Iran, one of the Middle East’s most strategically critical countries, is experiencing a deep crisis marked by economic collapse, political instability, and the renewed outbreak of popular uprisings. The country, which holds vital importance in terms of energy supply and geopolitical influence in the region, has long been in a fragile position both domestically and in its foreign policy.
The Jin Jiyan Azadî uprisings that began in 2022 had been a significant indicator of social fragility in Iran and the rising influence of women’s movements. At that time, people took to the streets to express their opposition both to the religious guardianship regime and to injustices based on ethnicity, language, and gender. Today, the public’s return to the streets is manifested in widespread uprisings that have been ongoing for more than ten days.
We spoke with sociologist and Iran expert Prof. Abbas Vali, well known for his work on Iran and the Middle East, about the popular uprisings unfolding in Iran, the structure of the opposition, the position of the Kurds, the regime’s options, and possible future scenarios.
We are once again facing popular uprisings in Iran. Looking at the revolt that has been ongoing for more than ten days, what kind of situation are we facing in Iran?
Clearly there is a very profound crisis in Iran. What we see is a country in which the economy has disintegrated, and a government is unable to control any of the major indexes of economic functioning.
And aside from that, there is also a profound political crisis, which I have called the crisis of sovereignty, which means that the government has the levers of power in its hand, but it’s unable to maintain order. It’s unable to run the country without violence. Violence is the only means left to the government to rule.
And this is the situation in Iran now. And we have a country uprising, but this uprising is by no means uniform. Uprising mostly happens in, if you like, peripheral areas, but these peripheral areas, like Luristan, Kurdistan, and also some central parts.
How do you compare the current popular uprisings with previous major social movements?
But this is in terms of its, you know, in terms of its size, clearly it’s a bigger uprising than the Jin jiyan Azadi uprising. But in terms of its depth, the democratic depth, it is not as, if you like, profound and deep as the Jinjan Azadi uprising. The reason for this is that that sector of the opposition, mainly the right-wing royalist opposition, are trying to hijack the uprising.
They are trying to guide it towards their own particular objectives, which is to, in a sense, control the uprising and marginalize its democratic content. This is why not every single person in the country, or not the sort of potential forces in the country, have so far not joined the uprising, because they are very scared that it may be hijacked by the right-wing royalist opposition. But the way that it is going on now, it seems that the government, despite using concentrated mass violence. So far 29 people have been killed, most of them in Elam and Loristan.
Elam, the Kurdish part, and the Loristan part. Most of them are young people. The 29 people have been killed.
Despite all this, this uprising is continuing, and by the hour and by the day, it is getting stronger and stronger.
What is the position of Kurdish political movements in this process?
The Kurdish political parties met, and they have a center of coordination, coordination of their activities. Seven Kurdish political parties met and decided to coordinate their activities against the government, and they gave up a declaration.
In this declaration, they asked the Kurdish people to get out of their houses and join the uprising. They have also declared a day of strike in Kurdistan, which is the day after tomorrow. On Thursday, they asked Kurdish businesses and Kurdish offices, and, in general, all the activities in Kurdistan, to be shut down in support of this uprising.
The situation which is continuing is this, that on the one hand, the regime has lost its legitimacy, the regime has lost the main part of its social support. At present, at the upper estimate, no more than 10% of the population is behind the regime, and this is the 10% which is actively involved in crushing this uprising.
Do you see signs of fragmentation or disintegration within the regime?
There are indications that the power block inside the country, which is headed by the leader Khamenei. The power block is coming apart, because, under democratic pressure from behind, it is unable to hold because of the multiple crises that it is facing, but unable to do anything about it.
And as the power block, the ruling block, is unable to do anything about the economic crisis, about the crisis in education, crisis in security, and everything that has happened after the 12-day war with Israel and America, in this situation, the cracks in the power block are showing up. And this shows up, it is if it continues and reaches the security forces, and if security forces are affected by the uprising, and they change their loyalty, then this government, this regime will fall. But we do not know what may come up, and as I said, the government has only very limited options.
What are the possible options?
One option is to use violence as much as it can, by killing people, maiming people, arresting people, putting people in prison. So far, as I said, 29 have been killed, and more than 2,000 people have been arrested and incarcerated. This option of using violence is one option.
