Hişyar Özsoy, a former MP of the Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP), spoke to ANF about the attempts to position Kurds as a “ground force” within United States President Donald Trump’s war strategy toward Iran and the diplomatic fractures that emerged during this process.
Özsoy stated that although Trump personally met with Kurdish leaders, the plan failed to gain traction because no strategic guarantees were offered and regional actors—particularly the Kurdistan Region of Iraq and the Kurdistan Free Life Party (PJAK)—approached the proposal cautiously. Özsoy emphasized that Kurdish political actors acted in light of the lessons drawn from the experience in Rojava and noted that Iran’s sociological structure and internal dynamics differ significantly from those of Syria.
Özsoy also pointed out that amid the ongoing geopolitical restructuring in the region, the political dynamism of Kurds across the four parts of Kurdistan has increasingly moved to the center of global agendas.
In recent weeks, we saw statements suggesting that Trump wanted Kurds to act as a “ground force” within the framework of a war with Iran, but later stepped back from the idea. There were various reactions from leaders in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, and the Kurdistan Free Life Party (PJAK) also declared that it would not side with either party. First of all, how do you assess these reactions and the stance taken by Kurdish leaders and political structures?
Kurds have acted in a very balanced and rational manner so far. The reason is this: there were already uncertainties about what the ultimate objective of the United States and Israel’s attack on Iran would be, and those uncertainties still remain. While Israel is thinking about regime change, even though Trump pointed toward such an objective, no one on the United States side, including Trump, believes that regime change would be easy at this stage. In fact, there is no clear exit strategy either.
They had hoped that through the attacks they launched, because they were already under considerable pressure, the people who had been protesting would take to the streets and that, with the support of internal dynamics, the regime would collapse. But the calculations did not hold; it appears that serious miscalculations were made. When Trump saw this deadlock, he personally became involved and met with Kurdish leaders. Just imagine that you are trying to overthrow a deeply rooted and well prepared regime like Iran, yet the Kurds, who are an important actor, had clearly not been convinced until that point.
Kurds therefore did not want to rush into the field without receiving certain guarantees, without becoming convinced that regime change would actually occur, and especially without clarity about their own status after the war. We can now clearly see how correct that judgment was. Most likely, Trump will soon say that “a significant portion of our military objectives has been achieved.” Even though Iran’s missile capacity, military equipment and air force may have been significantly damaged, the regime’s survival will be considered a victory for Iran.
In other words, Iran may have suffered serious operational damage, but if there is no regime change, both Israel and the United States will effectively have lost this war strategically. Within such a broader context, Kurds followed a “wait and see” policy, protecting themselves and their cities as much as possible, preventing the war from reaching Kurdish cities, and, if necessary, forming their own defensive dynamics. Otherwise, if the regime were not to fall, very powerful campaigns of retaliation could begin, and I believe this was also taken into account.
In short, Kurds did not trust the United States, they could not foresee the outcome of this war, and since no guarantees were offered, they did not want to become pawns in someone else’s political strategy.
Did what recently happened in Rojava also play a role here? Because the United States, so to speak, left the Kurds alone according to developments in Syria.
That was also important. We experienced this very recently in Rojava and saw how the United States can suddenly change its position. Of course, this is a critical situation and Kurds certainly took it into consideration. But beyond that, there are also certain experiences from the past. For example, what happened in Mahabad. In the First Gulf War in 1991, when the United States first attacked Iraq, it again told the Kurds to rise up. Kurds did rise up, but they were left on their own. Later, when the situation became more complicated, a no-fly zone was declared.
We also saw the position of the United States during the Kirkuk issue in 2017.
Therefore, Kurds know this: global and regional powers have their own national and imperial interests. At times these interests may overlap with Kurdish interests, and at other times they may diverge. This is the reality of politics. It was the same in Rojava. The process that began in the context of the fight against the Islamic State changed once conditions in Syria shifted, and alliances also changed. The United States said it would work with Damascus. In the past there was Bashar al Assad, but now there is a figure whom the United States has in a sense disciplined, a figure who, so to speak, has been made to wear a tie. Through this figure they will regulate both Syria Israel relations and the balances in the region.
