The Kurdish geography that gained de facto autonomy during the Syrian civil war created a strong sense of self-confidence among the Kurdish people. At a time when the Baath regime was severely worn down and weakened, the Kurds achieved significant gains, yet they did not seek to completely eliminate the regime’s presence. For this reason, large parts of the cities of Hasakah (Heseke) and Qamishlo remained under the control of regime forces. Seeking a negotiated arrangement with the regime was considered a policy in line with the political conjuncture of the period.
Taking into account the presence of Russia and Iran, and later Turkey and the United States in the region, it became necessary to pursue a balanced approach that factored in all these actors. The spread of ISIS across Syrian territory pushed the Syrian civil war into new dimensions. Syria’s growing openness to external intervention and the emergence of multi-actor power balances opened up new political and military spheres of activity for Rojava, and even diplomatic arenas that were previously unprecedented.
The Kurds’ participation in the international coalition force formed for the purpose of a joint military struggle against ISIS also led to the acquisition of considerable capacities and to growing international recognition.
Following ISIS’s defeat in Rojava, its expulsion from key Arab areas such as Tabqa (Tebqa), Raqqa (Reqa) and Deir ez-Zor (Dêrazor) resulted in significant territorial gains. With the establishment of control across the geography of northeastern Syria, commonly referred to as east of the Euphrates, the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) were formed.
Gaining control over areas rich in oil reserves and water resources, as well as the most fertile agricultural lands, also meant acquiring substantial power. All these developments can be counted among the Kurds’ major achievements. The ideological field and paradigm represented by the Kurds, offering what is seen as the most appropriate solution formula for the Syrian reality, prioritizing a democratic administrative system and bearing a more secular character, helped them gain significant support in world public opinion.
The collapse of the Baath regime and the rise of HTS to power
In line with the search for an alternative to end the disintegrated and decayed existence of the Baath regime, which had been worn down by the civil war and sustained only with the backing of Russia and Iran, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) was installed in power in Damascus with the approval of global and regional powers. This, in turn, altered the calculations of the forces that carried HTS to power in Syria. On this basis, policies prioritizing the establishment of a central government in Syria, the preservation of territorial integrity, and the maintenance of the state’s unitary structure came to the fore. In line with these aims, the reconstruction of Syria and the reintegration of non-state structures into the state became a priority objective.
Within this new conjuncture, the de facto autonomous structure of Rojava, which had partially emerged through the struggle against ISIS, and federalist and decentralist solution formulas became subjects of debate. Due to the HTS administration’s closed stance toward these solutions, and the explicit opposition of Turkey and certain Arab countries in the region, approaches endorsing the removal of Rojava’s de facto status gained ground.
The alignment of the United States, Israel and the NATO with regional powers in line with their own interests produced the current outcome unfolding in Rojava. There are significant reasons why HTS was favored over Rojava, whose worldview stands in sharp contrast to that of HTS. Without recognizing these reasons, it is difficult to make sense of what is unfolding in Rojava.
Rojava was turned into a central knot of the peace process in Turkey and framed as a red line and an issue of survival for the Turkish state. The interests of regional and global powers that pushed Rojava to fall under HTS control were of a different nature. External actors that were willing to sacrifice Rojava, if necessary, to strengthen HTS brought HTS to power in Syria in line with their regional interests. In this assignment, policies developed and to be developed against Iran also played an important role.
Although the Kurds’ autonomous governance model is more contemporary and aligned with international norms, this carried little weight for global and regional interest-driven powers. For them, it is not the will of peoples but their own interests that matter. Accordingly, they are less concerned with who or which force establishes a democratic system in Syria than with who will safeguard their interests. The political equations these dominant circles construct in the region are thus oriented toward their own benefits.
For the components of Syrian society (Alawites, Druze, Christian communities, particularly Assyrians and Syriacs, and Kurds) what is prioritized in these calculations is not their distinct administrative, educational-cultural and social rights, security mechanisms or representation stemming from their identities, but rather the benefits that can be secured through relations with HTS. For this reason, HTS was developed as a project and deployed in the field as an instrument to be used as desired.
While HTS needs to be instrumentalized to gain legitimacy, come to power and accumulate strength, external powers believe that by supporting HTS they will secure their long-term regional interests. Each actor constructs its policy around this web of interest. For this reason, even though HTS and the Western world and certain regional states may appear to be at odds under the current conjuncture, they feel compelled to work together in many areas, foremost economic interests, due to mutual dependencies.
