The wave of attacks stretching from Aleppo to Rojava has revealed a reality that no longer allows for debate from a Kurdish perspective. What is unfolding is neither a tactical military move nor a temporary escalation. What is taking shape is a multi-actor, deliberate and long-term attempt at liquidation aimed at excluding Kurds from the new regional order. The system constructed around international law, alliances, democracy and the rhetoric of human rights has, once again when it comes to Kurds, either fallen into silence or turned that silence into de facto complicity through political maneuvering and intrigue.
In the face of this reality, what has proven decisive for Kurds has not been the maneuvers of political structures, but the direct position taken by the people themselves. From the very outset of the process, the Republic of Turkey has sought, in a conscious and organized manner, to fragment Kurds, divide them and set them against one another. Conceptual confusion was deliberately produced, and ideological and theoretical debates were actively inflamed. This time, however, the plan failed. The people seized the opportunity to shape politics as it emerged, intervened directly, and became active agents on the ground. The reflex that has emerged is supra-party, supra-ideological, and clearly Kurdish in character. It is not a program imposed from above, but a collective will to exist formed at the threshold of life and death.
It is precisely at this point that the strong reaction provoked by debates conducted under the banner of the “brotherhood of peoples” must be correctly understood. There is no denial here of coexistence or equality among peoples. The reaction is directed at the use of this discourse, stripped of its context, as a tool of suppression and diversion at a moment when Kurdish existence itself is under direct threat. Society is articulating a clear hierarchy of priorities: this is not a time for debate, but a time to take a position and assume responsibility. First comes survival, first unity, first defense. Equality and brotherhood can only acquire meaning on this foundation.
A conscious and necessary return to historical memory is required. During the founding period of the Kurdistan Freedom Movement, two founding figures who defined the movement’s character through labor, sacrifice and internationalism, Haki Karer and Kemal Pir, came to embody meaning not through their ethnic origins, despite being of Turkish descent, but through the political cause for which they gave their lives. That cause was a national liberation perspective grounded in the Kurdish people’s right to self-determination.
For this reason, the idea of the brotherhood of peoples took shape along this historical line not as an abstract supra-identity that suspends Kurdish existence, but as a concrete political stance based on the Kurdish people’s right to self-determination. The social reflex emerging today is not a nostalgic invocation of that line; it is its continuation under present conditions, rendered clearer, more determined and more forceful by escalating threats and a narrowing space for maneuver.
The practice of Rojava transformed this debate from an abstraction into a concrete experience paid for at great cost. In Rojava, Kurds sought to build a democratic model of life not only for themselves but for all peoples in the region, and they largely bore that cost alone. With the Aleppo process, however, it became evident that Arab tribal forces embodied within the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) shifted, at the first moment of serious pressure, onto a line that facilitated the liquidation of Kurds. The sharpness and reactive stance now visible within society stems precisely from these lived experiences.
The reality that the attack line stretching from Aleppo to Rojava is driven by the strategic mindset of the Turkish state can no longer be concealed; it has, in fact, become a reality openly claimed. The contradiction between the annihilation practices carried out in Rojava and the peace of discourse constructed in the north constitutes a clear policy of denial from the perspective of the Kurdish people.
In this context, the statements made by Murat Karayılan in an interview with Sterk TV carry particular significance. Karayılan said, “President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Devlet Bahçeli should know this. There can be no peace with Kurds over the corpse of Rojava. You cannot carry out genocide in Rojava, make destruction your guiding principle, and then expect Kurds in general to make peace with the Turkish state and develop brotherhood. This is not possible.” His statement that “the stance of the people is our instruction” does not merely describe an attitude already visible on the ground; it points to the decisive reality itself: once again, the people have moved ahead of politics, determined the direction, and drawn the boundaries.
As this text was being written, a ceasefire agreement was signed between the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria and the Syrian state. This ceasefire, however, does not indicate the end of the process; rather, it shows that the form of the conflict has changed. From a Kurdish perspective, it must not be forgotten that ceasefires have historically often functioned not as guarantees of lasting security, but as instruments to buy time for new pressure and liquidation efforts.
