Global attention has increasingly turned toward Iran due to the conflict involving the United States, Israel, and Iran in the ongoing Third World War. As a result, Iran’s political and social structure has become a subject of growing interest. This series aims to provide an in-depth examination of these dynamics.
Iran’s geopolitical position is of considerable strategic importance. Extending toward Central Asia on one side and opening to the East through Afghanistan and Pakistan, Iran is bordered to the north by the Turkic republics and the countries of the Caucasus. Part of the Caspian Sea lies along Iran’s coastline, while to the west the country connects to Europe through Northern Kurdistan (Bakur) and Turkey. The Persian Gulf, a significant portion of which is under Iran’s influence, is located to the south, granting the country substantial leverage over the Gulf states. Iran also shares borders with Iraq and maintains close geographical and political ties with the Arab world. Consequently, Iran stands as one of the most strategically positioned countries, spanning a vast geography that stretches from Asia to Europe and, via the Caspian Sea and the Persian Gulf, to the Indian Ocean.
Iran is the second-largest oil producer within the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and holds approximately 10 percent of the world’s proven oil reserves and 17 percent of its natural gas reserves. With an estimated 125.8 billion barrels of untapped oil, Iran ranks second globally among countries with unused petroleum resources. Possessing nearly one-tenth of the world’s total oil reserves places Iran in a pivotal position within the global energy equation.
Iran’s current system of governance was shaped in the aftermath of the 1979 Iranian Islamic Revolution. Following the revolution, all state institutions were restructured, resulting in a system fundamentally different from the previous regime. Prior to 1979, Iran operated under a monarchical system; however, the revolution replaced the monarchy with a theocratic form of governance.
One of the most significant developments in the period extending from the end of Mohammad Mossadegh’s rule in 1953 to the Islamic Revolution was the set of reforms introduced by the Shah in 1962, known as the “White Revolution.” Envisioning a series of changes, most notably land reform, this reform package faced strong opposition from various segments of society from the moment it was introduced.
Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, who ensured political stability in the country, profoundly transformed the socio-economic structure with the support of rising oil revenues. While employment increased and wages rose, the pains of a rapid transition to an industrial society were also strongly felt. Millions of landless peasants who left their villages gathered in shantytowns on the outskirts of major cities. At the same time, an emerging industrial bourgeoisie grew increasingly wealthy as a result of new modes of production, while millions of poor, unemployed, and hopeless people, excluded both economically and politically, began to form the basis of an angry opposition beyond the major urban centers. This situation also contributed to the growing influence of the religious clergy.
The reforms implemented by the Shah in pursuit of modern capitalism provoked strong reactions from the bazaar, traditionally referred to as bazargan, a socio-economic group of small and medium-sized merchants that held significant influence in Iran’s political and social life, as well as from landowners and the clergy. The “White Revolution,” which included measures such as land reform, electoral reform, the extension of voting rights to women, and the partial privatization of state-owned enterprises, effectively sidelined the agrarian economy. By directing landowners toward industrial investments, the Shah aimed to establish a robust capitalist economic structure. Furthermore, he sought to weaken the influence of the bazaar merchants, whom he regarded as an obstacle to the nation-building process. In terms of foreign policy, these developments were reflected in Iran’s gradual assumption of the role of the United States’ “gendarme” in the region.
The alliance formed between the social classes threatened by these reforms and the religious clergy, who opposed several innovations, most notably the granting of voting rights to women, combined with the anger of impoverished and dissatisfied masses, creating a significant foundation for the revolution. The events, which began with the clergy’s reaction to electoral reforms, resulted in the deaths of many people. These developments also propelled the cleric Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, who would later become the spiritual leader of the 1979 Revolution, into prominence as a political figure. Khomeini was held responsible for the unrest, arrested, and imprisoned for 18 months. After his release in 1964, he continued to openly criticize the United States government. In response, the Shah sent him into exile. Khomeini first traveled to Turkey, then moved to Iraq, and ultimately was forced to relocate to France. During his years in exile, he maintained his criticism of the Shah, influenced the growing social opposition that paved the way for the Iranian Revolution, directed public discontent toward a common objective, and began organizing the foundations of the Islamic Revolution.
The Iranian Revolution, also known as the Islamic Revolution, began in January 1978 with the first major anti-Shah popular demonstrations. After strikes and protests paralyzed the country and its economy, the Shah left Iran on January 16, 1979. Subsequently, on February 1, 1979, Ayatollah Khomeini returned to Iran, welcomed by vast crowds. On April 1, 1979, Iran officially declared itself an Islamic Republic, marking the beginning of a new era.
