Bayramoğlu: political consensus is key to a solution

Journalist and writer Ali Bayramoğlu spoke to ANF about the Democratic Society and Peace Process, the reports submitted to Parliament by political parties on resolving the Kurdish question, and debates unfolding around Rojava.

The AKP approaches the process as a ‘governance issue’

Journalist and writer Ali Bayramoğlu said that, at the current stage of the parliamentary commission’s work, the scope of the reports submitted by parties on resolving the Kurdish question deserves close scrutiny. Bayramoğlu said: “The report prepared by the Justice and Development Party (AKP) is important simply because it is the ruling party and holds the majority within the commission. That is why its reports carry particular weight. Still, I cannot say I was surprised. There is content, of course, but they essentially approach the issue as a ‘governance problem.’ They address democratization reluctantly.

In the report, the matter is not treated as a political problem to be resolved, but rather, at this stage, is framed largely around ‘disarmament.’ We are faced with a report that deliberately avoids answering questions and confines itself. There is also no contradiction with the approach of the People’s Alliance. We already know that the political власти intends, at least initially, to center the issue on disarmament. In that sense, the report contains no surprise or rupture.”

Bayramoğlu also evaluated the report submitted to Parliament by the Republican People’s Party (CHP): “That the CHP names the issue as the Kurdish question and reflects this in its report appears, at least on paper, to be a positive step. They go a step further by speaking of a solution within the framework of democratic rights. However, we also know the CHP’s practice to date. They have not taken particularly consistent or courageous steps on these issues. So, the real question is what this report actually signifies. Are party reports sufficient on their own? No. There is a democratic dimension to this process, and there is also a dimension of social demand. Without these, reports remain incomplete. Otherwise, what is done amounts to a form of ‘masking’, postponing the problem and rendering it invisible under different headings. My expectation lies further ahead.

What is needed is an improvement in Abdullah Öcalan’s conditions, a discussion of the right to hope, and most importantly, the rapid development of democratic conditions. I expect the process to move forward once politics gains a new and genuinely democratic ground.”

Political parties’ proposals remain far from a solution perspective

Ali Bayramoğlu said that, at the current stage, the solution perspectives put forward by political parties remain incomplete and distant from resolving the Kurdish question. Bayramoğlu said: “The decisive phase lies ahead. Parties will come together under the coordination of the Speaker of Parliament and take steps toward producing a common text and a shared approach. That will be the real determining factor. Once again, we return to the same point: how the post-disarmament process will be managed, how returns will take place, and how the legal status of militants of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) will be regulated. All these headings will constitute the real field of debate in the period ahead. The reports we are discussing now essentially serve as preparation for this stage.”

Bayramoğlu said an attempt is being made to frame the PKK through a narrow definition, namely as a “disarmed organization” and continued: “From this perspective, there is no technical flaw. But for those expecting concrete steps toward resolving the Kurdish question, the picture is not particularly encouraging. Still, I remain positive, as I always have been. What matters is that the process continues. These developments were already expected; this stage, too, was anticipated.

I have previously highlighted three core issues. The first concerned contact with Abdullah Öcalan; recognizing him as an interlocutor has been fulfilled, at least partially. The likelihood of taking this step further now appears high, especially when the situation in Rojava is taken into account.

The second core issue is Rojava itself. Problems persist there, and we see the Turkish state speaking with two voices. Can these be entirely separated? Partly, yes. Preparations of reports within Turkey are proceeding on their own track. But it is also clear that the paths intersect at this point. While the reporting process continues, there is another actor confronting the state in Rojava, one that represents Kurds and does not appear eager to move in the direction proposed or expected by Turkey. On the contrary, it is seeking to establish itself as a principal force on the Syrian ground.

The recent clashes in Aleppo and the ceasefire reached between the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and official Syrian forces demonstrate this. Yet here again, the Turkish state speaks with two tongues, two voices. The first is the language of coercion, represented primarily by Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan. Alongside this, there are also figures adopting a softer and more positive tone. It is evident that both within the Justice and Development Party (AKP) and the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), the latter still play a role in opening space within the process.”

The state needs to engage with Öcalan on Rojava

Ali Bayramoğlu said the situation in Rojava represents one of the most critical dimensions of the process, noting that debates over how Kurds will exist in Syria will be decisive.

Bayramoğlu said: “We know what Hakan Fidan is saying: ‘As an organization and as a structure, dissolve completely; integrate into the system as individuals. Kurds, however, are trying to preserve their own space and their own political existence. That is why they put forward the proposal of a unified army. This proposal was rejected by Syria and does not appear likely to be accepted easily.

