Journalist Erdoğan Altan spoke to ANF about the reorganization of ISIS in Syria and Iraq, sharing striking assessments on the group’s renewed activity. Altan said that ISIS-linked structures have intensified their operations, particularly in areas controlled by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), warning that this poses serious risks to regional and international security.
Altan said that more than 2,500 ISIS militants are currently active across Iraq and Syria as he responded to ANF’s questions on the scope and implications of this renewed mobilization.
What kind of organization is HTS? What ideological, military, and political components does it consist of, and how have its relations with Al-Qaeda, local armed groups, and other jihadist structures evolved?
The answer to this question lies in the background of Ahmed al-Sharaa (al- Jolani) and his father, Hussein Mohammad Khalid al-Sharaa.
His father, Hussein Ali Mohammad Khalid al-Sharaa, was born in 1946 in the town of Faiq, located in the Zawiyat Huran area south of the Golan Heights, administratively part of Quneitra Governorate, but under Israeli occupation. His family was among the notable families of the region and took part in the Zawiya Revolt against France between 1920 and 1927.
He was influenced by the principles of Arab nationalism and the leadership of former Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser. In 1963, while still a high school student, he participated in protests against Syria’s separation from Egypt and the coup carried out by the Arab Socialist Baath Party that same year. As a result, he and his friends were detained for four days before being released through tribal mediation.
He refused to join the Baath Party in Syria and crossed into Jordan with the intention of traveling to Cairo, but was detained there for a month and a half. Jordanian authorities sought to deport him and demanded that he choose between Saudi Arabia and Iraq. Due to his proximity to the Iraqi Baath Party, he chose Iraq.
In 1969, prior to the 1970 coup that brought Hafez al-Assad to power, he returned to Syria. He worked as an English teacher in Daraya for one year before being appointed to the General Petroleum Company, where he later served as director of economic affairs and as an adviser to the Ministry of Oil. Between 1972 and 1976, he was a member of the Quneitra Provincial Council on behalf of the National Progressive Front. In 1973, he ran for parliament but was not elected.
At this point, a serious allegation warrants scrutiny: claims that Hussein al-Sharaa became one of the key infiltration agents of Israel’s intelligence service, Mossad, following his appointment to the General Petroleum Company. A similar allegation also emerges later in relation to al- Jolani.
al- Jolani was born in 1982 in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. His father worked as an engineer for a Saudi oil company until 1989, after which the family returned to Syria and settled in the Mezzeh neighborhood of Damascus.
The nickname “al- Jolani” derives from the family’s ties to the Israeli-controlled Golan Heights. After studying for two years at Damascus University, he reportedly dropped out. In 2003, he traveled to Iraq and joined Al-Qaeda, establishing strong ties with Abu Musab al-Zarqawi and assuming significant roles within the organization. Due to his Syrian background, he operated along the Iraq–Syria border and acted as a mediator between foreign and Arab Al-Qaeda members.
In 2005, he was arrested by United States forces in Iraq and released in 2008. He subsequently joined the Iraqi branch of the ISIS. There is a three-year gap during this period, during which it is alleged that he received training in London at a so-called “Leadership Development Academy” run jointly by the United States and the United Kingdom.
With the outbreak of the Syrian crisis in 2011, Al- Jolani entered Syria on the orders of ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi and founded Jabhat al-Nusra, the organization’s Syrian branch. In 2013, al-Baghdadi announced the merger of ISIS and Jabhat al-Nusra, but Al- Jolani rejected this move and aligned himself with Al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri.
In 2016, Jabhat al-Nusra was renamed Jabhat Fatah al-Sham and announced that it had severed ties with Al-Qaeda. Later that year, the group relocated from Ghouta to Idlib. In 2017, Al- Jolani officially announced the establishment of HTS and appeared publicly as a civilian figure.
