Iraq and South Kurdistan (Başur) have become one of the most critical arenas since the outbreak of the US–Israel–Iran war, where both proxy forces and states are directly engaged in conflict. The Iranian regime, while bombing bases and camps of Kurdish parties from East Kurdistan (Rojhilat) in South Kurdistan, particularly in Erbil (Hêwler) and Sulaymaniyah (Silêmanî), is also carrying out attacks on US bases, diplomatic institutions and oil fields. In response, the US and Israel are targeting pro-Iranian Shiite groups in Iraq, foremost among them the Popular Mobilization Forces (Hashd al-Shaabi). These mutual attacks are rapidly pushing Iraq, where multiple armed forces are present and overlapping political crises persist, into an environment of insecurity and chaos.
The US–Israel side is targeting Iran’s nuclear program, missile production facilities, military bases and defense systems in an effort to neutralize Tehran on all fronts. Through this, they are known to be pursuing widely discussed plans such as the “Abraham Accords” and the “reconstruction of Gaza.” Within this framework, they are also attempting to eliminate Iran-aligned forces such as Hezbollah, the Houthis, and the Popular Mobilization Forces (Hashd al-Shaabi) along with all affiliated groups. Since the war that began on February 28, Shiite groups in Iraq, along with Hezbollah in Lebanon, have been subjected to near-daily bombardments. However, beyond their military ties with Tehran, these Shiite groups also have a historical ideological and religious connection.
Religious and ideological ties
The spread of Shiism to Kufa and Karbala in the seventh century also laid the foundations of religious ties between Iraq and Iran. The shrines of Imam Ali in Najaf and Imam Hussein in Karbala have long been pilgrimage sites for Iranians. Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini’s exile in Najaf between 1965 and 1978, where he delivered his “Velayat-e Faqih” lectures, the training of students between the Najaf and Qom seminaries, and the influence of Iraqi religious leader Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani further deepened this network of belief.
Political ties between the two countries also remained strong until the 1979 Iranian Revolution. However, relations began to unravel due to border disputes and ideological rivalry, eventually leading to a major war between 1980 and 1988. Although the war, in which both sides suffered heavy losses, ended after eight years, relations remained tense and marked by mistrust. For example, Iran did not support Iraq during the 1991 Gulf War, while Saddam Hussein’s regime viewed Iran as an “existential threat.”
Following the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, Tehran’s political and religious influence over Baghdad increased again, as Iran-backed groups such as the Islamic Dawa Party and the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq came to power. This influence is clearly visible in the ongoing conflict. Iran-backed Iraqi Shiite armed groups, operating under the umbrella of the “Islamic Resistance in Iraq,” are targeting US military and diplomatic centers.
Which Iran-aligned armed groups in Iraq, often referred to in recent years as part of the “Axis of Resistance,” are maintaining their roles in the region, how do they seek to strengthen their position in Iraqi politics, and what role do they play in shaping the country’s political and social structure?
Formed against ISIS, became the largest force
The most widely known armed group in Iraq is the Popular Mobilization Forces. Hashd al-Shaabi was formed in 2014 after ISIS captured Mosul, bringing together various armed groups. Shortly after its establishment, Shiite religious leader Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani issued a fatwa calling on all those able to bear arms in Iraq to defend their land and holy sites and urged the unification of all armed forces. Following this call, nearly 67 different armed groups, the majority of them Shiite, came together under the umbrella of Hashd al-Shaabi.
Some of the prominent groups include the Badr Organization, Asaib Ahl al-Haq, Saraya al-Salam, Kataib Hezbollah, Kataib Sayyid al-Shuhada, Kataib al-Imam Ali, the Abu al-Fadl al-Abbas Forces, and the Harakat al-Nujaba.
After ISIS was defeated in Iraq in 2018, the Baghdad government officially recognized Hashd al-Shaabi and integrated it into the Iraqi armed forces. Former Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi set salaries for its members through the central budget and outlined a roadmap for incorporating the units into the regular army. However, some factions within the organization are still able to act independently of the government. With an estimated force of between 150,000 and 200,000 fighters, Hashd al-Shaabi has been in tension with the United States since 2019. Within Hashd al-Shaabi, Shiite groups are known to be divided into three different currents: one aligned with Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, another with Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, and a third supporting Muqtada al-Sadr, the leader of the Sadrist Movement.
Iran’s “most loyal” ally
Kataib Hezbollah, widely regarded as Iran’s “most loyal and strongest ally,” was established in 2003 following the US invasion of Iraq. Also known as the “Hezbollah Brigades” or the “Iraqi Hezbollah Brigades,” the group has come to prominence particularly through its attacks on US forces in the region since the outbreak of the Israel–Hamas war.
Designated as a “terrorist organization” by the United States in 2009, Kataib Hezbollah was led until 2020 by Qassem Soleimani, commander of Iran’s Quds Force, and Iraqi national Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis. Viewing US troops in Iraq as “foreign occupiers,” the group calls for the withdrawal of foreign forces from the country. It also fought against Sunni groups following the outbreak of the Syrian civil war in 2011 and remains active in Syria today.