As a result, the Kurdish side is seeking a solution in Rojava that preserves its legal personality and political existence. The deadlock therefore continues, and overcoming it will likely take time. Steps such as Hakan Fidan’s hardline statements and the Chief of General Staff increasing military activity along the Syrian border should be read as symbolic expressions of a classic state policy. On Rojava, we are still at that stage, and the possibilities for a solution remain limited because of these obstacles.

So, what is the most decisive element here? In my view, it is Abdullah Öcalan. Returning to Öcalan is essential. Whatever path is to be followed in Rojava, a process must be pursued based on the extent to which Öcalan can persuade Kurdish representatives there. For this to happen, the state, whether through political parties or institutional channels, needs to reestablish a relationship of engagement with Öcalan. I believe this is precisely where we stand today.”

I think the commission will have completed its function

Ali Bayramoğlu also spoke about the work and future of the parliamentary commission established to address the Kurdish question.

Bayramoğlu said: “There is now talk of a second phase. At present, the Imralı delegation is continuing its meetings with the Speaker of Parliament, the CHP, and other parties. Frankly, I think the commission will have completed its function. Unless it takes a very different decision, something that would genuinely surprise me, it will bring its existence to an end. As far as I can see, this is the will of the political authorities. The Speaker of Parliament is also part of that will, and ultimately, the process moves in line with whatever the President decides.”

Attempts to obstruct the process

Ali Bayramoğlu warned that possible provocations should be taken seriously during the process, recalling in particular the racist attacks directed at Leyla Zana by supporters of Bursaspor, and issued the following cautions: “We have seen such developments before. Forces seeking to obstruct resolution processes carry out various maneuvers. These can range from major conspiracies to efforts aimed at mobilizing society. I still do not believe that this resolution process is broadly welcomed within the armed forces. Perhaps at the level of the General Staff this is not the case as an official state policy, but at the level of cadres, I think there is serious discontent.

I do not believe that something specific is being deliberately engineered at this stage. However, I do think there is a reaction, a counter-reaction, that manifests itself through certain incidents. I am convinced these are not coincidences. Using stadiums, football matches, and symbols such as Leyla Zana as pretexts to amplify public noise is one of the well-known methods of provocation employed by opposing actors. That said, I do not believe such attempts will be particularly effective at this stage.”

Öcalan’s emphasis on political consensus is significant

Ali Bayramoğlu said regional and international balances will be decisive in the process, noting that Abdullah Öcalan’s emphasis on “political consensus” offers important clues about the character of the process. Bayramoğlu concluded with the following assessment: “As I said, the commission is essentially proceeding on its course, and that in itself is very important. Whatever outcome it reaches and whatever decision it takes, those will, of course, be debated. That is a separate matter. But the commission arriving at a decision point will be valuable in its own right.

At the same time, attention needs to be focused primarily on relations between the United States, the United Kingdom, Turkey, Syria, and the SDF. That is where the knot lies. If a disruption emerges, it will emerge there. And if a crisis occurs, it will not be triggered by covert maneuvers quietly engineered by elements within the system, but by the state itself. Frankly, I do not think it will be easy for matters to slide to that point. Major thresholds have been crossed, and a very significant stage has been reached.

The government’s predicament is this: it avoids saying ‘Kurdish question,’ avoids speaking of democracy, avoids discussing a new social contract, yet at the same time claims it will ‘resolve the Kurdish question,’ and does so almost exclusively through the concept of terrorism. Escaping this narrow space is far from easy, especially as elections approach. But it is also very difficult for the government to suddenly abandon the mechanism it has built up so far. In other words, saying ‘this did not work’ is not easy.

There is only one exception. If a serious problem arises in the SDF, Syria and Turkey, by securing approval from the United States or another power, attempts to intervene against the SDF on that basis, then the process could come to an end on its own.

There was a message Abdullah Öcalan conveyed to the delegation during the previous visit: ‘We have reached an understanding with the state; now we are seeking political consensus.’ This is a deliberately chosen political formulation. It suggests that a certain path has been taken with the state, but that this needs to be implemented politically and supported politically. The addressee of this research is not only opposition parties; the AKP itself and the state’s political sphere are also directly addressed.

Öcalan consistently emphasizes the need to broaden the field of political debate. In other words, he is saying that this cannot proceed without legality, democracy, or a model. Even if these elements are delayed, he indicates that the disarmament process will not be interrupted and will continue; however, the lasting resolution of the Kurdish question ultimately lies elsewhere, namely, in politics.”