Journalist Yücel Özdemir, who lives in Germany, assessed the Munich Security Conference with particular attention to the Kurdish question.
Part one of this interview can be read here.
Clearly there is tension between Europe and the United States. United States Secretary of State Marco Rubio also made a speech on this issue, using a softer tone compared with broader United States policy. In the picture you have drawn, is Europe moving toward a concrete shift in its security policies, as Macron openly articulated?
This desire is, at the very least, the goal and aspiration of the German–French axis. Internal contradictions exist, but despite these contradictions, they are aware that they cannot take a position vis-à-vis the United States unless they stand together. After the speeches by Merz and Macron, analysts in the German press watched closely to see how Rubio would respond. There was debate over whether the contemptuous tone used by United States Vice President J.D. Vance toward Europe last year would be repeated. Rubio’s remarks took a different direction. He used a softer language, said that “Europe is our partner,” and underlined that they want to strengthen relations. He said that President Trump has a plan for the world and that Europe should be part of this plan. This approach, however, was not found convincing in Europe.
How is this being interpreted in Europe?
In Germany, including by Defence Minister Boris Pistorius, analyses in the press stressed that Rubio’s softer tone should not mislead Europe and that Europe must continue to stand on its own feet in the period ahead. It is widely known that the global struggle over spheres of influence and conflict is essentially unfolding between the United States and China. The final alignment is largely taking shape between these two powers, even if the United States currently remains ahead.
The European Union, however, constitutes a very significant economic power when it acts as a whole. The market of 450 million people that Macron frequently emphasises is decisive in this regard. In the emerging global architecture, whichever power succeeds in bringing Europe to its side will gain a more advantageous position.
How is Europe seeking to carve out space for itself in global power balances?
At the same conference, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi offered Europe a partnership based on equal treatment. German Chancellor Friedrich Merz said there are countries with which joint action could be pursued against United States hegemony and included Turkey within this framework. In the period ahead, the European Union is expected to develop relations with regional actors such as Turkey, India, Brazil, and South Africa in order to establish a balance.
Regardless of how successful it ultimately proves to be, the European Union is making a serious effort to become an independent military power. Under French leadership, a debate has emerged over the idea of a nuclear deterrence umbrella. Germany is not a nuclear power; however, arguments have been put forward that France should be supported as Europe’s nuclear capability and that leadership in this area should rest with France. A division of roles is envisaged, with France taking the lead in military matters and Germany serving as the economic power. Although this deepens competition between the two countries, efforts to reach compromise in certain areas continue.
Although no concrete progress was made on the idea of a European army, which Macron advocated during his first term with the remark that “NATO is brain-dead,” Europe has rapidly militarised under the impact of the war in Ukraine. Military budgets have been significantly increased, and allocations have been made within the European Union budget for military expenditures that were not previously foreseen. This indicates the intention of European Union countries to emerge as military power in the period ahead.
In this process, Europe may articulate more openly that it is not compelled to rely on the United States under the NATO umbrella. Alongside steps taken in the economic sphere against the United States’ protectionist policies, tougher bargaining and heightened tensions are expected at the military level as well.
You also mentioned China. What do China’s messages at the conference mean for the United States?
China’s foreign minister stated clearly that the existing world order and international institutions must be preserved, foremost among them the United Nations. They acknowledge that these institutions have problems but argue that they should continue after being reformed. The same approach was voiced with regard to Europe. Germany was also given the message that, despite their shortcomings, existing international institutions should be protected.
Without naming the United States directly, China implied that the agenda of the Trump administration aims to change this existing order. Today, we are speaking of a United States that even sees the United Nations as an obstacle to itself. The current order contains elements that constrain Trump and the United States, and they want to change these. At this point, it can be seen that Europe and China are drawing closer in their perspectives. China wants to postpone confrontation with the United States as much as possible, especially on the military level, and to stretch the process over time. It aims to use this period to gain new allies and increase its military capacity. At the conference, China maintained this softer line but delivered implicit yet clear messages to the United States.
One of the main issues at the conference was Iran. Although Iran was not invited, pro-Shah groups held demonstrations focused on Iran. What is your assessment of the Iran issue?
Iran was indeed one of the major items on the agenda of the conference. The Munich Security Conference does not function as a decision-making mechanism; it is less a forum for taking binding decisions than a space for building relationships. As Conference Chair Wolfgang Ischinger has described it, the conference is a place to “repair broken relationships.” He illustrates this with the metaphor of a “bicycle workshop”: broken bicycles arrive; they are repaired and then sent back onto the road.
Viewed through this metaphor, it can be said that some damaged relationships were at least partially repaired in relation to Rojava as well. The possibility of a rapprochement between the central Syrian authorities and the Kurds has emerged. Relations between Germany and the Kurds may also have moved to a closer point than before. A similar picture can be observed with regard to Iran.
Iran was not invited; however, a platform was opened to Reza Pahlavi, who is seen as one of the most visible figures of the Iranian opposition abroad, bringing him onto the international stage. On the same day, a large demonstration was held in Munich. While organisers had expected one hundred thousand participants before the event, attendance reached two hundred thousand according to German police and media reports. This is a highly significant figure. It indicates that the Munich Conference has functioned as a kind of testing ground for the Syrian and Iranian opposition. It appears that Munich has passed this test.
What could be the impact of this “test” on the Iranian arena?
