KCK Executive Council Member Mustafa Karasu spoke to ANF about the first year of the process shaped by Abdullah Öcalan’s Peace and Democratic Society perspective, the responsibilities of the state and society, and how to struggle against forces opposed to a resolution.
The first part of this interview can be read here.
Throughout this process, there has been frequent discussion of the “coup mechanism”, a phenomenon that Abdullah Öcalan has repeatedly highlighted for many years, strongly warning about its dangers. Some of the steps you have taken were explicitly aimed at leaving no room for possible provocations. Do you think the state’s approach to these circles is appropriate? What should the government do to secure the continuation of the process?
Leader Apo [Abdullah Öcalan] addressed and analyzed the structural risk of the coup mechanism decades ago, and reality has confirmed his warnings. The coup attempt of July 15, 2016, was a direct consequence of the unresolved Kurdish question. It should be recalled that circles close to Gülen distinguished themselves by particularly aggressive hostility toward the PKK and Leader Apo, seeking to profile themselves and legitimize their claim to power within the state.
As long as the Kurdish question remains unresolved, there will always be actors who try to present themselves as “patriotic saviors” through exaggerated anti-Kurdish rhetoric and derive from this a justification for authoritarian or even coup-like interventions. In Turkey, coups have always had historical or fabricated pretexts. The military coup of September 12, 1980, also originated in the growing visibility and organization of the Kurdish freedom movement. Today, we are once again witnessing how certain circles portray the very discussion of the Kurdish question as a threat. These groups style themselves as self-appointed “defenders of national unity” and accumulate power so that, when the opportunity arises, they can once again violently shake the political order. As long as the Kurdish question remains unresolved, there will structurally always be coup potential in Turkey, a latent “coup habitus.”
The most effective way to counter such anti-democratic forces is to socialize the peace process, to make it a concern of the entire society. The government must take responsibility for this and actively contribute, through its stance and language, to broad social ownership of the process. Media and other influential actors that have so far distinguished themselves through nationalist and militaristic discourse should abandon this and assume a constructive role in democratization and peacebuilding. This would not only strengthen the legitimacy of the process but also significantly narrow the room for maneuver of potential coup actors.
Some of those uncomfortable with the process are Kurdish. This group used to say, when the PKK was fighting, “By waging war they are harming us. Why are they fighting?” Now they say, “Why did it end the war?” and carry out a counterpropaganda. What is the aim of these groups? Why do efforts toward peace and toward resolving the Kurdish question disturb them so deeply? How should the Kurdish people approach these groups? How to respond to them?
There have always been declared opponents of Leader Apo and the PKK. Some individuals and groups have never been able to accept that Leader Apo and the PKK have become the defining force of Kurdish politics over the past 50 years, exerting social and political influence in all four parts of Kurdistan. The so-called “process-opposing Kurds” you refer to have made no discernible contribution to the Kurdish people’s freedom struggle, neither militarily nor politically.
It must be said clearly: The PKK emerged on the political stage as a movement of the Kurdish poor, specifically as a movement of the Kurmanc. Unlike those currents that see capitalism as the engine of national self-determination, the PKK analyzed that capitalism accelerates the genocide of the Kurds and is used as an instrument of colonial annihilation. In practice, it has indeed become clear that capitalist structures are deliberately used to erode Kurdish social structures. From this follows the PKK’s fundamental break with the collaborating, capitalist-oriented class, a break that was a founding principle.
Those engaging in black propaganda think whether they can fill the space left by the PKK
When a ceasefire was called in 1999, these groups said that “The PKK abandoned the struggle.” When guerrilla activities resumed in 2004, they said, “The war harms us.” Today, now that the PKK has dissolved itself and decided to completely end armed struggle, they accuse Leader Apo and the movement of giving up the struggle, after more than 50 years of tireless commitment. In reality, Leader Apo aims to bring this decades-long struggle to a democratic resolution. He emphasizes that a state-centered solution may preserve the status quo, but a democratic solution will bring real progress for the Kurds. Everything that could be achieved through armed struggle has been achieved. Clinging to an outdated paradigm will now only harm the Kurds. Ultimately, even after further fighting, one would arrive again at such a political solution. That is Leader Apo’s perspective.
