Ertuğrul Kürkçü answered questions from ANF regarding the legal, social and political requirements of the second phase of the “Democratic Society and Peace” process indicated by Abdullah Öcalan in his statement on February 27. Kürkçü evaluated the issue within the framework of possible steps on the parliamentary ground, the balance of domestic politics in Turkey, and the potential impact of the deepening war between the United States and Israel and Iran on the process.
How could the war between the United States, Israel and Iran in the Middle East affect the democratic and political process in Turkey?
When we evaluate the United States’ attack on Iran together with the new security environment that has emerged in the Middle East, it is clear that these developments will not have a positive impact on the current negotiation process. The most optimistic scenario is that the process continues in its natural course without making significant progress but also without completely collapsing. However, in a more pessimistic scenario, there is a risk that many of the steps that should be taken could be postponed, restricted or completely suspended due to cross-border developments, domestic security concerns and the possibility that the war may approach Turkey’s borders. For this reason, the likelihood that the process will slow down unfortunately stands before us as a strong possibility. At this point, the government may adopt a more restrictive policy by emphasizing “security” justifications. Yet it remains important to continue rational and consistent objections that argue that genuine and lasting security can only be achieved by strengthening social peace inside the country and expanding the democratic participation of peoples. However, developments indicate that the government may also treat this process as an opportunity to “apply the brakes.”
Indeed, the rapid and harsh interventions against journalists who were following the military activity around Incirlik Air Base clearly demonstrate that Turkey is directly affected by the dynamics of the regional war and that this influence is reflected in domestic politics through a security-oriented reflex. The regional war environment has the potential to affect not only foreign policy but also domestic law, democratization and reform processes. Under such conditions, the steps that could be taken toward reform and normalization may slow down and may even be replaced by more security-oriented and administrative measures. In short, the atmosphere created by war carries the risk of delaying and restricting political and legal progress rather than accelerating it.
Where is the process in Turkey heading?
Abdullah Öcalan has referred to a period he defined as the “second phase, positive construction.” I would particularly like to recall the following point: regarding Öcalan’s evaluations, after the first meeting that took place following the completion of the contacts of the Imralı delegation with the parliamentary commission, the delegation conveyed that Öcalan had said, “We are now beginning the transition to the second phase.” However, in the evaluation he made on the first anniversary, we saw that Öcalan did not say the second phase had begun, but rather that it should begin. I personally think this second statement is more realistic, because from the other side, that is from the government, we have not yet heard any concrete step or clear declaration of will indicating that the “second phase” has begun.
The second phase we are referring to here concerns Kurds gaining a new status within the state of the Republic of Turkey, the open recognition of their existence and identity, and the creation of a legal framework for this. So far, no concrete step or clear sign of preparation has come from the government in this direction. However, from the Kurdish side there is objectively a strong expectation and feeling that this phase has been reached. This is understandable, because Kurds have struggled for nearly forty years to arrive at this point. Therefore, it is entirely natural for them to think that the time for this stage has come.
However, it is difficult to say that the government is sufficiently prepared at this point. For this reason, the Kurdish political movement and its representatives should formulate these demands more clearly and concretely, transform them into legislative proposals, bring them to the parliamentary agenda, and at the same time continue the negotiation process. In parallel with the negotiations conducted by Öcalan, it is expected that political representation mechanisms will also advance this matured political situation at the parliamentary level. Acting as both a political and practical voice for the demands of the Kurdish people and transforming these demands into concrete proposals are critically important for the progress of the process.
For instance, one very concrete and urgent example that immediately comes to mind is the issue of ill prisoners. The situation of ill prisoners is almost a race against time, and unfortunately this process is working against them. As far as we know, there are close to one thousand ill prisoners in prisons, a significant portion of them detained in cases related to the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). There is no direct obstacle related to security or law preventing steps from being taken on this matter. Enforcement law does not constitute an absolute barrier here. The problem stems more from arbitrary blockages in practice and in the processes of the forensic medicine institutions. It is striking that despite years of discussion on this issue, no serious progress has been achieved. In recent years many ill prisoners have lost their lives during this process. Yet this is an issue that has both a humanitarian and legal solution, and concrete steps on such matters could help the process move forward in a more reassuring manner.
For this reason, both within and outside parliament, such concrete, feasible and urgent issues must be kept on the agenda. As seen throughout the history of legal struggles, not only parliamentary efforts but also society’s ownership of the process, its monitoring and its support play a decisive role in advancing such processes. The political strength of the Kurds in parliament is important, but it is not sufficient on its own. The social will and democratic pressure surrounding parliament from the outside have always been important factors in the advancement of political processes.
Is it necessary to wait for regional developments for the process to advance?
I do not think it is correct to argue that the progress of the process should depend on developments in Iran, the outcome of tensions between Iran and the United States, or the stance of Iran-aligned groups in Iraq such as the Popular Mobilization Forces. Such expectations would make the process dependent on external factors and would inevitably delay its progress. This approach also pushes the role of popular will and internal political dynamics into the background. Yet the period we are currently in is one in which the will of the people is carried directly into the political sphere. When we speak of the “second phase” or the “positive construction process,” what is meant is no longer discussing what cannot be done, but rather what can be done. In this process, different political actors may have different demands and views. The government may have different priorities, the Kurdish political movement may have different demands, and various segments of society may express different expectations. However, all of these are natural components of this process of construction. The positive construction process is not a state of complete harmony or absolute consensus. On the contrary, it is a process that includes negotiation, debate and, at times, political tension. Every new right that is gained implies a shift in existing balances of power. No right emerges in a vacuum. The rights that are being demanded today are rights that were previously denied or restricted. Therefore, recognizing these rights again and placing them under legal protection inevitably requires certain changes within the existing system. For this reason, it is not realistic to expect the process to move forward without difficulties. Negotiation, debate and political struggle are natural parts of such a process. What matters is that the process continues to advance. If this period is truly defined as the “second phase,” it should also mean greater effort, stronger political will and more concrete steps. To put it metaphorically, shifting into second gear means accelerating further, covering more distance and moving toward the goal with greater determination.
