Qatar Charity financed housing projects constructed in coordination with the Turkish state in several locations, including the districts of Jindires (Cindirêsê) and Shera (Şera) in Afrin, as well as in al-Bab and Jarablus. Numerous armed group members and their families, brought from Eastern Ghouta, Hama, and Homs, were settled in these residences. Providing no assistance to the regions governed by the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES) and operating in Syria solely in coordination with the Turkish state, Qatar has emerged as one of al-Jolani’s closest allies since 2024.
On 29 May 2025, al-Jolani signed a 7 billion US dollar energy agreement with a consortium led by the Qatar-based Urbacon UCC Holding. Kalyon Energy and Cengiz Energy from Turkey, along with the United States–based Power International, were also among the developers of the project. The deal granted the consortium the construction of four gas-fired power plants with a total capacity of 5,000 megawatts, in addition to solar energy projects. The Kilis–Aleppo natural gas pipeline was also included in this package.
In August 2025, Urbacon UCC secured a 4 billion US dollar concession for the expansion of Damascus International Airport. Under the agreement, finalized in November 2025, the airport’s annual capacity is planned to increase to 31 million passengers, while a new terminal and a five-star hotel will provide the Qatari consortium with revenue guarantees for 30 years.
In February 2026, a memorandum of understanding was signed with the Qatar-based Power International Holding and the United States energy giant Chevron for oil and natural gas exploration and investment activities in Syria’s territorial waters in the Eastern Mediterranean. Yusuf Kablavi, Chief Executive Officer of the Syrian Petroleum Company (SPC), argued that this agreement would play a vital role in strengthening Syria’s economy.
The SPC had previously been established by a decree issued by al-Jolani in October 2025 as a holding entity bringing together all oil and refinery institutions under a structure with financial and administrative autonomy.
Syrian oil handed over to Saudi Arabia
Saudi Arabia has become one of the countries making the largest “investments” in Syria since al-Jolani assumed control of the administration. The Kingdom significantly increased its financial involvement in major projects, particularly after the United States lifted sanctions imposed under the Caesar Act in December 2025. Saudi investments have primarily focused on the oil sector, targeting the country’s most important source of revenue.
On 9 December 2025, the SPC signed agreements with Saudi firms ADES, TAQA, ARGAS, and Arabian Drilling to provide technical support, field development, and increased production at oil and gas sites. In addition to oil resources, elements of Syria’s energy infrastructure were also placed under Saudi management.
In February 2026, further agreements were signed concerning new airline and infrastructure projects. Riyadh announced the launch of an investment fund in Syria allocating 7.5 billion Saudi riyals (approximately 2 billion US dollars) to develop two airports in the city of Aleppo at various stages. Alongside these projects, a joint airline company named Flynas Syria will be established, with 49 percent ownership held by Saudi Arabia.
Additional agreements included the “SilkLink” telecommunications project, valued at approximately 1 billion US dollars and scheduled for completion within 18 months to two years, as well as cooperation agreements in the water sector with the Saudi-based ACWA Power. In July, Syria and Saudi Arabia had already signed 47 investment agreements with a total value exceeding 6 billion US dollars. Furthermore, as part of these agreements, Qatar and Saudi Arabia jointly paid 15.5 million US dollars to settle Syria’s outstanding debt to the World Bank.
Mediterranean coast handed to the UAE and France
The cities along Syria’s Mediterranean coast serve as the country’s primary economic and commercial gateways to the outside world. During the period of the Assad administration, the region, home to the Tartus Naval Base and the Hmeimim Air Base, both operated by Russia, was predominantly inhabited by Alawites. Following Bashar al-Assad’s flight to Russia and the subsequent weakening of Russian influence, al-Jolani initiated a series of attacks against Alawite communities under the pretext of “eliminating remnants of the Assad regime.” In March 2025, armed groups affiliated with al-Jolani launched coordinated assaults at at least 40 locations in Latakia and Tartus, resulting in the killing of approximately 1,500 Alawites, while hundreds of others were injured or abducted. The perpetrators of the massacre have yet to be brought to justice, and the fate of those abducted remains unknown. Amid these developments, the al-Jolani administration rapidly concluded agreements concerning infrastructure, energy, and tourism projects in the coastal regions.
The Port of Tartus, Syria’s largest seaport, was transferred to the United Arab Emirates through an 800 million US dollar agreement with the Emirati port operator DP World, granting the company a 30-year concession. Previously, in April 2019, Russia had signed a 49-year lease agreement for the port with the Assad administration, with the Russian company Stroytransgaz expected to invest 500 million US dollars in its modernization. However, al-Jolani annulled this agreement.
