KCK Executive Council Member Mustafa Karasu spoke to ANF about the first year of the process shaped by Abdullah Öcalan’s Peace and Democratic Society perspective, the responsibilities of the state and society, and how to struggle against forces opposed to a resolution.
Over the past ten months, the Kurdistan Freedom Movement has taken steps of extraordinary speed and high risk when compared with global examples: a ceasefire was declared on March 1; the PKK dissolved itself at its 12th Congress held on May 5–7, ending the method of armed struggle; on July 11, a group of 30 guerrillas, led by KCK Executive Council Co-Chair Besê Hozat, burned their weapons; and on October 26, it was announced that armed forces had begun withdrawing from Northern Kurdistan and Turkish territory.
KCK Executive Council Member Mustafa Karasu spoke extensively to ANF, addressing the historical, political, and social dimensions of this process, from the level of ownership within Kurdish society to the political climate in Turkey; from the resistance of war-profiteering circles to the responsibilities of the state; from debates over the parliamentary commission’s visit to Imrali and the issue of official interlocutors to the stance of the opposition; from the struggle for Abdullah Öcalan’s right to hope and physical freedom within the “second phase” to the role of women and youth; and from the growing international interest in Öcalan’s ideas to the steps that must be taken to ensure lasting peace.
In many countries, similar historical processes have taken years to unfold, yet as a movement you compressed this into just a few months. What gave you the strength and determination to take such decisive steps? How did you manage this? And how should these actions be understood in an atmosphere filled with uncertainty and concern?
Firstly, on behalf of our Movement, we extend our New Year’s greetings to Leader Apo [Abdullah Öcalan] and to all our comrades in prison. We hope the new year brings freedom and democracy to our peoples. Greetings to our own people, the peoples of Turkey, the Middle East, and the world, as well as all democratic forces, and we wish for a year marked by peace and democracy. In this sense, 2025 has become a year of hope.
The Peace and Democratic Society Process, advancing under Leader Apo’s initiative, has generated great excitement among the Kurdish people and democratic forces. We believe that in 2026 this process will deepen further: that Leader Apo’s physical freedom will be secured, that a solution to the Kurdish question will be achieved, that Turkey will democratize, and that wars in the Middle East and across the world will come to an end. With this belief, we wish 2026 to be a year of hope and positive transformation for everyone.
Öcalan has advocated a political solution rather than war for 52 years.
His pursuit of a democratic political solution dates back at least to an interview he gave to Mehmet Ali Birand in 1988, where he stated: “Let the state send one official; let us sit down and discuss the problems.” In March 1993, as a response to President Özal’s relatively conciliatory approach, he declared a unilateral ceasefire. During the second extension of this ceasefire, Özal was poisoned and removed from the political scene. In 1995, Leader Apo also expressed a positive approach toward the Erbakan government. In 1998, following messages conveyed by certain forces within the military, he once again declared a unilateral ceasefire on 1 September. Throughout the 1990s, he consistently sought dialogue and a political solution with the Turkish state. In an assessment on 15 August 1998, he emphasized that the time had come to move beyond attempts to resolve problems through war and clearly articulated his preference for a democratic political solution.
After being brought to Imrali on 15 February 1999 through an international conspiracy, Leader Apo once again asserted his will for a democratic resolution. He even sought to turn his captivity into an opportunity for peace. By withdrawing guerrilla forces beyond Turkey’s borders, he created a prolonged period of non-conflict. During this time, he worked to establish the theoretical and political foundations for a democratic solution. However, the state failed to respond to these radical initiatives and instead persisted in its policy of denial. The mistaken belief that the PKK had been defeated through Leader Apo’s imprisonment led to the continuation of armed conflict.
In 2006, Leader Apo once again initiated a unilateral ceasefire. From 2008 onward, negotiations aimed at maintaining non-conflict and achieving a democratic solution to the Kurdish question were conducted in Oslo, as well as in Imrali, with state officials. Throughout this period, Leader Apo put forward pragmatic and constructive proposals to open the way for a democratic resolution. He issued repeated calls and declarations in this direction.
All of these efforts culminated on 28 February 2015, when a joint consensus was publicly announced at Istanbul’s Dolmabahçe Palace.
These facts clearly demonstrate that Leader Apo has consistently sought a democratic solution and aimed to bring the armed struggle to an end on this basis. However, due to the absence of a genuine change in mentality within the Turkish state, and because it believed the political balance favored it, the state escalated its attacks starting on 24 July 2015. Despite these assaults, we resisted as a people and as a movement and ultimately rendered them ineffective.
Meanwhile, Turkey’s economic, social, and political crises deepened. The intensifying war in the Middle East and the uncertainty it produced pushed the Turkish state to search for a way out of this deadlock. In this context, Devlet Bahçeli made a call to Leader Apo. Leader Apo—who for decades has maintained that problems are solved through negotiation, not war—responded clearly: “I have the power to end the armed conflict and to move the Kurdish question onto a political and legal foundation.”