It may not be possible to know what is being discussed behind closed doors or which negotiations are underway. At this stage, however, a decline in mobilization represents the most dangerous scenario. The primary trap for Kurds lies in dispersing this historical momentum with their own hands through a sense of “temporary relief.” Any agreement approved or supported by the Turkish state, regardless of its content, must be approached with skepticism considering historical experience. Such arrangements have most often aimed not at producing solutions, but at gaining time and reorganizing the terrain.
Today, the primary risk lies in the possibility of never being able to capture this momentum again. Yet the current period offers Kurds a strategic window of opportunity that goes beyond war and narrow realpolitik calculations. This window must not be allowed to close until a genuine and binding constitutional framework is established. At the same time, it must be taken into account that the issue of Iran is becoming increasingly central within the regional equation, and Kurdish politics must not be caught unprepared for this possibility.
The sharp uprising (serhildan) stance displayed by the Kurdish people during this process is not merely an outburst of anger. This posture is decisive for the protection of Kurdistan’s status and for activating the real balance of power on the ground. The Kurdish question has ceased to be an issue quietly managed within narrow geopolitical bargaining spaces; through diaspora actions, social mobilization and growing visibility, it has been carried into an arena that generates greater pressure within international public opinion and has disrupted balances constructed against it.
One vital reality, however, must be stated more clearly. This process cannot be sustained solely through resistance, nor through uprisings alone. Resistance is necessary, but it is not sufficient on its own. Global political balances are not shaped by discourse, claims of righteousness or moral appeals, but by interests, security calculations, and cost assessments.
One striking example that clearly illustrates this reality is examined in the article titled “How is a genocide denied?”, written by Razmig Keucheyan for the February 2026 issue of Le Monde diplomatique. The analysis links Israel’s continued failure to officially recognize the Armenian genocide not to historical ignorance, but to regional security concerns and calculations of interest.
That a state founded by a people who survived genocide refrains from officially recognizing the genocide of another people constitutes an instructive contradiction, demonstrating that in international politics it is not moral truths but strategic alliances and balances of power that ultimately prove decisive.
This example demonstrates that being right on its own is not sufficient; righteousness produces political results only to the extent that it imposes costs on the opposing side, strains existing balances, and renders the status quo unsustainable. Otherwise, denial, silence, and postponement continue to function as techniques of governance.
For this reason, the period ahead represents, for Kurds, not only a time to rise, but a time to politically, socially and strategically sustain a society that has already risen. The geography of the Middle East and Mesopotamia is likely to witness greater chaos, deeper fragmentation, and more intense power struggles in the coming years. Within such a landscape, Kurdish endurance depends on situating a century-long struggle within a clear historical trajectory. This can only be achieved through strategic reasoning, strategic convergence, and strategic stance.
What has unfolded together with Aleppo does not indicate the closure of an era, but rather that the real struggle has now begun in a new form. The coming phase will be waged not only through resistance on the ground, but across diplomatic arenas, within international public opinion, and along lines of political pressure shaped through the diaspora.
The current picture makes clear that Kurds can no longer suffice with resistance alone; they must also develop a political reflex capable of thinking quickly, organizing rapidly and responding decisively. Diplomacy has ceased to be a slow-moving, long-term field and has instead become a sphere of struggle that produces immediate responses, visibility, and tangible costs. In this context, the diaspora is no longer a secondary supplementary source of support but has become the very frontline of the struggle.
What proves decisive in this new period is not repeatedly explaining the legitimacy of the cause, but transforming that legitimacy into organized, sustained and outcome-producing political pressure. If a line cannot be established in which reflexes are timely, coherent, and not exhausted by internal disputes, then achievements cannot be made lasting.
The central question today, therefore, is this: will Kurds confront this new period with old habits, or will they build a new speed and a new political rationality, diplomatic, social and organizational, at this threshold where the direction of the struggle has shifted? The historical momentum entered after Aleppo is precisely the name of the answer that will be given to this question.
For this reason, the issue is no longer only what has happened, but how and how quickly action will be taken from this point forward. New wars are already on the horizon, and this time there is no luxury of being caught unprepared.