South America has entered a period in which liberal democracy is becoming more visible, with geopolitical tensions escalating between Venezuela and the US on the one hand, and election processes extending into 2025 on the other. The rise of right-wing populist governments from Argentina to Chile and from Ecuador to Bolivia is often explained solely by economic crises, but it is also the result of the left’s failure to institutionalize democracy in its practice of governing and to produce a social alternative. Progressive experiences that treat power as an area to be managed rather than a transformative tool facilitate the return of the right wing as they fail to produce lasting solutions. This crisis is not unique to the continent; it points to a broader problem that undermines the left’s capacity to be a viable option on a global scale. This crisis deepened in recent days when Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro and his wife were abducted from their home by the US in a show of force, using mafia-like methods. This incident, in which international law was disregarded, and the United Nations merely stood by and watched, shows the state of democracy today.
Devriş Çimen from Yeni Özgür Politika spoke with sociologist and journalist Pedro Perucca, one of the editors of Jacobin Latin America, about current political trends in South America and the predicament facing democracy.
Due to the wars in Ukraine and the Middle East, developments in South America have fallen into the background in the media. What has happened there in recent years, or what is currently happening?
After the so-called Latin American Pink Tide (roughly between 1998 and 2012), a conservative counteroffensive took place, through which various right-wing forces returned to power in key countries such as Argentina (in 2015), Brazil (in 2016), and Chile (in 2017). But, as happened with different projects of the new right around the world, including Donald Trump’s first presidency, these governments later failed to secure reelection. This opened the period we are currently in, marked by an alternation between progressive and conservative governments, with neither side able to fully consolidate itself.
The underlying problem with the “second Pink Tide,” inaugurated in 2018 with the victory of Andrés Manuel López Obrador in Mexico (a country that had not been part of the previous progressive wave), is that in some cases these administrations were even less radical than their predecessors, aiming merely to manage the existing order more efficiently, without attempting any structural transformation of power relations. Thus, with the exception of Mexico, which did pursue redistributive policies that significantly raised average wages and lifted millions out of poverty, these progressive governments largely served as an interregnum before a stronger return of the right. The paradigmatic case is Argentina under Alberto Fernández and Cristina Fernández de Kirchner from 2019 onward: a deeply flawed administration, marked by an acute political crisis and runaway inflation, laid the groundwork for the victory of Javier Milei. This is the tragedy of governments that Nancy Fraser defines as “neoliberal progressivisms,” characterized by progressive cultural agendas of multiculturalism, inclusion, diversity, and feminism, combined with economic policies that deepen inequality, precariousness, and social discontent, ultimately feeding the right and blocking paths toward genuinely transformative left-wing projects.
Today, a large part of the continent remains trapped in this alternation, but in an increasingly difficult and rightward-shifting scenario shaped by the growing interference of the United States under the second Trump administration. As part of its hegemonic crisis, and within the context of an ever more acute geopolitical rivalry with China, the United States appears to be gradually abandoning its pretensions as the world’s police force in order to refocus on what the Monroe Doctrine defined as its “backyard,” while also seeking to block the consolidation of the Asian giant’s influence, which in recent years had begun to establish a significant presence. This is bad news for Latin America, as can be clearly seen in the escalation of attacks against Venezuela and in the growing US interference throughout the region.
What does President Milei, who defines himself as an “anarcho-capitalist,” seek to achieve after his neoliberal policies and strict austerity measures have caused economic and political instability in Argentina? Do current developments reflect the chronic political situation that already existed before Argentina’s economic collapse in 2001?
What Javier Milei’s presidency is attempting to do is to bring an end to what some analysts describe as a long-standing “hegemonic stalemate,” in which the Argentine working class, while unable to impose an alternative political-economic project, managed for decades to retain a capacity to block a thorough neoliberal transformation of production relations. The aim now is to impose a strategic defeat in order to relaunch a phase of capitalist accumulation that remains blocked today. This would, of course, come at the cost of losing historic conquests and rights for workers, the destruction of a significant national middle class, and the complete degradation of a welfare state that, in Argentina, still retains a strong presence, guaranteeing free healthcare and education, among many other benefits.
Trade union organizations are also under attack. Despite their steady decline since their historical peak during the so-called “first Peronism,” they continue to play an important role. At present, the spearhead of this offensive is the proposed “labor modernization” bill, an utterly regressive and anti-worker reform.
Despite its crises, Milei’s “libertarian” experiment achieved things that other right-wing projects had not. In order to carry out an unprecedented austerity drive during his two years in office, involving historic losses in wages and rights, he fully exploited the advantages of a novel digital ecosystem—bots, streamers, social networks, and memes—to amplify everyday hatred and consolidate a new pedagogy of individualism and cruelty. In this way, he managed to push his reactionary discourse into popular sectors, especially among young people (particularly young men, with a strong emphasis on a clearly antifeminist ideology), confirming that this is a right-wing force that is here to stay.
Despite the undeniable economic and political crisis facing the country, with record levels of industrial closures, unemployment, and poverty, as well as corruption scandals and official ties to drug trafficking, the government managed to win the midterm elections on October 26. This was due in part to the absence of an organized opposition and to fears that an official defeat would trigger a deeper economic crisis, but above all to direct US government intervention in the elections, through an unprecedented economic bailout to support Milei. Milei’s alignment with Trump, and with the genocidal Netanyahu, is total.