Abdullah Öcalan expressed this reality in his assessment of the Iranian Revolution, said: “The 1979 Iranian Islamic Revolution was not only a political revolution but also a cultural one. The revolution did not derive its strength solely from the organization of the Shiite clergy; rather, it drew its primary power from the social culture of the Iranian people, whose roots extend deep into history. At the outset, the revolution possessed a democratic national character, similar to the French, Russian, and Anatolian revolutions. It was based on a broad alliance of democratic national forces. This democratic national alliance, formed through the extensive solidarity of communists, Shiite communalists, and patriotic segments of other Iranian peoples, particularly the Kurds, was the true owner of the victory. However, the Shiite clergy and the middle merchant class, known as the bazaar, whose historical and social tradition of governance was stronger, quickly established their own hegemony and ruthlessly suppressed their other allies.”
Although both nationalist and Marxist opposition groups fought alongside Islamic traditionalists against the Shah, tens of thousands were executed by the Islamic regime following the revolution that culminated in the establishment of the Islamic Republic under Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. Shortly before the executions took place, Iran’s religious leader Khomeini issued what was described as a “secret but extraordinary” directive. The essence of this directive was as follows: “Members of the People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran, despite their claims to the contrary, do not believe in Islam. They have waged systematic warfare along Iran’s northern, western, and southern borders, collaborated with Saddam Hussein against Iran, engaged in espionage activities, and established relations with Western powers opposed to Iran’s independence. Therefore, all imprisoned members who continue to support this organization and its positions must be regarded as enemies and executed.”
Following this directive, Iran established special commissions to prosecute and sentence members of the People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran (PMOI) as “mohareb,” meaning those who wage war against God, and communists as “apostates,” referring to individuals who have renounced their faith. These commissions identified individuals deemed by the regime to be opposition figures or potential societal leaders and carried out their executions. Through this process, the clerical regime in Iran executed its opponents and conducted what has been described as an “internal purge.”
The period known as the “1988 executions of Iranian political prisoners” began in July 1988 and lasted for five months. During this time, thousands of political prisoners were executed by the Iranian government. Alongside members of the socialist and communist Tudeh Party, numerous members of the primary target, the PMOI, were also executed.
These executions have been described by various sources as “an unparalleled act of violence in Iranian history in terms of style, content, and intensity.” Iranian opposition groups reported that approximately 30,000 prisoners were executed during this period. It is important to note that all of these executions were carried out on the basis of directives issued by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. This development, in itself, provides sufficient insight into understanding Iran’s political governance and the nature of the clerical regime.
After 1924, the nation-state project in Iran was theorized within the framework of a Persian-centered concept of Iranian identity. The Persian-centered understanding of Iranian identity promoted by the Pahlavi Dynasty (1924–1979) constituted a nation-state project that emphasized pre-Islamic Iran while marginalizing Shiism. With the collapse of the Pahlavi regime, this Western-oriented Persian nationalism, which emphasized ancient Iran and excluded Islam, also failed. The Islamic Republic established following the 1979 Revolution challenged the Persian nationalism that the Pahlavis had sought to develop across various spheres. The new regime rejected the earlier Persian-centered concept of Iranian identity and instead introduced a redefined identity that emphasized Islamic history, excluded Western influence, and placed Shiism at its core, while still maintaining a Persian-centered framework.
The political structure that emerged following the revolution became flexible in foreign policy while adopting a rigid and dogmatic character in domestic affairs, eventually hardening into an inflexible system. This rigid political stance faced widespread public opposition internally, while externally it became a target of global hegemonic powers. Domestically, mass and widespread anti-government protests posed a significant challenge to the regime. Similarly, efforts to unite the population around an Iranian national identity in the face of external interventions no longer generated the same level of support as in the past. As a result, alongside the legitimacy crisis of the Islamic Republic, the Persian-centered Iranian identity intertwined with Shiism also entered into crisis and suffered profound ideological and political setbacks. Iranian society has likewise been affected by global developments, particularly those in the Middle East. The country has experienced a multidimensional identity crisis encompassing both the broader Iranian national identity and various ethnic identities. All these crises have led to a comprehensive questioning of Iran across political, social, and ideological spheres.
Leave a Reply