At the center of debates on the Kurdish question in Turkey lies a single fundamental question: can Turkey become democratic without the liberation of Kurdistan?
In recent times, the rhetoric rapidly circulated by the Turkish state, such as “normalization,” “solution,” “new era,” “integration,” and “Islamic ummah brotherhood”, at first glance creates the impression of a political opening. However, when the way this language emerges, its repetition, and its conceptual construction are considered together, it becomes clear that what is taking place is not merely a search for a solution; it also points to a deliberate process in which meaning, boundaries and legitimacy are being redefined.
The key issue that must be considered today is not only what is being said, but the semantic field within which these statements are constructed. Political processes are shaped not only through decisions and declarations, but also through concepts. Concepts do not merely describe reality; they also determine what is possible, what is reasonable and what is acceptable. For this reason, the language being constructed today is not a simple discourse, but a conscious semantic framework that defines limits.
Within this semantic field, concepts shift in function. “Normalization” renders the extraordinary invisible, “realism” lowers expectations, “integration” dissolves the demands for equality within the system, and “opportunity” presents historical rights as temporary gains. In this way, even without openly constructing a language of denial, the function of denial is sustained. Reality is not eliminated, but its perception is transformed. This represents a method that does not directly reject but gradually lowers thresholds without being noticed. The Turkish state applies this method, what may be described as political manipulation, not only to “its own Kurds,” but across all four parts of Kurdistan through a planned and continuous agenda.
The state discourse, recently articulated once again through Mehmet Uçum, operates precisely on this basis. The language may have changed, but in essence nothing has shifted. An approach that continues to treat Kurdish demands for representation, equality and status as issues to be limited does not produce a solution; it merely reconstructs its own boundaries. For this reason, the current framework is not new, but an updated continuation.
The practices of the Republic of Turkey on the external front clearly reveal the limits of this discourse. The constant possibility of military intervention against Rojava, ongoing pressure and provocations targeting Shengal and Maxmur, and operations directed at Eastern Kurdistan (Rojhilat) demonstrate that policies targeting Kurdish gains remain unchanged. While this policy continues externally, the use of language such as “solution” and “normalization” domestically calls for scrutiny of the discourse itself. What has changed is not the policy, but the way it is presented.
Considering this picture, the extent to which the debates conducted domestically carry real meaning must also be questioned. Arrests, the appointment of trustees, the failure to implement promised measures, and constantly shifting timelines all indicate that the policy pursued externally is being sustained internally in a different form.
At this very point, recent statements regarding the center of the process have made another debate more visible. Emphasis on the need to “define the legal framework established with Abdullah Öcalan” shows that the true center of the process is now openly acknowledged. However, what is decisive here is not the existence of such a legal definition, but its content.
Every status that is defined does not necessarily produce equality. While conditions of isolation and incommunicado detention continue in practice, communication remains limited and controlled, and the political sphere is kept narrow, any “legal framework” that emerges will not constitute a genuine ground for negotiation; rather, it will remain a pre-determined framework with fixed limits. Such a framework cannot produce a lasting and objective solution.
For this reason, what is decisive in the Imralı issue is the persistence of isolation and incommunicado conditions. Unless these conditions are dismantled and broad social and political participation is ensured in the process, no arrangement that emerges can generate historical legitimacy. A relationship built within a closed setting is not negotiation; it is direction.
At this stage, recent debates on organization and restructuring must also be addressed within a broader framework. Society-based initiatives and new forms of organization are undoubtedly important. However, it is vital that these discussions do not become confined within an approach that narrows the historical and political depth of the Kurdish question and redefines Kurdish potential within narrow ideological boundaries. The accumulation formed by Kurds over the past half century has evolved into a broad, multilayered and international reality that cannot be confined to a single ideological or organizational form.
What matters today, therefore, is not the production of new concepts, but the strengthening of a perspective that preserves the integrity of existing social and political potential. Unless the Kurdish dynamic is addressed together with the power it generates across different fields, its international visibility and its historical memory, even well-intentioned debates may unintentionally lead to the narrowing of this potential. In this period, what is decisive is not which concept comes to the forefront, but on which ground power is produced.
There will always be attempts by different political lines to direct this potential or confine it within their own limits. What is decisive, however, is that this dynamic can sustain itself as a common force that safeguards the historical interests of the Kurdish people without being trapped within narrow fields of competition.
The fundamental reality that must be placed at the center of these debates is the historical link. Half a century ago, Turkish revolutionaries who struggled alongside the Kurds and took part in the founding of the Kurdistan Freedom Movement clearly stated that the path to Turkey’s liberation passes through the liberation of Kurdistan. This was not merely a theoretical assertion; it was a historical will for which a price was paid. A genuine democracy in Turkey cannot be established independently of Kurdish freedom.
For this reason, all solution-oriented discourse today must be tested against this threshold. No approach that delays or restricts the liberation of Kurdistan can create the conditions for democratization in Turkey. These two issues are not separate but interconnected. In a system where Kurds are not free, Turkey cannot become democratic.
Of course, analyzing and exposing this process alone is not sufficient. However, as in every historical moment, different actors carry different responsibilities today. While some advance through direct practical and organizational lines, the task of intellectual and political analysis is to make the constructed framework visible, to expose its limits, and to safeguard the threshold.
What is required today, therefore, is not merely to produce reactions, but to reveal how the constructed semantic field operates, to clarify the difference between reality and what is presented, and to assume a warning role against the lowering of the historical threshold. The struggle is not only fought on the ground, but also on the level of meaning.
In conclusion, the essence of today’s debate is not the existence of a solution, but the threshold upon which what is presented as a solution is built. No framework that fails to meet the threshold of equality can produce a historical solution, regardless of its name.
The issue is not the beginning of a process, but the truth upon which that process rests. Any framework that excludes the freedom of Kurdistan cannot produce equality, and any ground that fails to produce equality cannot constitute a historical solution.
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