Ebru Gunay, Co-Spokesperson for Foreign Relations of the Peoples’ Equality and Democracy Party (DEM Party), spoke to ANF about the developments following the 27 February call, which has now marked its first year. Responding to our questions about the steps taken, the opportunities missed, and the roadmap ahead, Gunay reiterated the need for legal and concrete measures to be taken in order to build social consent.
Gunay said, “These steps to be taken in the sphere of democracy will directly contribute to resolving the issue and building peace. Instead of the cautious and hesitant approach we saw over the past year, this period requires a bolder and more determined stance.”
Ebru Gunay’s exclusive interview with ANF is as follows:
After one year, what concrete outcomes have emerged from the call? How would you summarize the picture in terms of legal regulations, administrative steps, mechanisms that have been established, or promises that have not been fulfilled?
One year has passed since the 27 February call. When we look at the past year, a great many developments have taken place, developments that could almost be described as historic in scale. Very serious events have unfolded. When we assess both the steps that were taken and the promises that were made but not kept, as well as the commitments that were voiced, we have left behind a year that was discussed across the entire public opinion in Turkey. The most fundamental characteristic of this period was that the Kurdish question was discussed, debated and evaluated across Turkey and within Turkish public opinion more openly than ever before. In this respect, the 27 February call enabled a very significant threshold to be crossed. With Abdullah Öcalan’s “Peace and Democratic Society Call,” the reasons for the existence of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), the conditions that led to its emergence and its current situation began to be discussed more openly in public. Previously, the resolution of the Kurdish question, its dynamics, its content and its causes had to a certain extent carried the character of a taboo. Over the past year, however, this issue has been addressed more openly than ever before.
In this process, I believe that the Kurdish freedom movement and Öcalan in particular took very courageous steps. The main will that opened the space for debate and laid the groundwork for stronger steps was the Kurdish freedom movement itself. When the call was made, many people did not expect such an explicit call for dissolution to be issued. There were question marks in the public mind as to whether the PKK would respond to such a call or not. There was a prevailing sense that such a step would not be taken. Yet none of these expectations materialized. From a position that broke with established patterns, Öcalan stated that the PKK should dissolve itself and stressed that this should be addressed within the framework of democratic politics and the creation of legal conditions. The PKK subsequently announced that it had convened its congress and decided to dissolve itself. In this way, important thresholds were crossed. With these developments, the Kurdish question became more directly discussable on the ground of democratic politics. Another historically significant threshold was the disarmament ceremony held in Sulaymaniyah on 11 July. It may be debated whether there are comparable examples in the world; there are cases of weapons being buried or handed over to third parties. However, for an armed force to take such a step through a public ceremony and to clearly demonstrate its determination in this manner constitutes a historically distinct example.
All of this demonstrates the determination of the Kurdish movement and Öcalan in seeking a resolution to the issue. A peace or resolution process is not only a matter of determination; it also requires courage. It is necessary to show this courage by assuming all responsibilities. At this point, I believe that the Kurdish freedom movement and Öcalan have taken courageous steps.
From the perspective of Turkey and those in power, some important steps have also been taken. The video message of Abdullah Öcalan being conveyed to the public and to the world after many years, and his calls for democratic integration and legal frameworks being shared directly in his own words, were developments outside the usual patterns. In addition, the establishment of a commission in parliament and the fact that this commission, even if not all political parties were represented, went to Imrali to meet with Öcalan are significant thresholds in Turkey’s political history. These developments should be regarded as steps toward breaking with the understanding that the Kurdish question is merely a matter of security.
The Kurdish question is not a security issue; it is a matter of identity, status, and legal recognition. The proper arena in which these issues should be debated is the legislative body, namely parliament. Historically, this ground has become visible to this extent for the first time. The content of the report is a separate subject of debate; however, the very fact that parliament has become involved in this process constitutes an important threshold. In conclusion, when we look back, it is possible to say that significant thresholds have been crossed in Turkish politics in terms of the democratic resolution of the Kurdish question, that certain prejudices have been broken, and that some attitudes have begun to change.
How has the emotional climate and public perception shifted from when the call was first made to where things stand today?
As you may recall, even within the Justice and Development Party (AKP), it was said that no one had expected this call. At first, there was a sense of sorrow, followed by an atmosphere of near tears, then curiosity, reaction and, eventually, a more supportive mood. How the transformation in public feeling and perception has unfolded over the past year is an important question. The emotional climate on 27 February was genuinely different. From the perspective of the Kurdish people, we are speaking of a historical process that many people experienced directly, witnessed firsthand, and built their lives around for years. Accepting that this process had changed was not emotionally easy. The reactions seen at the outset were largely emotional reflexes of that moment. The critical point here is that there is a very special bond between the Kurdish people, the Kurdish freedom movement, and Mr. Öcalan. For this reason, after the initial emotional atmosphere that followed the call, a public reality emerged that sought to understand and make sense of the process. This was essentially about a relationship of trust, and over time this became even clearer.
