As tensions deepen between Iran, the United States, and Israel, the balance in the Middle East is being shaken and the region is moving toward a new historical breaking point. For the Kurdish people, who have been pursuing freedom and status for more than a century, these developments contain both new opportunities and serious risks. In this process, the Democratic Society paradigm put forward by Kurdish leader Önder Apo stands out as an alternative solution model against the spiral of war and conflict.
Prof. Dr. Abdurrahman Gülbeyaz, who draws attention to the changing power balances in the Middle East, the global effects of these developments, and the decisive role of the Kurdish issue in shaping the future, answered our questions.
How does the ongoing war between Iran, the United States, and Israel affect the balance of power in the Middle East? Do you think the region is entering a new historical rupture?
To understand what is happening in the Middle East today, one must first avoid treating the visible military and diplomatic movements as if they alone explain the reality. The tension between Iran, the United States, and Israel is of course of vital importance in the literal sense; however, its importance lies not simply in a confrontation between three actors but in making visible a much deeper and more ancient crisis.
The concept and apparatus of the “state,” invented in this geography more than five thousand years ago, and especially its modern version—the “nation-state”—developed in capitalist Western societies from the 17th century onward and gradually imposed on the rest of the world, has created an incompatibility between the condition of humanity and global life that has become increasingly intolerable.
The issue is not merely that states are clashing with one another. At the global level, the problem is the conflict between the idea and practice of the state—whose energy is often drawn from death and destruction—and life on earth itself. Looking at how this architecture of domination has been applied in the Middle East over the past century, the conflict manifests as forcing the nation-state model, tailored in the West, onto the multi-layered societies of the Middle East.
For this reason, I believe we are indeed at a historical rupture. But I do not interpret “rupture” with the naïve assumption that the old is dissolving and something automatically better will replace it. No. Historical ruptures—especially in regions like the Middle East, where technologies of destruction, proxy wars, and political domination emerge endlessly—produce both opportunities and disasters at the same time. The old balance may weaken, shake, or collapse, but there is no guarantee that a just order will replace it. More often, what emerges from dissolution is not liberation but new and more brutal forms of domination, bloodshed, and external intervention.
If we look at the structural dimension, the fundamental antagonism between state and society once again imposes itself. Society, as an open system, tends to change, adapt continuously, and generate new forms. The state, by contrast, tends to organize itself as a closed system and prefers as little change as possible. To minimize change, it ultimately relies on force.
As I discussed in an article written after the uprising that followed the killing of Jîna and the rise of the “Jin, Jiyan, Azadî” movement, the state system seeks to isolate itself from external influences and preserve itself as it is, whereas society constantly generates transformations and adaptations despite and precisely in opposition to this pressure. Today’s tensions are another manifestation of this structural contradiction, now expanded onto a wider geopolitical plane.
What opportunities or risks could the deepening of this war and tension create for the peoples of the Middle East and especially for the Kurdish people who are seeking status?
For the Kurdish people, such historical moments are always double-edged. On the one hand, they create opportunities; on the other hand, they generate serious risks. They create opportunities because when the absolute control capacity of centralized state apparatuses weakens, long-suppressed historical and political actors may find breathing space and room for maneuver. But they also produce risks, because in such periods Kurds are often not treated as direct political subjects but as military reserves, buffer elements, regional balance cards, or bargaining objects in international negotiations.
In my view, a crucial distinction must be made here: for the Kurds, opportunity does not lie in aligning themselves with the temporary needs of external powers. The real opportunity lies in strengthening their own historical subjectivity. Everything else, even if it appears as an opportunity at first glance, is often only the first stage of a more refined form of instrumentalization. Recent history is full of examples. At the very moment Kurds become visible, they can also be made equally disposable.
This is precisely the issue I think about around the concept of “Kurdistan.” Over the past century, the decisive factor has not only been the existence of the Kurds but how dominant political thinking understands “Kurdistan.” Throughout the hundred-year history of the Turkish Republic, this concept has not merely been treated as a geographical name but as a historical and political reality that must be suppressed, erased, and fragmented. For this reason, that history has unfolded as a continuous chain of crimes and massacres on the one hand, and a continuous chain of Kurdish resistance on the other. Even today, although many things may appear new, it is possible to say that the same will to annihilation and the same will to resist are once again confronting each other.
Therefore, today’s tensions may open a door for the Kurds. But where that door leads depends on the extent to which the Kurds can establish their political will independently of the strategic needs of others. Otherwise, what is called an “opportunity” will once again become just another name for being used in someone else’s war and then abandoned.
