The ongoing clashes in Aleppo’s Kurdish neighborhoods of Sheikh Maqsoud (Şêxmeqsûd) and Ashrafieh (Eşrefiyê) have not only reshaped the military balance on the ground but have also brought diplomatic and political calculations about Syria’s future back to the fore.
Considering these developments, politician Hişyar Özsoy laid out a wide-ranging picture, from the United States’ policies on Syria and Iran to Turkey’s role in and around Aleppo, and from the talks between the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and Damascus to the position of the Kurds within the broader regional equation.
Özsoy said that what is unfolding in Aleppo has triggered a new period of reckoning for the Kurds, while also making visible the on-the-ground reflections of the United States’ Syria design centered on Turkey and Israel.
High risk of spreading to other fronts
Politician Hişyar Özsoy assessed how the United States relationship with the Kurds in its Syria policy has shifted depending on circumstances, why the negotiations between the SDF and Damascus have stalled, and Turkey’s role behind the attack in Aleppo. Özsoy said: “For the United States, this shift in priorities is not new. When the United States first engaged with the Kurds, the Kurds were under attack from the ISIS, Bashar al-Assad was in power in Syria, and Washington was taking an anti-Assad position. Given the support it provided to the People’s Protection Units (YPG) and later to the formation of the SDF, once regime change took place in Syria and the United States began to sponsor the new regime, a serious transformation occurred in its relations with the SDF. Previously, most of Washington’s tactical and military relationships in Syria were managed east of the Euphrates River, but now it is trying to implement its political and diplomatic strategy in Damascus.
There is now another regime that the United States has openly taken under its patronage and reconciled with Israel, and it is trying to strengthen this regime and build a new Syria through Ahmed al-Sharaa (al-Jolani). Within this framework, Washington’s primary concern is al-Sharaa’s relationship with Israel. Establishing a relationship in which al-Sharaa would submit to Israel was part of this, and it has achieved that. As a secondary move, it is now trying to integrate the Kurds, with whom it has been in a military alliance for a decade, into the new regime in some form.
At this point, several problems have emerged. Negotiations have been underway since 10 March, and the Damascus regime has largely turned a deaf ear to the demands coming from the SDF. Whenever an agreement with the SDF comes close, Turkey’s direct interventions step in. Just before the attack on Aleppo, negotiations between the SDF and the Damascus delegation on 4 January had, according to what was reflected in the press, begun positively and were moving toward a signature. However, Foreign Minister Sheybani, who stands very close to Turkey, entered the meeting, announced that it was over, and expelled the United States delegation. One day later, talks for a security agreement with Israel began in Paris, and an agreement was reached on 6 January. On the same day, this attack took place in Aleppo.
I believe that Turkey was involved in this attack on Aleppo with its full capacity. This was not external support. It was an operation in which Turkey was involved from the planning to the execution, with military, diplomatic, intelligence and technical military dimensions, and which was carried out together with the Damascus administration and armed mercenaries acting on Turkey’s behalf.
The attack was essentially aimed at breaking the will of the Kurds in the negotiations between the SDF and Damascus, undermining their demands for status, diluting their military power to impose integration, and weakening the SDF’s hand at the negotiating table. It can be assessed from many angles, but fundamentally this was Turkey’s intention. What has begun in Aleppo also has a very high potential to spread to other fronts.”
The United States concept is to strengthen Sharaa as much as possible
Özsoy described how the military balance on the ground is shaped by the division between east and west of the Euphrates River, pointing to the United States’ inconsistent stance on this division, Turkey’s interventionist role in the talks between the SDF and Damascus, and possible military scenarios. He said: “The distribution of forces on the ground, how much each side can fight and how much territory it can hold, also determines the framework east of the Euphrates. Until now, the United States has told the Kurds that ‘we have no arrangement regarding west of the Euphrates, we do not get involved there.’ It said the same in Afrin (Efrîn), in Manbij, and in Tal Rifaat. Now, however, the Damascus regime is carrying out a series of military movements toward Deir Hafir and Tabqa. In other words, it is entirely possible that the United States will again take the position of saying ‘this is west of the Euphrates’ and stay out of it. This needs to be said from the outset.
I am not even sure whether there is a clear boundary in the minds of the Americans between west and east of the Euphrates. The Americans have made promises, but there are also promises they did not keep; we have seen this before. Not only in Syria, but also in Iraq and in Afghanistan. Therefore, rather than negotiating over east and west of the Euphrates, I think the United States’ main concept is this: to strengthen al-Sharaa as much as possible. We have already enforced Israel’s security demands, made him submit, and now we can use him as we wish in designing the new Syria. The Kurds, meanwhile, should roll back their demands as much as possible.
In this concept, the weakening of the Kurds is not seen as a problem for the United States. Of course, when we say ‘the United States’ we are not talking about a single actor; there is the State Department, there is United States Central Command (CENTCOM), there are military and bureaucratic structures, and there is Congress. But the team currently running this diplomatic process is led by Tom Barrack. From what we can see, they are not drawing a clear framework for what an agreement between the SDF and the regime should look like. The dominant approach is, ‘just reach some kind of agreement so we can close this issue.’ In the context of Israel, they have for now obtained what they wanted from Damascus; Damascus has, in one way or another, submitted to Israel. The Kurds, on the other hand, have been forced to withdraw their demands and to step back on borders.
