Massacre attacks targeting Alawites have intensified since Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) came to power in Syria. Despite widespread reactions, attacks carried out by HTS under the leadership of Ahmed al-Sharaa (Al-Jolani) and affiliated jihadist mercenaries have continued.
With the added impact of Turkey’s permissive stance toward the HTS administration, these mercenaries have openly continued to kill Alawites and occupy residential areas. By failing to comply with the 10 March Agreement it signed with the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), the HTS administration has repeatedly demonstrated its intention to threaten other communities living in Syria and to prolong the war in the country.
Peoples’ Equality and Democracy Party (DEM Party) Istanbul MP Celal Fırat spoke to ANF about the massacres carried out by HTS.
Turkey described the events as political manipulation
Celal Fırat said the Turkish government had taken no concrete action against the attacks carried out by HTS, adding that official statements were seen as inadequate by Alawite institutions. Fırat said: “In early 2025, severe violence targeting the Alawite population took place along Syria’s western coastal regions, particularly in Latakia and Tartus. Numerous reports reflected in the public domain documented the massacre of hundreds of Alawite civilians, the systematic targeting of villages, and the abduction of women, children, and the elderly. These events must now be unequivocally recognised as massacres and grave human rights violations; indeed, international circles are also assessing them in this way.
In Turkey, the government limited itself to verbal condemnations of sectarian attacks, while issuing statements stressing that what was happening should not be turned into ‘political manipulation’ or ‘domestic political material.’ As Alawite institutions and as the Alawite community, we clearly state that this approach obscures the real humanitarian tragedy on the ground, renders the bloodshed invisible, and produces a language that soothes consciences but does not save lives.
As someone who is part of the political structure I represent and as an Alawite citizen, I have openly and without hesitation condemned the massacres targeting Alawites in Syria. We have repeatedly stated that Turkey must use its diplomatic power and international influence more effectively to stop these massacres. We have also consistently underlined that pushing minorities out of political processes, leaving them unprotected, and denying their existence only fuels this environment of violence.”
UN and human rights reports are insufficient
Fırat said that reports published by the United Nations and independent human rights commissions documenting violations against Alawites remained inadequate. He continued: “Today, the United Nations and independent human rights commissions are preparing reports stating that these attacks against civilian targets constitute human rights violations. Violations directed particularly at Alawite communities are included in these reports. However, unfortunately, the reports that have been prepared are not sufficient to stop the Alawite blood being shed in Syria. Every death that is documented and every attack that cannot be prevented shows that the international system is failing its test of conscience.
We define what is happening not merely as a security issue, but as an open sectarian hate attack, a form of social execution, and even a process of genocide. As we raise our voices, we connect these massacres to the historical traumas we have experienced in the past. Because of Alawites, these attacks are not new; in our collective memory there is a chain of pain stretching from Maraş to Çorum, from Dersim to Sivas. What is happening in Syria today represents a new link in this chain, showing that Alawite identity is being systematically targeted for destruction.”
Portraying the events as a civil war or general chaos is inadequate
Celal Fırat said it was misleading to describe what is happening merely as a civil war or a state of general chaos, continuing as follows: “Some countries and certain circles argue that this violence should not be explained solely through sectarian hatred, pointing instead to factors such as internal political power vacuums, the growing influence of radical groups, and post-state chaos. Of course, these elements exist. However, when all these analyses ultimately present what is happening as ‘merely the result of a civil war’ or a ‘general state of chaos,’ they render invisible the dimension of hatred directed at Alawites. This is precisely what deeply wounds us. Because the truth is clear:
Those being targeted are Alawites; those being killed are Alawite civilians, and what is being denied once again is Alawite life.
For this reason, we will not remain silent. For this reason, we will insist on naming these massacres correctly. Because every atrocity that is left unnamed paves the way for the next one.”
Reactions of Alawites in Turkey remain fragmented and inconsistent
Fırat said there have been reactions among the Alawite community in Turkey to the massacres in Syria but noted that these responses have remained fragmented rather than collective. He also said: “Protests and written statements are being made; reactions are rising on social media, and some institutions are issuing press statements. Individually, Alawite intellectuals, religious leaders, and academics are speaking out. However, all these reactions remain partial, fragmented, and inconsistent.
In my view, the main reason for this is that the Alawite community in Turkey has a highly fragmented organisational structure. This fragmentation has many causes, of course, but the most decisive factor is that the state has systematically dismantled Alawite organisation through its own institutions and policies.
This is part of a deliberate process of assimilation. As a result, producing a collective reflex is difficult. A common crisis desk cannot be established; a shared language cannot be developed, and a unified timetable cannot be created. Everyone is speaking, but not at the same time, from the same place, or with the same strength.