In this context the Kurdish issue was turned into an internal matter of Syria. The United States also bluntly shifted its position by saying “yesterday is yesterday, today is today.” This was a very important lesson, and it certainly had an impact when calculations about Iran were being made. However, I believe there are also very serious differences regarding Iran’s internal dynamics.
What are the differences?
Iran is not Syria. Politics in Syria shapes the geopolitics of the Middle East, but its global impact is limited. Iran, on the other hand, has both regional and global influence through its relations with China and Russia and its balances with Europe and the United States. A change or a war in Iran would affect not only the regional equation but also global energy routes, trade and migration flows.
Therefore, the Iran file is much larger. Kurds make up roughly 10 percent of Iran’s population and clearly do not have the capacity to change the regime in Tehran through armed action alone. Even an alliance with non-Persian groups such as the Baloch, Arabs and Azerbaijanis might not be sufficient. The non-Persian population in total is around 40 percent, perhaps at most about 50 percent, while the other half of society consists of Persians. In addition, Azerbaijanis are to a significant extent supporters of the regime. Ali Khamenei himself is Azerbaijani. A considerable portion of the clerical leadership and the command structure of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) also come from Azerbaijani backgrounds.
What I mean is this: when you take into account Iran’s demographic and sociological structure and the relationships these groups have with the regime, it does not appear possible for that regime to collapse even with military support from the United States and Israel unless a strong alliance among social groups and an alternative political opposition are created. Kurds also took this into account. Local actors can see Iran’s internal dynamics and balances much more clearly. In other words, it was not only the experience in Rojava or the historical fear of being abandoned midway. Kurds also made their decision by carefully observing Iran’s sociopolitical realities. It seems they were not mistaken, because regime change appears very difficult at this stage.
An attack on Iran had been anticipated for many years. Especially over the past year, the process discussed in Turkey was based on the expectation that regional actors would be reshaped. Kurds live in all the regions where this change is taking place and appear to be decisive actors in each of them. From the perspective of both Kurds and regional stability, even if it is difficult to predict, what kind of picture do you see emerging?
There are four states and four regimes in the Middle East: Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria. In one way or another, the systems in these countries are built upon the denial of the Kurds. Over the past century Kurds have been ignored, attempts were made to eliminate them and they were subjected to assimilation policies. Yet when we look at the last 40 years, processes such as the First and Second Gulf Wars and later the fragmentation of Syria enabled Kurds to return to the stage of history and politics despite all those efforts of destruction.
In Iraq they achieved a certain status. In Rojava, although a fragile process continues, Kurds will now find a place for themselves in Syria. In Turkey there is an ongoing and somewhat ambiguous process. Although it is difficult to predict where it will lead, it is clear that Kurds will continue to remain a key dynamic in Turkish politics.
With the recent developments in Iran, Kurds have become an important actor both in Iran and in the wider regional geopolitics. Yes, they are divided and produce politics in four different countries, but even if they do not become a state they will continue to remain a strong political dynamic in all four countries. While the systems established a century ago that tried to bury the Kurds are now beginning to crack, Kurds are naturally trying to reclaim their rights and status.
As for the war in Iran, Trump could appear a week from now and say, “We have stopped the nuclear program, we have neutralized the air and naval forces, eliminated the missile capacity and weakened the IRGC, and we are drawing a line here.” This phase of the war may end or it may continue. However, the one thing that will not change is the presence of Kurds in Iran. As the regime weakens or becomes more flexible, if Kurds are able to establish unity among themselves and strengthen their relations with the broader opposition in Iran, they will take a central place in politics.
Recently there has been serious political dynamism in Southern Kurdistan (Başur), Rojava and Northern Kurdistan (Bakur). With this latest war, Kurdistan in Iran has also entered into intense interaction with the other parts. Even though the Kurdistan Regional Government does not want to be drawn into the war, developments in Kurdistan in Iran always influence politics in Southern Kurdistan.
Today, in 2026, the Kurdish question across the four parts is now at the very center of both regional and global agendas. These are the results of major ruptures and geopolitical restructuring in the region. If Kurds remain prepared, ensure internal unity and build the right relationships with democratic opposition forces in the countries where they live, they can emerge from this historical period with significant gains.
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