After consolidating control over rural areas extending from Idlib to Afrin, HTS reorganized its structure by forming twelve new brigades, six combat brigades and six administrative brigades, developing a new military strategy. The group’s military wing announced the creation of three major brigades: the Talha bin Abdullah Brigade led by Abu Hafs Binash; the Ali ibn Abi Talib Brigade led by Abu Bakr Muhin; and the Zubayr ibn al-Awwam Brigade led by Abu Mohammad Shura.
Prior to this restructuring, a Mujahideen Shura Council had been established, along with regional and sectoral emirates, division commands, and commanders overseeing groups in towns and villages. Prominent figures within this structure included former Jabhat al-Nusra military commander Abu Hammam al-Shami, as well as Abu Omar al-Kurdi and Abu Musab. Additional brigades were tasked with internal security, checkpoints, traffic control, and covert operations.
Most of these structures and individuals previously operated within Al-Qaeda, ISIS, and the Syrian National Army (SNA) and are listed by international states, institutions, and organizations as designated terrorists. Despite this, relations with these structures and affiliated individuals continue to this day, a point that must be recorded as a critical footnote.
What kinds of threats does the presence of ISIS-linked groups within HTS pose for the region? How does this affect relations and contradictions among international and regional powers, particularly the United States, Russia, Iran, and Turkey?
HTS claims that it has severed its ties with Al-Qaeda in Syria. However, a significant portion of the elements within its ranks maintain historical and ideological links to ISIS. Some of these individuals originate directly from structures that previously operated within ISIS. This situation creates favorable conditions for ISIS to regain strength within Syria’s fragmented political and military landscape.
HTS’s consolidation of control over Idlib and its surroundings has enabled ISIS cells to infiltrate these areas or for former members to be integrated into HTS structures, leading to a noticeable increase in terrorist attacks. Recent months have indeed seen a rise in ISIS operations. Estimates indicate that approximately 2,500 ISIS militants are currently active across Syria and Iraq.
ISIS groups that have taken part in massacre attacks targeting Alawite and Druze communities are also laying the groundwork for new atrocities and assaults. It is widely known that large numbers of foreign ISIS militants have been positioned in coastal regions under the name of HTS, further heightening the risk of renewed violence and instability.
The fact that ISIS operates with its own symbols in areas under the control of the Damascus authorities and carries out massacres targeting Alawites has raised serious questions. What kinds of debates does this situation trigger regarding the current Damascus government’s security capacity and political legitimacy?
The continuation of the previous answer and the response to this question, I believe, can be clearly demonstrated through the following concrete facts: As with all radical Sunni organizations, ISIS benefited from the arrival and consolidation of HTS in Syria. The character and ideological profile of ISIS figures are very close to those of HTS, and many personal ties and relationships were forged during years of war. ISIS has made effective use of these connections and has consistently operated through planned strategies and projects, despite the existence of rivalry between the two groups. For these same reasons, ISIS has benefited significantly from the recent shifts on the ground. In parallel, it has been established that armed groups affiliated with the Turkish state have also maintained relations with ISIS on multiple levels. Although these groups are reported to have integrated into the so-called interim government, no genuine integration has taken place. They remain independent in every respect and operate in line with the outlook and priorities of the Turkish state. At the same time, ISIS continues to exploit the overall state of chaos in Syria. The organization thrives under such conditions, rebuilding its structures and carrying out its activities amid fragmentation and instability. This environment allows ISIS to operate openly, even in areas nominally under the control of the Damascus authorities, thereby deepening debates over the regime’s security capacity and undermining its claims to political legitimacy, particularly considering ongoing massacres targeting Alawite communities.
Movements of Turkish state-affiliated forces and ISIS activities
ISIS has intensified its activities in the region amid attacks by Turkish state forces and Turkish state-affiliated mercenaries targeting the Autonomous Administration and Aleppo areas. According to official media sources of the interim government, attacks carried out by mercenaries since October in Deir Hafir, Deir ez-Zor (Derazor), and the Sheikh Maqsoud (Şexmeqsud) and Ashrafiah (Eşrefiye) neighborhoods have continued, alongside ISIS operations in these areas.
On November 20–21, 2025, slogans asserting ISIS’s presence and continuity were written on the wall of a building in the rural village of Anjara north of Aleppo, as well as on the wall of a mosque in the Meşrika neighborhood.