This struggle has always been legitimate, and it has brought the realities of the Kurdish question into full view. Our Movement has long since abandoned rigid interpretations of real socialism and the idea of one state for each nation. These developments have laid the groundwork for a democratic political solution. Acting in line with Leader Apo’s perspectives, we are striving to create the conditions and opportunities necessary for such a solution. The Kurdish question is over a hundred years old, and our struggle spans fifty years. These steps must be understood as the outcome of the profound impact that half a century of struggle has had across Kurdistan, Turkey, the Middle East, and beyond. This is not the product of a short-term effort; over fifty years, values have been created and realities revealed that now make a democratic political solution possible.
How have these steps affected Turkey’s political and social climate? What kinds of changes have they produced, and how do you assess the level of engagement, particularly within Kurdish society?
Undoubtedly, emerging from an environment of armed conflict after more than a year has given society and democratic forces some breathing space. During periods of war, democratic forces were under constant pressure. The government justified repression by labeling any political actor it wished as linked to the PKK. This climate of conflict served to legitimize attacks and restrictions. During this process, the CHP and certain other circles were targeted not by terrorism accusations but on different grounds, leading to the arrest of the CHP’s presidential candidate and numerous mayors. Measures taken against outlets such as Tele1 and against Merdan Yanardağ are also widely viewed as attempts to limit the social support that could develop around non-conflict and a solution to the Kurdish question. Some political actors have openly stated this, including a CHP deputy who cited these pressures as a reason for the limited growth of public support for the process. Such explanations, however, reflect politically reactive positions rather than principled ones.
Despite these negative factors, the political climate has nonetheless softened to a certain extent, and repression justified by “terrorism” has partially receded. A space has emerged for democratic struggle. Although some groups continue to fuel Kurdish hostility, the participation of the AKP–MHP bloc in this process has objectively contributed to a softening in society’s perception of both the Kurdish question and Kurds themselves. Regardless of attempts to obscure reality with slogans like “Terror-Free Turkey,” society is increasingly recognizing that the Kurdish question exists and that Kurds have legitimate demands. The end of active conflict has brought relief not only economically but socially as well.
Although the dissolution of the PKK created a sense of emotional loss among Kurds, society recognizes that the success of this process will bring significant gains. For this reason, there is strong support for Leader Apo’s efforts and for our Movement. Over the past year, Kurdish society has undergone a profound process of politicization. This extends far beyond the DEM Party’s base; Kurds across the political spectrum have developed a heightened awareness of democratization and the Kurdish question. A shared commitment to a democratic solution has taken shape. Even Kurds who vote for the AKP tend to support a democratic resolution, and although they may still consider the government’s position, this mindset strengthens collective ownership of the process.
The Kurdish people’s engagement with the process is fundamentally positive. Politics is not built on fear or anxiety. Every political objective can be achieved through struggle and struggle itself dispels uncertainty. Those who do not take ownership and do not struggle inevitably remain trapped in empty and meaningless concerns. Therefore, the essential task is to struggle and to organize. Only through this path can all doubts and fears be overcome.
The steps you have taken have, especially in the political, media, and academic contexts, torn the mask off those actors who profit from war. What drives these groups that openly oppose the process? How do you think these circles should be dealt with?
These groups benefit not only materially and ideologically from the ongoing conflict between the state and the Kurds; they are also deeply rooted in anti-Kurdish resentment. The anti-Kurdish feeling cultivated over decades is the result of a deliberate state policy: an education system, a media language, a cultural construction, and political narratives all based on denial, stigmatization, and exclusion of Kurdish identity. Those who today push for the continuation of war are the local agents of external forces that have a strategic interest in weakening Turkey through permanent instability and thereby drawing it into political dependency. Although they rhetorically hide behind slogans such as “Fatherland, Nation, Sakarya,” in practice they act as a fifth column of foreign interests within the country.
War profiteers exposed: Those who want to sabotage peace
It is important to clearly identify these actors as opponents of peace and advocates of war. They do not act in the interest of Turkey’s stability. On the contrary, their very existence is tied to the continuation of war. As early as the 1990s, it was revealed how certain circles benefited politically and economically from what was called the “PKK and Apo profit model.” The louder their tone, the greater their profit. The behavior of those who at the time called themselves “artists” and, for example, viciously attacked Ahmet Kaya when he announced he would sing a song in Kurdish is still remembered today. Such attacks aimed to curry favor with political elites and economic power centers and thereby gain social recognition within the cultural sphere.
Given that at least one third of Turkey’s population is Kurdish, taking a stance against this process essentially means saying: “I refuse reconciliation with my neighbor.” These groups are the product of deeply internalized ideological indoctrination that has been normalized over generations. No matter how they define themselves politically or socially, in their actual effect they function as internal agents of external forces that have no interest in a peaceful and democratic coexistence in Turkey.