Therefore, what will ultimately determine the course of the process is not external developments but rather internal political will, social demand and the transformation of these demands into concrete political and legal steps. The steps taken in this direction will be the most important indicator of whether the process is truly advancing.
How do you assess the war in Iran and the latest developments in the Middle East?
It is clearly an imperialist war. Following the Gaza genocide, the so-called axis of resistance was weakened by the regime change in Syria and the dismantling of Hezbollah by Israel. After that, it was already foreseeable that the final step would be the United States–Israel attacks on Iran’s nuclear facilities. These developments unfolded almost as if they were part of a process that had been prepared in advance and carried out before the eyes of the entire world. However, beyond these visible military preparations, it is still not entirely clear what the ultimate objectives of the United States are in this war. Is this war being conducted merely to escalate international tensions and demonstrate power, or is it intended to bring about a concrete regime change or strategic transformation in Iran? These questions still do not have a clear answer. The discourse about regime change in Iran that was voiced during the administration of Donald Trump also reflects this uncertainty. From the perspective of international law, it is not legitimate for any country to intervene in the internal affairs of another in this manner. Changing the government of a country through external military intervention, outside the will of its own people, is incompatible with the norms of international law. No matter how repressive the existing regime in Iran may be, that does not make external intervention legitimate. Moreover, there does not appear to be a strong alternative political force inside Iran that the United States could support and that has a genuine social base. Monarchist forces do not command significant support within society. The main opposition dynamic in Iran in recent years has been the popular movements that have repeatedly emerged. This popular opposition is not driven by a monarchist restoration but rather by demands for democratic rights and freedoms. At the same time, it cannot be said that the United States has presented a concrete, credible and implementable plan for a democratic transition in Iran. The position of the European Union is also unclear within the framework of international law. The approach of the United Nations, which condemns both sides “equally,” is also problematic from the perspective of international law. Because while negotiations between Iran and the United States were ongoing and diplomatic channels had not yet been exhausted, the United States launched military attacks. In such a context, placing the attacker and the attacked on the same level is meaningless.
This situation can be better understood when it is evaluated not only in the context of Iran but also as part of a broader strategy aimed at re-establishing the hegemonic position of the United States in the world. Its policies toward countries such as Venezuela, Cuba, Canada and Greenland show that unilateral global aggression by the United States continues. For this reason, the claim that the United States is waging this war in the name of “human rights” or democracy is not taken seriously by the international public. Even within the United States, support for the war remains around twenty percent.
However, regardless of where a way out may be found, wars can also create new political possibilities. In this regard, the situation of the Kurds in Iran carries particular importance. The region of Eastern Kurdistan (Rojhilat), where Kurds in Iran live, could assume an important political and social role in this process. The fact that the Iranian regime has increased its military and political measures toward this region shows that it is aware of this possibility. With a cautious and balanced political strategy, Eastern Kurdistan could play an important role in the democratic transformation processes in Iran. However, shifts in power caused by the crisis should in no way mean that external interventions are preferred. The Kurdish political movement has sufficient historical and political experience in this regard and will manage this process carefully.
These developments also reveal the crisis of the international system itself. The ineffectiveness of international institutions such as the United Nations shows that the security and rights of the world’s peoples are increasingly dependent on the political calculations of great powers. For this reason, the applicability and effectiveness of international law norms are losing credibility.
What path should oppressed peoples and the Kurdish people follow in the face of these global developments?
The current moment makes it a historical necessity for oppressed peoples to develop their own independent political line. Rivalry among major powers often becomes a factor that restricts the right of stateless peoples and societies to determine their own future. The possibility that Europe could develop an independent political line against the United States appears weak. Likewise, it is clear that global powers such as Russia and China act primarily according to their own geopolitical interests and do not pursue a political perspective that prioritizes the freedom of oppressed peoples. For this reason, it is of great importance for oppressed peoples to establish their own political unity and common grounds of struggle. In this respect, the struggle of the Kurdish people has historically reached an important level of political maturity. However, this struggle should not remain limited to the discourse of a “third way.” In order to build a genuinely independent political line, it is necessary to construct an independent political and social power center capable of sustaining that line. A third way can only exist with the presence of a third political pole. Developments in the Middle East over the last thirty years indicate that a new political order is taking shape in the region. This new order has not yet been fully formed and still contains many uncertainties. Nevertheless, the Kurdish people have become an important political actor within this process. This situation places the Kurdish people in a significant position not only in regional politics but also within global political balances.
Periods of chaos and crisis are also periods in which new political orders emerge. Such processes create not only conflict and uncertainty but also new political opportunities and transformations. In this context, it is of great importance for the Kurdish people and other oppressed peoples to strengthen their independent political will and assume an active role in determining their own future. For this reason, the period we are living through today should be seen not only as a time of crisis but also as a historical moment that opens the way for the construction of a new political and social order.
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