On November 4, ISIS carried out an attack on a customs vehicle on the road between Aleppo and Deir Hafir, killing two customs officers.
On November 26, ISIS attacked a customs patrol on the Aleppo–Raqqa Road, injuring several patrol officers.
On December 20, ISIS set up a temporary roadblock on an international highway near the town of Tell Rifaat, an area under the control of Turkish state-backed mercenaries.
On December 23, 2025, Aleppo’s Internal Security Chief, Mohammed Abdulksani, announced that internal security units, in coordination with the General Intelligence Directorate, had carried out a targeted operation against an ISIS cell hideout. Three ISIS militants were reportedly captured along with their ammunition.
Also on December 23, slogans referring to ISIS’s presence and continuity were written on the wall of the Al-Bukhtiri School in Aleppo’s Şehar neighborhood.
On December 27, 2025, a member of the Ministry of Defense was killed in Aleppo’s Seif al-Dawla neighborhood.
The incidents listed above indicate a marked increase in ISIS activity following the transfer of control in the area to Turkish state-affiliated mercenaries. The pattern also suggests that both sides act from a similar perspective and seek an escalation of tension across the region.
Deployment of Turkish state-backed mercenaries within the Syrian army
Following the reorganization of the Syrian army and the incorporation of Turkish state-affiliated mercenaries into its structure, their deployments were arranged as follows: in the Aleppo region, Division 72, known as Firqah 72, was placed under the leadership of Doxan, who is responsible for the Sultan Mohammed Fatih faction, while Division 76 was led by Seyf al-Din Poat (also known as Abu Bakr), who oversees the Hamzat Division mercenaries. In the Hama region, Division 62, under the leadership of Mohammed Jasim (Abu Amsha), was made responsible for the Sultan Suleiman Shah (Amshat) faction. In the Deir ez-Zor region, Division 68, led by Ahmed Hasun (Abu Hatim Shaqra), was tasked with overseeing the Ahrar al-Sharqiya mercenaries. According to reports, Turkish state-affiliated mercenaries have been deployed along the borders of the so-called Harezm administration, stretching from northern to southern Syria, and their structures have been shaped in line with the interests of the Turkish state. It is also stated that Turkey consistently uses these mercenaries to increase pressure on the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF).
Areas under the control of mercenaries and ISIS activity
In areas where Turkish state-backed mercenaries have spread, particularly across Homs, Hama, and Deir ez-Zor, ISIS activity has been notably high. Recent operations attributed to ISIS in these regions include the following:
October 8, 2025: ISIS attacked a patrol unit on the road between Palmyra (Tadmur) and Homs, injuring three people.
October 16: An attack targeted a temporary government military post in the western and eastern countryside of Deir ez-Zor.
October 17: ISIS struck military positions around the village of Shaumeriyeh near al-Sukhnah.
October 20: Forces of the SDF ambushed a group on the Hanim al-Ali frontline east of Raqqa. After images and videos of the ambush were released, it emerged that the ambushed group consisted of ISIS militants.
November 14, 2025: ISIS targeted a military vehicle in the al-Sukhnah Desert and in Palmyra.
November 16: ISIS planted a mine on a vehicle transporting oil-field workers.
November 26: An ISIS attack targeted a patrol unit in eastern Deir ez-Zor.
November 29: ISIS activity increased in the al-Faraqles, al-Qaryatayn, and Homs Desert areas.
December 6: ISIS cells targeted a military patrol east of Hama, killing two people.
December 12: Graffiti declaring ISIS’s presence and continuity appeared on walls in the cities of Hama and Homs.
December 13: ISIS graffiti was written in the village of Termela in the Homs countryside. On the same day, an ISIS member attacked a coalition delegation in Palmyra, killing two United States soldiers and a translator.
December 26: ISIS detonated an explosive device at a Shiite Mosque in the Wadi al-Zahab neighborhood of Homs.