Kataib Hezbollah has several battalions within the Popular Mobilization Forces, and some of its members hold senior positions. The group is reported to be particularly active in Baghdad and Anbar, with an estimated force of around 10,000 fighters.
The 12th Brigade of Hashd al-Shaabi
Harakat al-Nujaba was founded in 2013 by Akram al-Kaabi. Kaabi had previously been part of Muqtada al-Sadr’s Mahdi Army and was among the founders of Asaib Ahl al-Haq. However, due to internal disagreements within Asaib Ahl al-Haq, Harakat al-Nujaba emerged as a separate faction. The group maintains close ties with Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Quds Force and is estimated to have between 3,000 and 5,000 members. Active in areas such as Baghdad, Anbar, Nineveh and Salahaddin, it holds official status as the 12th Brigade of the Popular Mobilization Forces (Hashd al-Shaabi). It was designated as a “foreign terrorist organization” by the United States in September 2025.
Protector of Shiite holy sites in Syria
Kataib Sayyid al-Shuhada (Master of the Martyrs Brigades) was founded in 2013 by Abu Mustafa al-Sheibani, who is also among the founders of Kataib Hezbollah. The group primarily operates under the policy of “protecting Shiite holy sites” in Syria. Led by Secretary-General Abu Ala al-Walai, it was designated by the United States as a “Specially Designated Global Terrorist” entity in 2023 and later as a “foreign terrorist organization” in 2025.
Holding official status as the 14th Brigade within the Popular Mobilization Forces, the group is estimated to have around 10,000 members. It is active in Baghdad, Basra, Nineveh, Salahaddin and in border regions between Syria and Iraq, particularly along the Abu Kamal corridor.
From political formation to armed organization
Harakat Ansarullah al-Awfiya was first established in 2013 in Maysan province as a political formation under the name “Kayan al-Sadiq wa al-Ataa” (The Entity of Honesty and Giving). However, with the formation of the Popular Mobilization Forces (Hashd al-Shaabi) in 2014, it began operating as the 19th Brigade. It was designated by the United States as a “Specially Designated Global Terrorist” entity in 2024 and as a “foreign terrorist organization” in 2025. The group is active in Maysan, Baghdad, Anbar and in border regions between Syria and Iraq.
A group shaping national politics
Saraya al-Salam (Peace Brigades) is considered the armed wing of the Sadrist Movement led by Muqtada al-Sadr. Established in 2014 to fight ISIS, Saraya al-Salam remained partially affiliated with the Popular Mobilization Forces but began operating as a separate structure after 2021. The group is estimated to have between 10,000 and 15,000 members, and its centers in Basra and Wasit were closed by al-Sadr in 2025. It remains active in Shiite-majority areas such as Baghdad, Basra, Wasit, Maysan, Najaf and Samarra.
South Kurdistan, the most fragile region
South Kurdistan, the area most affected by the war, is facing a more complex and fragile situation. While the Iranian regime targets parties from Eastern Kurdistan (Rojhilat), the United States is striking Iran-aligned groups. This dynamic is putting political, economic and security balances at risk in South Kurdistan, governed by the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK). Iran is also among the main countries with which the Kurdistan Region maintains trade relations.
Iran exports food, agricultural products, textiles and automotive goods to the region and has significant investments in infrastructure and service projects, with more than 10,000 Iranian workers reported to be employed there. There are also regular flights between Erbil and Tehran, and agreements such as the Penjwen (Pêncwên) free trade zone are in place. The deepening of the war, therefore, not only directly threatens the lives of Kurds but is also likely to lead to long-term economic and political tensions.
Shengal’s gains at risk
The war and chaos in the Middle East are turning Kurdish attention not only to Southern Kurdistan and Eastern Kurdistan, but also to Shengal. Located near Mosul and connecting Iraq, Southern Kurdistan and Syria, Shengal holds a strategic position and remains at the center of regional powers’ focus. The Turkish state seeks to occupy Shengal to encircle Rojava and control the Mosul–Kirkuk line, while Iran aims to incorporate it into what is described as a “Shiite corridor.” As the war expands, the situation in Shengal is becoming increasingly risky. However, danger is not limited to this.
Before the war, control over camps and prisons in Syria holding ISIS members and their families was transferred from the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), with US approval, to Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham. Following this, around 7,000 ISIS members from these camps and prisons were moved to Iraq and placed in critical provinces such as Nineveh, Mosul and Anbar.
In short, both the continued presence of ISIS, which carried out the 2014 genocide against the Yazidis, and the current war are exposing the Yazidi community, rebuilding itself from self-governance to self-defense, to renewed threats. Rather than recognizing the will of the Yazidis and forces such as the Shengal Resistance Units (SRU), the Women’s Units (WU) and the Êzîdxan Forces, the Baghdad government is instead pursuing a policy of encirclement. At the beginning of this year, it deployed large military forces along the Shengal border, establishing numerous checkpoints on main roads, inter-village routes and border crossings. Checkpoints have increased in areas such as Khanasor, Sinune and Qahtaniyah. Raids have been carried out on many villages, collecting individual weapons from Yazidis and leaving them vulnerable to potential attacks.
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