The other option, of course, is for the regime to start negotiation with America, accept all the American demands, that is to end the enriching uranium, to end the nuclear program, and above all, the major bone of contention between America and Iran in the negotiation, which is to stop the missile program in Iran. That is the sticking point in the negotiations. And if the regime is pushed too far by this uprising, I will not be surprised if the regime accepts the American demand, at least to go on with the 10-year moratorium of putting, if you like, a stop on the production of missiles, and also reducing its military power in order to continue and survive.
Therefore, the regime really has these two options. The other option, which is clearly open to the regime, is to start a kind of radical reform inside itself, that is to close down some of the controlling organs of the regime, which is run by the clergy, controls the elections, controls the judiciary, controls the legislature. These organs, like the Council of Guardians or Council of Experts, have to be disbanded and ended.
And if that happens, the way can be opened up, it can be opened up inside the regime for negotiation with the uprising.
Is there a possibility for such negotiations?
The uprising at present doesn’t have any visible leadership or organization. But there is a leadership, there is an opposition outside the country, which is claiming leadership.
There is also an opposition inside the country. Most of them are in prison, or they have been put under house arrest. Now, there is a possibility that if a regime comes to the point that it is not able to hold on any longer, may come to kind of making a compromise with the internal opposition inside the country. Most of them are in prison.
But such a compromise will cost the regime too much, because this opposition simply doesn’t want the basic principles upon which the Islamic Republic is based. That is the doctrine of guardianship of the jurist, which is Khomeini’s doctrine. And also the idea of unity of religion and politics upon which the Islamic Republic is based.
Therefore, one of the major issues for negotiation in any reform will most likely be an attempt to establish a secular government, a reformed secularized Islamic Republic, which is very difficult to hold. In this respect, if you look at it all in all, the crisis, economic crisis, crisis in military security, crisis in social, cultural, this is basically a systemic crisis. That is a crisis which has basically taken over the entire system. And dealing with this reform is very difficult .You mentioned divisions within the opposition.
You mentioned divisions within the opposition. What is the main point of divergence?
On the other hand, among the opposition, the right-wing opposition, represented by the royalists who want to bring back royal rule to the monarchy, to Iran, their attempt is to remove the head of government, which is Khomeini, and the people around him. They don’t, in a sense, in their view, which is a very conservative view, removal of their power bloc would be enough to continue with the business of the day.
But that is not the case. This government, this regime has been in power for 47 years. And in 47 years, it has built numerous institutions, processes, and practices in order to sustain and enforce its own rule.
Those institutions must be dismantled. Those institutions must be, in a sense, destroyed. Without destroying those institutions, removing the leadership, simply removing the leadership, is not going to serve the cause of democracy in Iran.
You said that the ongoing popular uprising is not democratic like the Jin Jiyan Azadî movement. What kind of distinction is there?
This uprising must be democratized. Democracy must be deepened there and must be expanded. By which I mean, if you look at this uprising, unlike the previous uprising, the Jinnah uprising, the Xinjiang Azadi uprising, where the democratic aspect and the democratic character of the uprising was very prominent.
We had a multifaceted, intersectional subject, which was fighting religious apartheid, fighting ethnic, national, linguistic apartheid, was also opposed to gender and sexuality apartheid. Those things now we do not see in this movement. That means that the way that the right-wing are leading, trying to carry this movement forward, is to take the democratic spirit out of it.
Therefore, the task of the democratic forces, including the Kurdish opposition, is to bring back those pluralist democratic slogans to deepen this movement and ask for a kind of pluralist democracy in which the identities of the non-sovereign identities of the Kurds, the Baluchis, the Arabs, the Turkmens and the Azeri Turks will be represented in this opposition and in the kind of alternative that this opposition wants to institute. At present, as I said, the royalists will be content by simply removing the leadership and keeping the system. But removing the leadership and keeping the system is not going to be useful for a democratic cause.
This regime must be dismantled, its institutions must be dismantled, and also the democratization of the movement means that the movement must be united around an alternative which is democratic, pluralist, and also, above all, connected to freedom and justice in the country. Freedom and justice for all. This means that this movement must fight for a kind of pluralist democracy based on democratic citizenship, that citizenship must be de-ethnified, must not have an ethnic character, must not have a religious character, must not have any kind of specific character other than what is called the democratic character, radical democratic character, being representative of the diversity and plurality of the population who are fighting for the downfall of this regime.