The Syrian civil war has produced one of the deepest political and social disintegrations of the modern Middle East. In a geography where the state apparatus has withdrawn, the rule of law has been suspended, and armed groups and foreign interventions have shaped realities on the ground, the dominant feeling for a long time was nothing but chaos. Yet this chaos is not an abstract concept; it represents destruction with concrete historical dimensions.
Defined as one of the greatest humanitarian catastrophes of our era since the Second World War, the Syrian crisis has claimed the lives of hundreds of thousands of civilians, according to United Nations data, with the true death toll likely far higher due to unrecorded casualties. Nearly 14 million people have been displaced: 6.8 million as refugees and 6.7 million internally displaced within their own country.
More than 16 million people are in urgent need of humanitarian assistance, and millions of children are direct victims of war and devastation. These figures make clear that what has unfolded in Syria is not merely a civil war, but one of the most profound social and humanitarian collapses of the modern era.
For precisely this reason, any political order that emerges amid destruction on this scale must be understood not simply as a governance choice, but as an existential response to chaos. History is not written solely in the language of destruction. At certain moments, order emerges unexpectedly from within disintegration itself. Recent world history is replete with such examples.
The Latin phrase Ordo ab Chao (order born from chaos) is not a randomly chosen metaphor to describe the experience of Rojava and Northern Syria. The structure that emerged from 2012 onward was not a predesigned state project, but the outcome of society’s effort to preserve its existence and generate continuity in the absence of the state.
Developing amid security vacuums, sectarian violence, and forced displacement, this experience did not seek to impose order by suppressing chaos; rather, it aimed to build order by recognizing chaos, internalizing its parameters, and managing it.
What has been constructed in Rojava is not a centralized authority in the classical sense, but a political rationality based on local councils, social participation, women’s leadership, and multi-ethnic representation. In this respect, Rojava has reversed the logic of “order first, society later.” Society has become not the object of order, but its founding subject. Emerging from chaos, this order is therefore both innovative and fragile.
Yet the political order produced by Rojava has been read by the international system not as a stabilizing force, but as a source of uncertainty. This is because hegemonic powers do not seek democratic depth or social legitimacy, but rather a “controllable stability” that is predictable, negotiable, and steerable when necessary. Rojava produces values but cannot be controlled. This has transformed it from a model to be supported into an experiment to be constrained. Had it been seen as a structure to be eliminated outright, the orientation of hegemonic powers would have been far more destructive.
This contradiction has been clearly visible on the ground. One of the most socially legitimate structures in Syria has simultaneously been the least protected. Conversely, centralized, single-interlocutor, negotiable actors—regardless of their past—have been rendered “acceptable” options. This preference is less a moral deviation than a consequence of the system’s own operational logic.
What has been prioritized is not democracy, but governability and manipulability. The de facto exclusion of Hatay and the Golan Heights from the Syrian map stands as one of the clearest examples of this approach.
It is precisely here that Rojava’s dilemma has deepened. The order born from chaos established itself on the ground, but did not possess equivalent power at the negotiating table. Under asymmetrical negotiation conditions, political gains were treated not as rights, but as temporary concessions. Under headings such as “integration,” “centralization,” and “security,” efforts were made to hollow out this order from within. The order born from chaos was now to be suffocated at the table.
Turkey’s position has been decisive throughout this process. Ankara has framed Rojava not as a political experiment, but as an existential threat, pursuing this approach not only through military operations but also through diplomatic and political pressure. International actors, seeking to avoid direct confrontation with Turkey, have viewed Rojava as a dispensable space. Thus, the discourse of “controllable stability” has paved the way for the hollowing out of democratic structures on the ground under the banner of “integration.”
However, reading the order established in Rojava solely through the lenses of security and governance would be incomplete. Any political structure that can survive amid chaos must also rest upon a social and economic foundation capable of sustaining life. This is where the true achievement of the political mind governing Rojava and Northern Syria becomes evident.
This assessment is not merely the result of an external reading. The period that began with a conference held in Amed in 2015 for the reconstruction of Kobanê and continued through mid-2021 with direct engagement on the ground provided concrete opportunities to observe how this political rationality functions.
Humanitarian aid, healthcare, basic needs provision, and reconstruction efforts carried out alongside military fronts clearly demonstrated that political claims only resonate to the extent that they sustain everyday life. The reality on the ground was clear: order was not upheld by slogans, but by healthcare services, the weaving of social networks, access to basic necessities—in short, by the continuity of life itself.
For this reason, the economic policies adopted in Rojava and Northern Syria rest on micro-level but highly decisive measures. Ensuring that essential commodities such as sugar, fuel, and basic foodstuffs remain accessible at controlled prices; preventing strategic resources like oil from being surrendered to market speculation; and above all, organizing healthcare services to be entirely free or provided without regard for payment—these are the concrete expressions of this political rationality.
These are not grand ideological claims, but vital balancing mechanisms that prevent social disintegration, displacement, and collapse.
It must be emphasized: this approach is not a romanticized “alternative economic model.” Capitalist reflexes, market relations, and irregular practices persist in this geography as well. This is inevitable. What is decisive is preventing these reflexes from becoming destructive to the political and social fabric. Rather than surrendering the economy to the absolute dominance of the free market, the governing rationality in Rojava has focused on preserving the minimum balance points necessary to keep society standing.
For this very reason, the economic pillar constitutes the sustainability test of the order beyond military and political momentum. A ground where people can receive treatment, access basic needs, and are not pushed into absolute uncertainty about the future serves as the silent but vital carrier of political order. Rojava’s survival to date has been possible because this carrying rationality has been preserved despite immense pressure.
Today, signals from the field indicate that this capacity is being directly targeted. The process conducted under the discourse of “integration” is turning into a liquidation line advancing through unilateral impositions rather than mutual and binding agreements. Turkey’s “multi-instrument pressure” strategy—simultaneously deploying diplomacy, security, and political coercion—aims to appropriate the military, political, and social accumulation built over more than a decade.
The essence of initiatives carried out in Turkey under banners such as “Terror-Free Turkey” and “National Solidarity, Brotherhood, and Democracy” is likewise the takeover—without war—of gains achieved in Rojava at immense cost. Ultimately, the cost of a potential war would be heavy for all parties.
The non-implementation of the March 10 Agreement should not be accepted as a pressure timetable for Rojava and the Kurds. Such deadlines are externally imposed techniques designed to break willpower, but they can be neutralized by a political rationality that maintains its own internal agenda and continuity. For this reason, all attacks aimed at passivizing and breaking Rojava’s political and military will must be systematically countered—not merely through reflexes, but with consistent arguments, persuasive political formulations, and legitimate grounding.
In such a context, Kurds cannot be expected to remain passive under all circumstances. The issue is not the glorification of war, but resistance to the normalization of powerlessness. A people constantly threatened with war cannot be forced into silence indefinitely. Imposed conditions sometimes push societies toward thresholds they do not choose; this is not preference, but historical compression.
It is precisely at this point that our responsibility becomes clear. The purpose of this text is not to offer advice to the political mind governing Rojava and Northern Syria. That mind has already succeeded in surviving for more than a decade amid war, embargo, and siege; it has produced and proven its own mastery. Nor is our task merely to applaud this achievement from afar. The true responsibility lies in adopting a serious and collective political position capable of defending this rationality under all conditions, giving voice to it in the face of attacks, and speaking on its behalf when necessary.
Because some orders endure not because they are recognized from the outside, but because they are not abandoned from within. The greatest achievement of the political mind governing Rojava and Northern Syria has been not merely resisting amid chaos, but making life possible. What will now be decisive is the extent to which this capacity for survival can be defended.