There appears to be significant social support for Reza Pahlavi among Iranians abroad, and an opposition force to the regime exists. Inside Iran, the bases of support for the Shah’s son are known to be weak; however, there is a strong anti-regime dynamic within Iranian society. The massacres carried out by the regime to date, the killing of thousands of people, and the large-scale social movement that emerged during the Jina Amini process all attest to this. Iran is simmering from within, yet there are currently no visible actors capable of changing the regime. Many of those who become visible are executed. The fact that Trump openly revived the thesis of “regime change” immediately before or after the Munich Conference is also linked to this picture.
In the period ahead, the possibility of regime change in Iran is on the table. This requires a two-pronged assessment. The atmosphere and synergy created in Munich will be used as a source of pressure on the Iranian regime. A four-point framework has been presented to Iran: recognising the existence of Israel and refraining from posing a military threat; severing ties with proxy forces in the region, especially Hezbollah; abandoning the nuclear weapons programme; and ending repression of the opposition at home.
These headings will form the basis of negotiations to be held in Geneva. If Iran accepts these demands, it may be possible for the existing regime to be reshaped in line with United States demands rather than pursuing regime change. The case of Venezuela illustrates this: the regime did not change, but cooperation was established through underground resources.
Could the Iranian leadership move in the same direction? In other words, could it offer certain concessions to the United States to preserve the regime or the current system of governance?
Judging the statements made so far, there is no such tendency at present; on the contrary, more hardline rhetoric has been voiced. The course of development in the period ahead will be decisive. Within Iran, a tendency may emerge to seek a partial accommodation with the United States to manage the process, in other words to stretch it out over time. In such a scenario, the United States may aim to draw Iran closer into its own orbit without pursuing regime change.
Is this approach limited to Iran, or is it part of a broader strategy?
Although Iran appears to be the immediate focus, the moves concerning both Venezuela and Iran are, in essence, directed at China. These two countries are key markets for China and major energy suppliers. China meets a large share of the energy required for the development of its industry from these countries. Venezuela holds the world’s largest proven oil reserves, while Iran is among the countries with the largest oil reserves in the Middle East after Saudi Arabia and possesses the world’s second-largest natural gas reserves after Russia. From an energy perspective, Iran represents an extremely important potential market for the United States.
If the United States succeeds in drawing Iran closer into its own orbit, regime change may not come onto the agenda. The emergence of such a tendency would amount to cutting off one of China’s most vital arteries. This could become one of the most critical developments of the year. A possible shift in Iran’s axis, or a regime change in Iran, stands as one of the issues that will directly shape the global order in the period ahead.
At this point, the United States’ strategy is not focused on a single country; it forms part of a broader struggle with rivals within imperial competition. Hard or soft moves toward Iran are components of this whole. The engagement with the Kurds of Rojava and their invitation to the conference are also not independent of this strategy toward Iran. If the region is to be reshaped, Syria must first reach a relative level of stability. The same applies to Iraq, where the weakening of Iran’s influence is a stated objective. As the circle tightens, Iran may be pushed either to politically accommodate United States plans or into a harsher phase. However, Iran’s historical dynamics and internal struggles may prevent this process from unfolding in a one-sided manner.
It is also known that peoples under long-standing repression and a broad social opposition exist within Iran. It would be inaccurate to define this opposition solely as pro-United States, pro-imperialist, or pro-Shah. While the common denominator is a desire for change in the clerical regime, expectations differ over how this change should take place. There are also social dynamics acting on the expectation of a more liberal and outward-looking Iran. For this reason, this picture should not be reduced to a single category.
Why did Turkey remain in the background at this conference? It participated, but why was it not visible on the main stage?
Turkey did not, in fact, attend the conference with a particularly low profile. It is true that the foreign minister was not present; however, at the previous conference the foreign minister had already attended and spoken as a panelist. This time, Finance Minister Mehmet Şimşek was invited and attended the conference. Although he was listed as a speaker on one of the panels in the programme, he did not deliver a speech. The reason for this was not explained to the public.
Speculation suggests that he may have preferred not to appear on the same platforms because Syrian Kurdish representatives had been invited; however, there is no definitive information on this point. The conference was also attended by Hulusi Akar, Chair of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey’s National Defence Commission, as well as Akif Çağatay Kılıç, the President’s chief adviser on security policy. In other words, representation was not entirely weak, but Turkey chose not to position itself as a highly visible actor. This posture suggests that Turkey adopted a position that takes existing regional balances into account.
Why?
Because Turkey is acting along a line that observes developments and positions itself accordingly, rather than openly opposing the United States’ moves to redesign the region. This also explains why Turkey did not impose an explicit veto on the participation of Syrian Kurdish representatives in the conference. It is understood that Germany informed Turkey in advance about the invitation process and that Turkey did not veto the invitation. Had Turkey openly objected to the invitation and turned it into a diplomatic crisis; Germany would likely have taken this into account. No such objection was raised. Statements by representatives from Rojava also indicate that Turkey did not adopt an obstructive stance.
From Turkey’s perspective, preventing the establishment of an autonomous structure in Syria like that in Southern Kurdistan is viewed as a significant gain. In the current picture, the objective of integration within the Syrian state has come to the fore rather than the formation of an autonomous region.
Turkey recognises that the de facto gains made by Kurds between 2011 and 2019 cannot be completely disregarded and prefers to manage this reality within a framework of “minimal gains.” The aim is to ensure that this does not harm domestic politics in Turkey or potential negotiation processes.
Finally, Mithat Sancar’s remarks that “the first phase has ended, and the integration process is beginning” can also be read within this framework. It appears that the bracket opened in Syria has largely been closed and that a relatively stable period is emerging. The reflection of this for Turkey will be steps to be taken under the heading of integration. What will be decisive from this point forward is how the government manages this process.
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