These circles like to present themselves as actors demanding “even more rights for the Kurds.” In truth, however, they have never participated in the freedom movement, borne responsibility, or made sacrifices. Now they speculate about filling the gap they believe has been created by the PKK’s withdrawal. Some of them, who have never contributed to the real achievements of the Kurdish people, resort to populist claims such as, “Why don’t we have our own state?”, an argument that is politically shallow and detached from reality. Even the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) has declared its support for this process. The claim that “the PKK does not want a state” is nothing but demagogy and part of a deliberate disinformation campaign. The fact that these voices can even be articulated is owed to the decades-long achievements created by Rêber Apo and the movement. Of course, there are also well-meaning, sincere patriots who adopt such positions out of frustration with the state’s denial policies. But these differ fundamentally from those who deliberately sow political confusion.
We are the ones who have been fighting the Turkish state for 52 years—and we know this state very well. The same is true in reverse. In conflicts worldwide, it is the fighters who eventually negotiate and make peace. Today, our movement is the most politically experienced force in the Middle East. We know both the right and the wrong paths. And of course, it is our responsibility toward the Kurdish people to enable a democratic and political solution to the Kurdish question. These circles know very well that if Rêber Apo succeeds with his solution perspective, their decades-long propaganda against him will collapse. His paradigm would completely strip them of political relevance. Some collaborators would also have no interest in a solution, because with the end of the conflict, their usefulness to the system would disappear as well.
The Kurdish people know very well the role the PKK has played in the freedom struggle. Rêber Apo is a leadership figure who has been tested time and again over 52 years and has always delivered political gains for the Kurdish people. He neither deceives nor is deceived. Therefore, the Kurdish people should treat those who oppose the peace process or seek to profit from it in the same way they treat declared enemies of the Kurdish cause and its adversaries in Turkey. These forces are nothing other than the natural allies of the enemies of a democratic peace process.
For this process is also a process of struggle. Whoever stands against Rêber Apo and the peace process weakens the Kurdish position. Downplaying these actors under the banner of “being Kurdish” misreads their real role. The most effective way to confront them is to actively stand behind Rêber Apo’s initiative and to strengthen social support for the process to such an extent that its success becomes irreversible.
At the beginning of the process, there was much speculation about MHP leader Devlet Bahçeli and AKP chair and President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan acting from different motivations and being not fully aligned. Do you see today a political convergence within the governing coalition, particularly about the peace process?
It is true that the AKP and MHP have different ideological and political starting points. This naturally also applies to their respective views on the Kurdish question. In this sense, it was quite plausible that there were differences in their stance at the beginning of the process. Today, however, both parties stand in a very close alliance with one another. Had there been no substantive convergence on such a central issue as the Kurdish question, Devlet Bahçeli would certainly not have made the corresponding public statements. This suggests that discussions between him and Tayyip Erdoğan about this process had already taken place in advance.
Even if their respective motivations may not be the same, it is nevertheless clear that they have politically agreed to initiate the process. Had such an agreement not been reached on this essential issue, it could have led to a serious strain or even the dissolution of the coalition. Political analysis often holds that the AKP is primarily concerned with maintaining its power, while the MHP focuses on the “preservation of state and nation.” Yet given the absence of open contradictions between the two, it can be said that the interests of the AKP and MHP currently overlap. The practical experience of one year of the peace process clearly shows that both actors are pursuing this path together and in a coordinated manner. In this sense, it should also be viewed positively that the AKP and MHP, as two central actors in the process, are politically drawing closer to one another and thereby securing the continuation of the process.
Within the framework of the steps taken by the state, a parliamentary commission was established during this process. This commission carried out various activities and, most recently, held a meeting with Leader Apo in Imrali on November 24. How should we interpret the meeting between a delegation composed of parliamentary parties and Leader Apo? What significance does it hold in terms of the process evolving into state policy and establishing official channels of dialogue?