These incidents point to a sustained escalation of ISIS activity in areas where Turkish state-backed mercenaries have expanded their presence, underscoring the growing security risks across central and eastern Syria.
How has the growing influence of HTS and al-Jolani over Damascus created new military, logistical, or ideological opportunities for ISIS?
The expanding influence of HTS and al- Jolani over Damascus has directly contributed to Syria’s fragmentation and opened new opportunities for ISIS.
From a military perspective, the resulting power vacuum has allowed ISIS cells, particularly those based in central desert areas, to reorganize and expand their operations. The number of ISIS attacks reportedly tripled in 2024, reflecting the group’s ability to exploit weakened state control. On the logistical level, the erosion of border controls has facilitated the movement of weapons and militants, making it easier for ISIS to sustain and expand its networks across Syria. Ideologically, HTS’s Salafi-jihadist roots have created an environment in which ISIS can attract radical elements and former fighters. At the same time, periodic clashes between HTS and ISIS have intensified competition between the two, rather than eliminating ISIS’s space of maneuver. In addition, unresolved integration problems within the fragmented Syrian army, along with the release of ISIS members from former Assad-era prisons, have further deepened instability in the region, providing ISIS with fresh manpower and operational room.
Could the inclusion of the Damascus government in the international coalition against ISIS become an effective and results-oriented strategy, or would it create new political problems?
The inclusion of the new Damascus government in the anti-ISIS coalition would inevitably generate internal conflicts. Although a few symbolic operations have reportedly been carried out with intelligence sharing from the United States and support from Jordan, this step has already produced serious political complications. The historical roots of HTS in ISIS-affiliated structures are an openly acknowledged reality. A cosmopolitan country such as Syria cannot be governed with an ISIS-style mindset. Under these conditions, HTS faces two possible paths: either it will completely sever all its ties with ISIS, or it will bring about its own downfall by imposing a system of governance that runs counter to Syria’s mosaic identity. Both scenarios, however, lay the groundwork for new conflicts in Syria rather than offering a stable and effective strategy in the fight against ISIS.
How do you assess the relations between HTS, al-Jolani, and Turkey? Do these relations have a direct or indirect impact on ISIS regaining strength in the region? Considering the siege of both neighborhoods in Aleppo and the attacks targeting Christians around the New Year, are these developments a result of such ties?
Relations between HTS, al-Jolani, and Turkey are described as very close. Turkey has supported HTS from the outset and used it against the People’s Protection Units in 2014. Groups affiliated with the SNA were also positioned in key posts within HTS. A series of agreements were reached with HTS, particularly as part of Turkey’s efforts to maintain control over northeastern Syria. Turkey’s links with ISIS and its support for the group are widely known internationally. The Turkish state has treated ISIS as a proxy force on the ground and has continued to make use of the group in line with its strategic interests in Syria. Reports in the media indicated that, just a month ago, numerous ISIS mercenaries were transferred to the Aleppo countryside under the coordination of the National Intelligence Organization (MIT). Previous analyses have also pointed out that Aleppo has been turned into an ISIS hub.
The attacks targeting the Sheikh Maqsoud and Ashrafieh neighborhoods cannot be viewed independently of these steps by the Turkish state. In Aleppo, assaults on Kurdish neighborhoods are being carried out on the one hand by ISIS mercenaries embedded within the SNA, and on the other hand through sieges and embargoes enforced by HTS-affiliated general security forces. The bomb attacks carried out against Christian and Alawite communities around the New Year are likewise described as having been executed by ISIS through joint planning between National Intelligence Organization and HTS. Taken together, these dynamics suggest that the close relations between HTS, al-Jolani, and Turkey have played a significant role, both directly and indirectly, in creating the conditions that allow ISIS to regroup and expand its operational space in and around Aleppo.
Is this broader picture linked to the attack carried out against United States forces in the Tadmur (Palmyra) area? Should this attack be seen as part of ISIS’s reorganization process and as a political instrument of threat?