On the other hand, Alawite institutions do not want the Alawite community to be targeted once again. Many Alawite organisations act with the concern of ‘not becoming a target again’ and this concern leads to the adoption of a cautious but, unfortunately, ineffective language.
There are institutions that are resisting, but the system intervenes effectively there as well, and the outcome is clear: blood continues to flow, yet the voice raised against it remains weak.
In none of the Alawite massacres that have taken place in this country have legal processes been made genuinely visible. Beneath this silence lies in the memory of a society that has lived through Maraş, Çorum, Sivas, Dersim, and Koçgirî. This memory exists alongside deep anxiety, and the feeling that ‘if we shout too loudly, things will get worse’ remains strong.
In other words, while we continue to live in a state of apprehension even in the geography we inhabit, the state’s failure to name these massacres clearly means that Alawites are often able to object to this injustice only through the language of faith, and only to a limited extent through the language of rights.”
Attacks on Alawites can also be read as a tool to draw the SDF into war
Celal Fırat said that attacks targeting Alawites and reactions to the Alawite community’s demands for federation could also be interpreted as part of a plan to draw the SDF back into war. Fırat said: “Attacks against demands for federation or autonomy voiced by Alawites, along with systematic targeting, can today clearly be read as one of the tools being used to pull the SDF back into the war.
However, it is not possible to explain this picture under a single heading. What is happening is part of a much broader, multi-layered, and dangerous geopolitical scenario.
First, this must be stated clearly: the demands articulated by the Alawite community in the Syrian context do not constitute a call for a separate state. They are not an armed project, nor are they a search for sectarian rule.
The demands of Alawites are extremely clear: the right to life and security, the right to local governance, political representation, and the protection of their collective existence. These demands are expressed through concepts such as federation, autonomy, or decentralised administration, because the suffering experienced has left no other form of guarantee.”
Alawite demands run counter to HTS’s vision of governance
Fırat said that the persistent massacre attacks targeting Alawites are closely linked to the fact that Alawite demands contradict the form of governance sought by HTS. He also said: “Why are these demands, so legitimate and so profoundly human, being targeted with such severity? Because they run counter to the vision of rebuilding Syria from a single centre and under a single identity. They place limits on the rule of armed groups over lawless spaces. They undermine the ground on which radical and sectarian elements mobilise society.
It is precisely for this reason that Alawite demands for rights are deliberately criminalised with labels such as ‘separatism,’ ‘provocation,’ or a ‘foreign plot.’”
Attacks on Alawite federation demands aim to draw Kurds into war
Celal Fırat said the position of the SDF is of vital importance, warning that black propaganda carried out through Alawite demands for federation is also aimed at pulling the SDF into war. Fırat continued:
“At this point, the position of the SDF is of vital importance.
Today, the SDF stands within a fragile ceasefire balance and is squeezed between the United States, Russia, Turkey, and Damascus. If forced into a new front, the SDF is positioned within an equation that could trigger a multi-actor conflict.
Alongside attacks targeting Alawites, the discourse of ‘federation’ is being circulated through the following propaganda language: ‘Look, a new division is coming. Look, a new line of autonomy is being established. Therefore, armed intervention is legitimate.’
This language does not target Alawites alone; it also creates a ground that forces the SDF into becoming a party against its will, thereby re-legitimising war. This must be stated clearly: until now, Alawites have had no organic link with the SDF. Yet it is now evident that they are paying a heavy price for not having such a link created. Through a deliberate strategy, these two issues are being deliberately overlaid. The objective is clear: to equate Alawite demands with Kurdish military presence, manufacture a perception of threat, and legitimise armed interventions.”
The attacks serve those who oppose a pluralistic future in Syria
Celal Fırat said the massacre attacks and rising tensions benefit those who do not want a multi-identity, pluralistic future in Syria, concluding as follows:
“Who does this tension serve? It serves radical armed groups, those who defend a centralised model of rule, and regional actors who do not want Syria to build a multi-identity, pluralistic future. Because when the SDF is drawn into war, stability collapses; Alawites are presented as a ‘security problem,’ and their demands for rights are suppressed.
The most dangerous point is this: the Alawite community’s right to life, physical security, and demand for equal citizenship are deliberately portrayed as a military threat. This approach fuels a dark politics that targets not only Alawites, but also Kurds, Druze, Christians, and all minorities in Syria.
We object to this, because the Alawites do not want war. Alawites do not seek power. Alawites simply want to live, to exist, and to have a say over their own destiny. And this demand is neither a crime nor a threat; on the contrary, it is the only genuine foundation for peace and coexistence.”