The Kurds live in Turkey, Iran, Iraq, and Syria, each with different political conditions. Is it possible for Kurdish politics to develop a common perspective in this new period?
It is possible—and in my view necessary. However, “common perspective” should not be confused with uniformity. Conditions differ in the four parts; state structures differ, the intensity and form of violence differ, legal regimes differ, and social and political experiences differ. Expecting the same organizational form, tactic, and discourse to be repeated in exactly the same way everywhere would reduce politics to a mechanical template.
But this does not mean a shared horizon is impossible. On the contrary, what is needed today more than ever is a common overarching perspective that does not deny the specific conditions of each region but also prevents the Kurdish issue from becoming a set of disconnected secondary problems. The minimal foundation of this perspective is clear: Kurds are not a security problem but a historical and political people. A minimal strategic understanding must exist that categorically prevents Kurds from being used against one another. While the struggle in each region preserves its own specific legitimacy, it must also connect to a shared political horizon concerning the whole.
I call this not unity in a rigid sense but coordinated plurality. A common perspective does not mean everyone repeating the same sentence; it means that people acting in different realities recognize the same historical knot.
How is the role of the Kurdish issue changing in the Middle East policies of global powers? How are Kurds viewed as actors in the regional equation?
There is indeed a noticeable change, but it does not mean that Kurds are finally being recognized as legitimate political subjects carrying justice. Rather, the Kurdish issue is no longer something that can be kept on the margins of the regional equation, frozen when convenient, or ignored when necessary. It is increasingly becoming one of the central nodes of many fundamental issues—from energy corridors and border regimes to proxy wars and internal instability.
However, visibility is not the same as recognition. Kurds may be becoming more visible, but in the eyes of regional and global powers they are still often seen not as equal founding subjects with legitimate rights, but as a factor to be managed, balanced, trimmed, supported, or punished when necessary.
Therefore, the fact that the Kurdish issue is becoming more central in global politics cannot automatically be considered a positive development. Sometimes the increased visibility of a problem indicates not that it is close to being solved, but that it is being more intensively controlled.
How does Abdullah Öcalan’s Democratic Society paradigm offer an alternative to the nation-state-centered political crises in the Middle East?
In my opinion, the main importance of this paradigm is that it does not confine the Kurdish issue to the narrow debate of whether there should be a separate state or not. The historical deadlock of the Middle East largely stems from this: social plurality is either suppressed or absorbed in favor of centralized sovereignty, and political solutions are constantly sought within the same statist framework.
The Democratic Society paradigm intervenes in this knot from a different point. It places society at the center rather than the state. It prioritizes plurality rather than uniformity. It emphasizes the organization of coexistence rather than sovereignty. In this sense, the issue is not only how Kurds will live, but how the peoples of the Middle East can live together without denying each other.
Do you think the approach of democratic society and democratic confederalism could be a model not only for solving the Kurdish issue but also for different peoples in the Middle East?
Yes, as I suggested earlier, I do. Because the value of this approach lies in the fact that it does not rely on ethnic exclusivity. It is based on the shared life of different social groups, mutual recognition, and the strengthening of local and social initiative. Therefore, in theory it can serve as a model not only for Kurds but also for other peoples and faith communities in the region.
How can a perspective of peace among peoples and democratic solutions be developed in the face of increasing war and conflict in the Middle East?
First of all, it must be clarified what peace is not. Peace is not simply the silence of weapons. Calm without justice is not peace; it is merely postponed conflict.
A genuine perspective for peace can only be developed by placing the experiences of those most denied and most oppressed at the center. Peoples must recognize each other as equal political entities, the legitimacy of local and social self-organization must be accepted, and women’s freedom must be treated as a foundational issue.
How do you foresee the future of the Kurdish issue in light of the changing balance of power in the Middle East in the coming years?
The Kurdish issue will neither disappear nor be pushed out of the regional equation. On the contrary, it will become even more central in the coming years. However, this centrality does not automatically produce a positive direction.
The decisive factor will be the extent to which Kurdish political actors can articulate their historical demands independently. If this can be achieved, the Kurdish issue could open a new political horizon not only for the Kurds but for the entire Middle East. Otherwise, even if visibility increases, the logic of annihilation will continue in different forms.
In conclusion, the Kurdish issue will also serve as a litmus test for the future of the Middle East.