The issue is that Turkey is not satisfied with these rollbacks and concessions. It wants the SDF to be eliminated altogether. Yet the Damascus administration had discussed many details with the SDF; there were reports that it had accepted the SDF being positioned within the new army as three divisions and brigades, with a relatively autonomous structure. The process was moving in this direction in the talks on 4 January. But Turkey intervened directly. It thought that the framework that was very close to agreement on 4 January did not suit it and took on a spoiler role. Together with the Damascus administration and the armed mercenaries acting on its behalf, it carried out this attack.
They will probably try to apply even more pressure on the SDF in the coming period; there may be further attacks. Where this will stop depends on where the Americans draw a line. If the Americans draw a clear line, neither Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) nor Turkey will be able to move. But what we see now is that the existence of such a line is questionable; it also appears that the United States has given tacit approval at a certain stage for the forces backed by Damascus and Turkey to be given free rein. How far will this process go? If they do not face strong resistance, they will try to force as many concessions as they can.”
The Kurdish questions in Syria, Iran and Turkey are now deeply intertwined
Hişyar Özsoy described how a possible attack on Iran along the Israel–United States axis could reshape regional politics, the role the Kurds could play in this picture, and the on-the-ground consequences of the United States’ policy of bringing Turkey and Israel closer together in Syria. Özsoy said: “An attack by Israel and the United States on Iran now looks like a matter of timing. The real questions are what its scale will be. At this stage, we cannot fully predict that. However, at least during Israel’s twelve-day assault, no will for regime change emerged in Washington, because there is fear of the problems such a change could create. We do not know whether it will go that far this time. But in any case, if the regime in Iran falls or is weakened, the Kurds will be one of the key actors. That is why the eyes of the United States, Turkey and the Kurds are all, in one way or another, on Iran.
There is also this: if the United States moves to eliminate the Kurds in Syria in one way or another, this will also narrow the ground and possibilities for alliances with the Kurds in Iran. After all, the Kurdish questions in Syria, Iran and Turkey have become intertwined. But I do not think that United States policy, at least under Barrack and his team, is able to read this picture with such nuance.
The dominant logic in Syria is this: we can somehow bring Israel and Turkey together. On the one hand, there is Israel, the West’s biggest ally, which is backed by the entire West despite all its practices and brutality. On the other hand, there is Turkey, a problematic but still North Atlantic Treaty Organization member. The United States wants Turkey and Israel to meet on common ground, to align their security concerns, and to impose a design on Syria. In other words, a Damascus–Turkey–Israel coalition is being sought.”
Özsor also said: “But there is a structural problem here. Turkey does not want the Kurds to establish a political, administrative and military autonomous structure there; it is extremely insistent on this. For that reason, it wants Sharaa to build a rigidly centralized Syrian leadership that concentrates all powers in its hands. Israel, on the other hand, even though it has imposed its own demands on Sharaa, does not trust this regime, the power bloc around Sharaa, or many of the radical Islamist groups he is connected to. It foresees that this regime could create problems for it in the medium and long term.
For this reason, Israel’s interest lies not in an over-strengthened Damascus with growing military capacity, but in a more decentralized and flexible Syria, balanced by the Kurds, the Druze, the Alawites, and other social groups. There is serious disagreement with Turkey, but at the same time a search for a middle ground continues. The United States is also trying to bring Damascus, Israel and Turkey together.
In this equation, pressure is being applied to the Kurds; they are being reduced, weakened and diluted to integrate them into the new regime. Whether this will work is another question. Because the United States can neither completely discard the SDF nor fully dismantle them. On the other hand, the issue of dealing with radical elements in Syria will also come onto the agenda in the future. This is one of the expectations the West has of Sharaa. But Sharaa does not have the military capacity to do this on his own. That is why the United States knows, and says openly, that at some point Sharaa and the SDF will have to work together. There is an extremely complex equation on the table.”
The process in Turkey will not formally collapse
Özsoy said that the developments in Aleppo would likely not lead to a formal collapse of the process underway in Turkey but would force the Kurdish movement to reassess its position. He said: “The process in Turkey will probably not formally collapse; it will continue. There is a commission in parliament; a report will be prepared, and perhaps some partial legal arrangements will be made. But when we look at what happened in Aleppo and what followed, I think all components of the Kurds and the Kurdish movement will have to rethink things very seriously.
Because what happened in Aleppo is not something Turkey merely supported. Turkey is one of the architects of this process; it has put its diplomacy, its intelligence, its political will and its technical-military capacity directly into it. While this brutality was unfolding in Aleppo, it is enough to look at the rhetoric of the government, state officials and the media in Turkey. From Devlet Bahçeli to Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, from ministries to intelligence institutions and the media, a planned and comprehensive concept is clearly visible. This brutality was designed, its propaganda was carried out, and every kind of support was provided. The situation is clear.
The question is what kind of process a state and government mindset that has shown such ruthless hostility toward the Kurds, who have been under siege for six months and confined to two neighborhoods in Aleppo, and toward the security structures there, really expects from the process being conducted in Turkey. I am not optimistic about this. My personal view is this: we are facing a dominationist approach that imposes liquidation and submission on the Kurds both in Syria and in Turkey, that aims to dismantle their political will and their status, and that, when it cannot achieve this, wants them to settle for a few crumbs of rights. Unfortunately, I do not see any intention, will or determination on the part of the state and the government to address the Kurdish issue as a political matter and reach a just and lasting peaceful solution. On the contrary, there is plenty of evidence to the opposite.”