For example, the PKK dissolving itself, the disarmament process, and particularly the calls for democratic integration laws, for opening the way to democratic politics and for removing legal obstacles, made the process more comprehensible for the Kurdish people. Ultimately, the core issue was the legal and political recognition of the struggle that the Kurdish people have waged for years, and the expression of this recognition within Turkey’s political arena. As these steps developed, especially with the statements made on 11 January and 11 July and the calls by Mr. Öcalan, many of the questions in people’s minds became clearer. The concepts of democratic integration, expressions of communal comradeship, the emphasis on equal citizenship, and the discourse calling for opening the way to democratic politics through laying down arms, for the functioning of the rule of law, and for the recognition of Kurdish existence and identity directly addressed the Kurdish people’s questions within the process. I believe that the main determining factor has been the dialogue and level of mutual understanding between Mr. Öcalan and the Kurdish people. As contact increased and views were reflected in the public sphere, the process became more comprehensible. This contact, particularly in terms of making the rule of law function and defining a legal framework, constituted a serious threshold.
It will be recalled that in previous years, for example during the lawyer visits amid the hunger strikes in 2019, similar assessments were voiced. Looking at the recent statements and the manifesto that was published, it can be seen that broadly the same framework has been maintained: allowing Kurdish existence to enter through the door of law, and recognizing identity, freedom of organization and political will. This already constitutes the fundamental expectation of the Kurdish people.
Over time, particularly from the perspective of the Kurdish people, a deeper understanding and mutual comprehension developed between Mr. Öcalan’s approach and the expectations of the people. A public reality emerged that was able to display the reflexes required by the process. The reactions given to developments in Rojava and the responses shown by Kurds living in Turkey, in many cities across Kurdistan, and in Europe were connected to this. This reflex points to a social consciousness that grasps the relationship between the peace process and the existence and status of the Kurds. I read about the change that has taken place since 27 February largely through this concrete transformation. As contact within the process increased, people’s perceptions and approaches transformed in parallel.
Do you think the process has become socialized at this stage? The public is often not informed about the talks being conducted and the information being conveyed during the process. Do you think social consent has been formed within both segments? If not, why?
The process should not be assessed only from 27 February onward; it is also important to look at the period before 1 October. For example, on 1 October, Mr. Bahçeli’s gesture of going over to the benches of the DEM Party and shaking hands was an important signal. The Imrali delegation had its contacts. At that time, many debates were taking place in public opinion, such as “Has the process started or not?” and “Will the Kurdish question really be resolved?” However, the period in which the process genuinely entered a phase of dialogue and took shape in the public mind began when the Imrali delegation started meeting with Mr. Öcalan and when these meetings were reflected outside.
Despite this, a certain level of confusion persisted. The call written in Mr. Öcalan’s own handwriting and shared with the public on 23 March reduced this uncertainty a step further. His subsequent video message and the statements reflected to the public made the framework of the process more visible. The path toward the lasting formation of social consent runs through improving the conditions in Imrali and strengthening the grounds on which Mr. Öcalan can establish direct contact with the public. As these opportunities are provided, social consent will be placed on a more solid footing. At the point reached today, regular and comprehensive contact from Imrali with journalists or politicians is still not at the desired level. Yet we are speaking of a main actor. The main actor’s ability to establish direct contact with the world and with public opinion carries a different significance in terms of the credibility of the process.
As these conditions are created, social consent will become stronger and more convincing. Because these opportunities have not yet been fully ensured, social consent has not reached the desired level either. However, there is an important reality: as you likely observe in your own fieldwork, even people who say, “It has not reached us much,” also say, “We trust Mr. Öcalan.” His presence creates a sense of trust within society. The saying among the public, “If he says something, there must be something he knows,” expresses precisely this. For this reason, these channels of contact need to be expanded. While the second year is being discussed, this is one of the fundamental issues that needs to be addressed and resolved first.
Because the picture is this: on one side there is a strong state mind or governing perspective; on the other side, the main actor’s communication with the outside world, with public opinion, with journalists, intellectuals, women and young people remains more limited. In order to establish this balance, equal conditions need to be created. Once equal conditions are ensured, social consent will naturally take shape. Indeed, over the past year, with every contact Mr. Öcalan established with the outside world, social consent has grown a step stronger. Each contact moved the process forward and increased trust. This is the fundamental criterion: when conditions are created that allow for regular and strong contact, social consent will acquire a more distinct and lasting character.
If we were to draw up a balance sheet of “opportunities and risks” for this one-year period, which headings would stand out? Were there missed opportunities?