In the new political equation sought to be established in the Middle East, the sidelining of Rojava’s autonomous existence paved the way for it to be exposed to HTS attacks. Although the calculations of the external powers backing the attacks by Damascus and Turkey against Rojava differ, there has been a convergence around Rojava’s loss of territory, positions and power. Many additional external factors could be listed in Rojava’s exposure to attacks.
Turkey’s role in this has been decisive. When potential developments and war scenarios in Iran and Iraq are considered, the insistence on turning Rojava into a buffer against possible developments in favor of the Kurds becomes more understandable considering the current situation. The reason for unleashing HTS and affiliated mercenary groups against Rojava lies in Ankara’s primary foreign policy objective of linking potential developments in Iran with the peace process in Turkey and turning Rojava into a nodal point in this equation.
Rojava’s regional position, advantages and disadvantages
Rojava has, since its emergence, become an arena marked by fluctuations within regional power balances. It has been repeatedly drawn into external interventions, regional policies and inter-power interest conflicts. Turkey’s attacks, justified under the pretext of “security concerns,” and its incursions into Syrian territory to establish zones of occupation have posed a serious threat to Rojava. Although cooperation with coalition forces was built around the role of the SDF as an operational force against ISIS, this cooperation did not extend to the defense of Rojava, creating a serious vulnerability. This, in turn, made Turkey’s attacks easier.
Despite the relationships Russia and the United States have established with Rojava, their reluctance to provide a protective umbrella and their prioritization of their own interests further emboldened Turkey to carry out attacks. Rojava’s specific weight, in effect, placed a burden heavier than the capacity required to carry out the role it had assumed.
On the other hand, Rojava’s inability to extricate itself from a series of disadvantageous situations created by the expansion of its military reach across a vast geography with a predominantly Arab population within the framework of the fight against ISIS weakened its self-defense mechanisms. The visions of the powers involved in the Syrian war for Syria’s future and the expectations of the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria diverged and came into open conflict following HTS’s rise to power. The shift in United States policy on Syria also altered its posture in the fight against ISIS, and the mission previously carried out by the SDF was transferred to HTS.
The failure of the region’s autonomous status to gain formal international recognition, the lack of results from diplomatic efforts, and the absence of the necessary external support in the face of attacks left the Autonomous Administration isolated.
The inability of talks between Damascus and Rojava to overcome a series of obstacles, and the failure of mediation efforts to yield the desired outcomes, made the option of war appear inevitable. The primary objective of HTS and its backers has been to erode Rojava’s gains and eliminate its status. An approach aimed at breaking Rojava’s resistance through military attacks and forcing it into a compelled settlement became dominant. All these factors, accompanied by an intense psychological warfare campaign, have constituted serious disadvantages for Rojava.
Despite all this, it is important not to overlook Rojava’s advantageous position. Whether the Rojava administration has adequately utilized these advantages is a separate subject of debate, and there are aspects that merit criticism. These are matters that require a reckoning in due course. Even so, a tremendous level of mass support has emerged. Significant public opinion has been formed worldwide. Among Kurds, a powerful spirit of solidarity, unity and mobilization against genocide has taken shape. On this basis, Rojava has preserved its institutional existence. Although reduced compared to earlier periods, it has maintained a degree of military capacity and secured representation in administrative and security matters.
Despite everything, the geography referred to as Rojava stands today with its people, institutions and the values it has created. Considering the gains in language, culture and identity, it is possible to say that it has preserved its achievements under current conditions. Most importantly, the geography of Rojava has continued to exist as a space in which democracy can take root, and Kurds have asserted themselves as subjects of democracy. Serving as a democratic alternative to the current HTS rule and ensuring women’s participation in the system constitute one of the greatest gains for the peoples of Syria.
Gains and losses in the agreement reached
It is crucial in every respect to draw the right lessons from the outcome that emerged at this historical juncture. Identifying the shortcomings and mistakes stemming from past political, military, organizational, administrative, educational and diplomatic efforts, and sharing them with the public is both important and necessary. This is also essential in terms of accountability toward the constituencies represented. The inadequacy of relations with the HTS administration, external interventions, and the failure to eliminate the ground for conflict led to attacks that resulted in the loss of some of the gains that had been achieved. Losses that were not deserved were incurred.