The establishment of the “Commission for National Solidarity, Brotherhood and Democracy” within the Turkish Parliament constitutes an important step. Even though the term “Kurdish” does not appear in its name, it is clear to everyone that, in substance, it concerns the Kurdish question. The commission consulted numerous institutions and individuals, and in all these discussions the Kurdish question and possible paths toward a solution were addressed, either directly or indirectly. Because of the importance of the issue, the parliamentary speakers, both the current and former ones, were also involved and expressed their views on how to bring an end to the armed conflict and shape a political solution process. Their contributions were generally constructive.
The very fact that such a commission was established is a political signal of high symbolic and practical significance. For the first time, the existence of the Kurdish question was explicitly acknowledged by the legislative branch as well. Even the incident in which Kurdish mothers were prevented from speaking in their mother tongue brought the issue even more sharply into political focus. In response, the Speaker of Parliament traveled to Amed and delivered a speech in Kurdish. This was a symbolic attempt to soften the criticism that had emerged.
It seems that CHP and Yeni Yol have been subject to some intervention
However, the fact that ultimately only representatives of three parties traveled to Imrali indicates that not all political actors approached the issue with the seriousness it requires. It is evident that the CHP and the New Path group were subjected to pressure that prevented them from participating. Nevertheless, the fact that a visit to Rêber Apo on Imrali took place at all is of great importance. Through this step, the process moved beyond talks with individual representatives of the executive and entered a new phase: engagement with a political body that embodies the will of parliament. In this way, the political field itself was drawn into the process.
This represents a qualitative shift: the ball is now in the court of politics. The central question is whether Turkey’s political system is able and willing to assume a responsible role in this key issue. What began as a state initiative has now turned into a political task in the narrower sense. Ultimately, a solution can only be durable if it is legitimized by parliament and supported by the necessary legal framework. Without legal anchoring of the peace process, there can be neither lasting peace nor a viable political solution.
For decades, the state has known who the legitimate interlocutor in the Kurdish question is and has, in the past, negotiated with Rêber Apo and the PKK. The involvement of parliament now also sends a message to Turkish society: Rêber Apo is officially recognized as an interlocutor. The commission delegation’s visit to Imrali therefore marks the transition into the second phase of the process for peace and a democratic society.
The decision by the parliamentary commission to travel to Imrali was evidently controversial. MHP leader Bahçeli was insistent, the vote on the matter was postponed several times, and eventually the CHP and the New Path group withdrew. The summary record of the meeting that was published afterward also drew sharp criticism. Members of the DEM Party stated that they had not been involved in drafting this text and, like other opposition parties, called for a full and transparent publication of the meeting. How do you evaluate this entire course of events? Why was the process so conflict-ridden? What political miscalculations became apparent?
The summary report presented to the commission was subsequently discussed publicly. Gülistan Koçyiğit had already shared essential contents of the Imrali meeting with the press, thus letting everybody know the key points of that meeting. The commission consisted of three members. Clearly, each of them perceived different aspects of the discussion as particularly relevant. We don’t really know whether it is customary in such conflict-resolution processes to publish full transcripts. What matters first and foremost is that the members of the commission are informed about the contents. Had representatives of other parties also participated in the meeting, confidentiality would not have existed anyway. It appears that the AKP and MHP viewed the lack of participation by other parties critically and understand their own stance as a reaction to this situation.
In addition to the summary presented to the commission and the points raised by Gülistan Koçyiğit, there were other reflections as well. However, it was observed that these were deliberately distorted. For example, there was no discussion of a coup involving the MHP in İmralı; Leader Apo made certain warnings suggesting that the unresolved Kurdish issue could create a fertile ground for a coup. Nevertheless, Leader Apo’s evaluations in this regard were deliberately misrepresented. It appears that what was discussed in Imrali was reflected in some people’s relationships. Some expressed suspicions in this regard toward AKP circles.