However, this electoral victory does not dispel the prospects of growing political and economic conflict in the short term. While the current moment is not comparable to the situation that led to the popular uprising of 2001, given that social organizations are far weaker and there is a deeper subjective crisis among citizens, Argentina has a long history of politicization, organization, and street-level resistance to reactionary plans, a tradition in which I continue to place my confidence.
The policies pursued by Hugo Chávez since 1999 and continued by Nicolás Maduro since 2013 did not lead Venezuela toward a fully consolidated democracy. The political and economic crisis persists. Juan Guaidó, a previously little-known opposition politician, proclaimed himself “interim president” in 2019. Recently, opposition leader María Corina Machado was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. What do Guaidó and Machado oppose? What is the current state of democracy in Venezuela?
Venezuela is a very complex case and difficult to summarize, because polarized positions often prevail in its analysis, hindering understanding. On the one hand, a sector of the left continues to defend it uncritically, drawing few distinctions between the Chávez and Maduro administrations and blaming all of the country’s problems on the political, economic, and military offensive of the United States. In recent months this offensive has intensified, including not only attacks by paramilitary forces but also the intervention of US armed forces, which sank several small Venezuelan boats, claiming they were trafficking drugs without providing any evidence, and, just days ago, even the seizure of an Iranian oil tanker off Venezuela’s coast.
On the other hand, right-wing forces and their allied media around the world denounce Venezuela as a criminal “dictatorship,” applying an outrageous double standard when compared to other allied oil-producing countries, whose brutal human rights violations are tolerated without protest.
Of course, Venezuela is neither one thing nor the other. Since Hugo Chávez took office in 1998, immediately branded a “dictator” by his enemies, the so-called Bolivarian Revolution won dozens of elections whose democratic character was beyond question, certified by organizations such as the Carter Center. However, it is also true that after Chávez’s questionable death, continuity under Nicolás Maduro involved a series of setbacks, particularly a loss of popular protagonism, especially regarding the role of the “communes,” which Chávez had defined as the “living heart” of the revolution. There was also a growth in bureaucratic structures and power, especially within the armed forces and the “Bolibourgeoisie,” enriched by the massive profits derived from oil management at PDVSA, as well as increasing doubts about the transparency of recent electoral processes.
US denunciations of a “dictatorship” are, of course, driven by its desire to gain control over Venezuela’s strategic oil resources. This explains its support for figures as mediocre and disreputable as Juan Guaidó and María Corina Machado, both US puppets with no real historical relevance, alongside a brutal economic offensive against the country. But today, while the entire left must unquestionably defend Venezuela against the escalating attacks of imperialism, it is also true that Venezuela is not an example that revolutionary movements can uncritically and proudly uphold.
Colombia, one of the most important countries on the continent, seeks to consolidate democracy and peace. Although efforts have been made to end conflicts through peace processes, instability continues to prevail. What measures are being taken to institutionalize and socialize democracy and peace?
The Colombian case is unique in Latin America because efforts to consolidate democracy and peace are unfolding in a country marked by decades of armed conflict, profound social inequality, and an institutional framework historically captured by conservative elites. In this context, the arrival of Gustavo Petro to power in 2022 represents the first left-wing presidency in the country’s history, or at least the first in nearly 80 years of successive right-wing governments. This marked a political and symbolic turning point, but many of the difficulties facing the administration stem precisely from this unprecedented novelty, as it seeks to transform conservative, racist, and classist logics entrenched over decades, often with the support of the United States, which for years used the hypocritical discourse of the “war on drugs” to subordinate Colombia to its regional objectives.
One of the central pillars of Petro’s government has been the so-called “total peace,” which aims to resume and expand the agreements signed with the FARC in 2016, advance negotiations with other armed actors, and at the same time address the structural causes of the conflict. In this regard, policies have been promoted around agrarian reform, land restitution, the strengthening of peasant economies, and the recognition of Indigenous and Afro-descendant peoples, understood not as subordinate actors but as central subjects of democratization. This has been accompanied by an agenda to expand social participation and create new democratic institutions, with greater state presence in historically abandoned territories and an explicit rhetorical break with the militaristic approach that dominated for decades. For the first time, clearly anti-imperialist statements have also been heard, along with explicit support for the Palestinian struggle and many other topics previously absent from Colombian official discourse.
However, these advances coexist with significant difficulties in consolidation. The government faces strong resistance from business, media, and political sectors that retain control over key institutional levers, as well as constraints stemming from a fragmented political system and a parliament unwilling to support the executive’s proposed structural reforms. Added to this is the persistence of violence in certain regions, where armed groups, illegal economies, and local actors continue to contest territorial control, demonstrating that peace cannot be reduced to formal agreements but requires deep social transformations and long-term planning.
In this context, the institutionalization and socialization of democracy and peace in Colombia remain open and contested processes. Undoubtedly, Petro’s government has made the most serious attempt to address these issues at their roots, placing on the agenda a redefinition of the relationship between state, territory, and society. Its success and continuity will depend on the ability to translate this political orientation into sustained policies, to broaden social consensus, and to resist attempts at blockage and delegitimization. More than a point of arrival, the current experience shows that democracy in Colombia remains a field of struggle, in which peace is fought for both within institutions and in the everyday lives of the social majority.
To be continued…
Note: The interview was conducted before the abduction of Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro by the US.