The greatest loss in the clashes was the loss of life. The material and moral losses suffered by the civilian population affected by the war, as well as the evacuation of residential areas and the deterioration of living conditions, also stand among these losses.
The economic and geographic losses and certain resources cited as losses beyond the loss of life are matters that could normally be resolved through dialogue and compromise. While the transfer of existing economic resources may be perceived as a loss, it should not be forgotten that these resources belong to the people of Syria as a whole. The transfer of control over oil and gas fields and energy resources to the central government had already been accepted in some earlier talks and negotiations. Likewise, the integration of issues such as Rojava’s economic resources, border security, customs gates, and state institutions through negotiation is, in principle, a natural course of action.
Assessments driven by the psychological impact of losing existing means and capacities in the conditions that emerged after the clashes do not provide a sound basis for drawing conclusions. Although the agreement text does not fully meet the desired level and consensus was not reached on fundamental issues such as education in the mother tongue, when the overall framework is considered, agreement was reached on the necessary elements to move out of a climate of conflict.
It is also significant that consensus was achieved on core issues, including representation within state bodies and the administrative system, as well as the regulation of military presence, internal security and self-defense on a defined basis and their integration into the central system. Progress on matters that still require advancement will be possible through dialogue in the period ahead.
Despite the steps taken within the current ceasefire process and integration efforts, it is too early to say that risk areas have been fully eliminated. Nevertheless, the compromise reached in Rojava can be said to carry value in terms of playing a role that may help open the way for a peace process in Turkey. More broadly, it can also be noted that an important threshold has been crossed in terms of the Kurdish people’s gains. Reading Rojava’s gains not solely within the confines of Rojava, but within a broader regional context, may offer a more realistic perspective.
Rojava’s future and the tasks ahead
The conflictual environment experienced with gangs affiliated with HTS is not limited to HTS alone; it also constitutes a defensive resistance against the Turkish state and the forces that have reached a consensus with it. Reaching an agreement before the situation escalated to an irreversible point is a positive development. The period ahead opens important opportunities for Rojava to return to its own foundations and to rebuild its social organization. Preserving and developing its existence within a renewed administrative system stands among the most fundamental tasks. Reorganizing the social sphere and actively mobilizing public participation in reconstruction and defense efforts should also be treated as a primary priority.
The problems facing Rojava and Syria have not been ended. The agreement reached with HTS should not be seen as a final resolution. Uncertainties regarding the future continue to weigh heavily. It is worth underlining that the current situation is temporary and represents a period-specific outcome shaped by the present conjuncture.
The Middle East has not yet settled into a stable order. The projected changes in the region and the new design sought to be imposed have not yet fully taken shape. The areas of crisis have not been resolved or concluded. It would be more realistic to say that the process is still at an early stage.
Developments in Rojava, in this sense, amount to little more than a clearing of the ground for larger arenas of conflict. Iran and Turkey are shaping their security strategies with the awareness that their turn may come next. Accordingly, the issues of Iraq, Syria–Rojava, Lebanon and Palestine are being structured in line with these security strategies.
The struggle over the control and sharing of economic resources and energy routes in the Middle East, including borders, has only just begun. In a context marked by the prospect of confrontation among global powers, it appears unlikely that lasting agreements can be reached. As the regional conjuncture shifts, political balances will also change, affecting many actors in both positive and negative ways. The interim government in Syria likewise retains a provisional character; it should not be forgotten that once the perceived need for it ends the mandate assigned to it may also come to an end.
Possible Iran-centered developments in the period ahead will have a closer impact on the countries of the region, and particularly on the position of the Kurds. This makes it necessary to be prepared in every respect for the region’s emerging conjuncture.
The mass mobilization that has formed around the defense of Rojava has created opportunities to carry this momentum into the sphere of national unity. Looking ahead, the possibilities for success are as considerable as the losses endured. Drawing sound lessons from lived experiences is indispensable for reading the process correctly.
The first step toward setting Rojava back on its feet must be to confront illusions, shortcomings, and mistakes with courage. The reconstruction of a democratic system stands before everyone as a major collective task. Damaged bonds with the masses must be repaired through concrete steps grounded in a self-critical approach.
When possible regional developments are considered, being prepared for all scenarios, strengthening the internal front, and consolidating national unity constitute core tasks facing the Kurds. For this reason, strengthening the spirit of unity in Rojava, organizing socially, and preparing for developments are inevitable and cannot be postponed.