Additionally, the General Authority for Land and Sea Ports of Syria signed a new contract with the French shipping and logistics giant CMA CGM for the operation of the container terminal at the Port of Latakia, further consolidating foreign involvement in the country’s coastal infrastructure.
Why has Turkey moved to control Syria’s energy infrastructure?
The Turkish state has trained and equipped armed groups in Syria from the earliest days of the civil war. From the first months of his rule, al-Jolani signed comprehensive military, economic, infrastructure, and energy agreements with the Turkish state. This cooperation, extending from free trade negotiations and defense pacts to energy corridors and military training protocols, recalls the colonial and demographic engineering projects carried out by the Turkish state in the occupied regions of Afrin, Serêkaniyê, and Girê Spî. In addition to these areas, Turkey’s influence in Idlib, which has intensified over the past year and a half, has formed the basis of many of the agreements signed during this period.
In Idlib, functioning as al-Jolani’s main stronghold, the Turkish state established observation points and controlled border crossings, thereby providing de facto patronage. Through crossings such as Bab al-Hawa, economic flows and military support enabled HTS to become an integral part of Turkey’s buffer zone policy in northern Syria. This relationship has now evolved into what can be described as “interstate” agreements with al-Jolani’s administration.
One and a half months after al-Jolani assumed control, the Turkish state lifted export and import restrictions on Syria. A circular issued by the Ministry of Trade on 12 February 2025 removed export limitations to Syria via Turkey, while also allowing goods, except for metal scrap, to be traded from Syria to third countries through Turkey. Import procedures from Syria were restored to their pre-civil war status, and border gates were reactivated to increase trade with Turkey’s longest land-border neighbor.
As the al-Jolani administration gained increasing “legitimacy” on the international stage, economic cooperation between Turkey and Syria expanded significantly. The first major agreement signed by al-Jolani was a 7 billion US dollar energy tender concluded in Damascus on 29 May 2025. The project, implemented through a partnership involving the United States, Turkey, and Qatar, envisages the construction of natural gas power plants in central and eastern Syria, as well as a solar energy facility in the south. The consortium aims to generate a total of 5,000 megawatts of electricity and includes UCC Concessions from Qatar, Power International from the United States, and Kalyon Holding and Cengiz Holding from Turkey. Accordingly, natural gas combined-cycle power plants and solar energy facilities with a total installed capacity of 5,000 megawatts are planned in the regions of Treyfi, Zeyzun, Deir ez-Zor, Mhardeh, and Wadi al-Rabii.
Turkey’s substantial investments in Syria’s energy infrastructure have drawn considerable attention. According to a report by the European Union Institute for Energy Security Studies, Turkey has supported the regional electricity grid in Idlib in parallel with its backing of the al-Jolani administration since 2021. Experts suggest that through these new energy agreements, Turkey is seeking “alternative opportunities” in the Eastern Mediterranean, where it has largely been excluded from major regional energy deals. The Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum, established in 2020, brought together Egypt, Israel, Greece, Cyprus, Italy, and Jordan, effectively consolidating Turkey’s regional competitors in the energy sector.
At the end of June, an agreement was signed to resume direct land transportation between the two countries. By August, economic cooperation and investment agreements had further increased. During the Turkey–Syria Roundtable Meeting held in Ankara on 6 August, hosted by the Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges of Turkey (TOBB), consensus was reached on ten agreements aimed at achieving a 5 billion US dollar trade target.
Additionally, within the framework of the newly established Turkey–Syria Economic and Trade Joint Committee (JETCO), an institutional mechanism was introduced to evaluate all dimensions of bilateral economic and commercial relations. The Turkey–Syria Business Council, previously operating under the Foreign Economic Relations Board of Turkey (DEIK) before the war, was also reactivated to facilitate renewed economic engagement.
Damascus airport project awarded to Turkish companies
A consortium including Turkish companies Kalyon Construction, Cengiz Construction, and TAV Construction secured the tender for the modernization and construction of Damascus International Airport, signing an agreement worth 4 billion US dollars. In addition to the Turkish firms, the consortium also includes UCC from Qatar and Assets Investments from the United States. Under the terms of the agreement, the facilities at Damascus International Airport are planned to be upgraded within eight years to reach an annual capacity of 31 million passengers.
The International Construction Fair Buildex, held in Damascus between 28 May and 2 June, brought together a total of 740 domestic and international companies. Turkey was the country with the largest participation, represented by 112 construction and building firms. Over the past year under the al-Jolani administration, investment and trade agreements between Turkey and Syria have exceeded 15 billion US dollars.
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