Yes, the two are directly connected. The Palmyra attack is part of ISIS’s ongoing reorganization. Syria’s fragmentation has opened space for ISIS, and the attack exposed both the government’s security weaknesses and ISISs continued use as a political threat instrument. The United States’ retaliatory operation, during which more than 70 targets were reportedly struck, confirmed this assessment. It was also revealed that the individual who carried out the Palmyra attack had links to HTS and to the Turkish state. Reports further indicated that Turkey’s National Intelligence Organization engaged in intensive efforts to secure the release of individuals detained by the United States.
Recent developments clearly show that the scale of ISIS activity has increased significantly. One striking aspect is that all of these operations have taken place in areas under the control of Turkish state-affiliated mercenaries, while ISIS has not carried out a single attack against them. This points to a relationship between the actions of both sides; it can even be said that they are acting in coordination. In this sense, Turkey is using ISIS to advance its own interests. Attacks targeting areas controlled by the SDF serve the Turkish state’s agenda by fueling hostility between Arab and Kurdish communities in Syria, weakening both and preventing Syria from regaining strength.
At the same time, these attacks are also framed as preparations for a potential confrontation with Israel. In the event of an attack on Turkey, these radical forces and the mercenaries aligned with them could be rapidly mobilized against Israel. The Palmyra operation carried out by ISIS-linked mercenaries within HTS also aligns with Turkish interests. Since the fall of the Baath regime, Turkey has sought to establish bases in these areas, but Israel has blocked such moves. For this reason, Ankara opposes the deployment of the international coalition against ISIS in the Palmyra area, seeking to preserve its own leverage there.
Overall, Turkey’s approach to Syria has never gone beyond advancing its own interests. The policies pursued by ISIS and allied armed structures have consistently served the same objective, reinforcing instability rather than contributing to any genuine resolution.
Regarding the attack in Yalova, information reflected in the media suggests that ISIS had long been able to operate and organize freely in the area. It was also reported that some ISIS members had previously been detained and then released. Why did the Turkish state feel the need to carry out such an operation at this stage?
A similar pattern to developments in Northern Kurdistan and Turkey is now unfolding in Northeast Syria. The equation in Syria is fragile and constantly on the brink of new conflicts. The attacks targeting the Sheikh Maqsoud and Ashrafieh neighborhoods on the very day a Turkish delegation held talks in Damascus were not coincidental; they were part of a direct provocation aimed at the Autonomous Administration. The leading figure behind this dirty scenario is Turkey’s Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan. Immediately after his threat that “if the SDF do not lay down their arms, civil war will break out,” civilians were targeted. The clique imposing deadlock and keeping coup mechanisms alive is headed by Fidan. He acts not like a foreign minister, but like a minister of war. Whenever a glimmer of hope for peace emerges, he appears on screens to issue threats on behalf of the state. He is the figure exerting the greatest effort to ensure that no solution is reached in Syria.
Fidan has consistently deployed provocative rhetoric and actions to sabotage peace efforts in both Northern Kurdistan and Northeast Syria. The dirty methods used through the media, bureaucracy, judiciary, and politics are clear indicators of the deep rot that has surfaced in recent times. The familiar “good cop–bad cop” routine has once again been brought onto the stage. Yet it must not be forgotten that both roles serve the same center. Ignoring the “good cop” role played by the Justice and Development Party (AKP)–Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Nationalist Movement Party (MHP)–Devlet Bahçeli clique, which paves the way for and supports Fidan’s “bad cop” role, would be a serious mistake.
At the same time, there is a direct link to the fact that international powers are waging a major energy struggle in Syria and across the Middle East. For this reason, regional, tactical, and strategic moves are not aimed at resolving Syria’s problems but at enforcing deadlock. Apart from the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria, no force or state, foremost among them the Turkish state, truly wants chaos and crisis in Syria to end. Even if some institutions and circles attempt to present goodwill gestures in their statements, they quickly face pressure from transnational capital interests.
Despite all these adverse conditions, the hope and perspective for peoples to live together, within the framework of the Peace and Democratic Society process initiated by Abdullah Öcalan, have also opened the way for strong resistance against the chaos and crises that are being deliberately manufactured.