There were opportunities. From the perspective of the state, looking back, it could have moved more quickly.
The 27 February call was made. Then, in mid-March, another comprehensive call followed, and immediately afterward significant developments took place. From the very beginning of the process, the state could have taken faster and more decisive steps. After every step taken by the Kurdish movement, stronger and bolder responses could have been produced. It is difficult to imagine a threshold beyond this: an armed organization, an armed force, openly said, “I have laid down my arms and I am ready to take part in democratic politics.” Moreover, these statements were not merely lower-level declarations; they were voiced by senior leaders as well. After such a step, producing a reciprocal response constituted a serious opportunity. This was the expectation of public opinion; it was the expectation of the public in Turkey, of democratic circles, and of international public opinion alike.
However, one of the classic handicaps of resolution processes came into play: the tendency to stretch processes over time and to proceed cautiously. I believe that these thresholds were not sufficiently utilized by the state. A step as bold as this could have been met with a step of equal boldness. Take the issue of the right to hope, for example. This is not a matter that requires complex or special planning. Even the implementation of existing legal norms could have created a major opportunity. The right to hope has been discussed since 1 October, and even before 27 February. Yet the right to hope does not require extraordinary new legislation; it is directly linked to the implementation of the rulings of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), and Turkey’s legal system is compatible with this. If these rulings were implemented, many problems could be resolved.
For this reason, the Kurdish question can also be viewed as a matter of entering through the door of law. The issue is largely defined as an area in which the law is not being applied. At the end of one year, the fact that the right to hope has still not been implemented is a significant shortcoming. Yet during this process, serious opportunities emerged. Even after the withdrawal of armed forces from Turkey, concrete steps could have been taken. A more determined and bolder position could have been adopted. I believe that historically, there has been a reflex of “dominant state reasoning” in the approach to this issue in Turkey. There is an approach that assumes the side that must constantly take steps is the Kurdish side. Sociologically, this can also be described as a form of hegemonic arrogance. These mental thresholds need to be overcome. There are mutual judgments accumulated over years. The process is also a process of construction; it requires erosion, change and transformation. To the extent that this transformation takes place, historical opportunities can be seized.
If those in power had better prepared society on their own side, transformed the language of the media, and aligned the language used by politicians with the requirements of a resolution process, a serious change could have occurred in public opinion and historical opportunities would not have been missed. Society could have crossed certain thresholds within itself. In Turkey, however, such preparations were not made on the side of those in power. Even though the process has been brought to parliament and certain content has been produced, the Kurdish question is still approached at the level of mindset primarily as a security issue. Because the security perspective prevails, a hesitant attitude emerges regarding cultural identity and rights-based steps. This leads to missed opportunities. Yet even the implementation of minimum legal norms could have created a serious change. The implementation of ECtHR rulings, taking steps regarding prisons, especially with respect to ill prisoners, and observing the principle of equality in execution regulations were possible and not difficult measures. Debates on execution regulations were held in two separate periods; however, the exclusion of political prisoners from their scope created serious distrust in society. These were not extremely complex issues. Simple and practical legal arrangements could have ensured the application of the principle of equality in execution. Yet those in power adopted a more anxious and cautious approach on these headings. For this reason, I believe that the opportunities that emerged were not sufficiently utilized.
What should a realistic roadmap for the second year look like? Which steps can be taken in the short term, and which headings require a longer-term strategy?
From the perspective of democracy, the report that has been presented had the potential to be a much stronger document. The commission conducted highly comprehensive hearings and carried out strong preparatory work. For this reason, it was possible for the spirit of a democratic society and the spirit of peace to be reflected in the report in a clearer and stronger manner. The peaceful and democratic aspects that emerged in practice could have been incorporated into the text more comprehensively. Looking ahead, the implementation of minimum legal norms will be decisive. In particular, creating conditions of freedom that will open the way for contact with the outside world, and clearly defining the legal framework for this, carry great importance for the new period.
The points set out in the commission report, especially those defined in Articles 6 and 7, are noteworthy in this respect. The implementation of Constitutional Court rulings, the proposal of necessary legislative amendments, and the conduct of discussions on execution regulations are among the fundamental steps that need to be taken for the construction of a democratic Turkey and a democratic society. The steps to be taken in the sphere of democracy will directly contribute to resolving the issue and building peace. Instead of the cautious and hesitant approach of the past year, this period requires a bolder and more determined stance. Otherwise, rather than strengthening social consent, the tension between trust and anxiety may deepen. For this reason, faster and more concrete steps need to be taken. The responsibility that parliament will assume in this process carries a historical character. The swift implementation of concrete practical steps that will persuade society, build confidence, and demonstrate determination will be decisive for the durability of the process and the construction of peace.
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