Following the collapse of the Assad regime on December 8, 2024, the new political landscape that emerged in Syria quickly evolved into a process marked not by democratic transition but by deepening conflict, expanding external intervention, and a renewed push for centralized rule. Throughout 2025, successive massacres, fragile agreements, constitutional impositions, and repeatedly violated ceasefires demonstrated that a solution based on equal representation for Syria’s peoples remains distant.
During this period, the massacres targeting Arab Alawites in coastal areas, the fate of the agreement signed on March 10, 2025 between North and East Syria and the Damascus administration, and the escalating military and political pressure on the Autonomous Administration emerged as critical fault lines that will shape the country’s future.
Massacres in coastal cities
Armed mercenary groups affiliated with Syria’s Transitional Government carried out large-scale attacks against the Arab Alawite community between March 6 and 10, 2025, targeting Latakia, Jableh, Daliyah, Qardaha, Tartus, Baniyas, and Hama. According to local sources and human rights organizations, the attacks involved mercenary factions backed by the Turkish state, including the Sultan Suleiman Shah Division (Abu Amsha) and the Hamza Division, as well as foreign jihadist elements operating within Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS). Thousands of civilians were killed, and numerous residential areas were set ablaze and destroyed.
The coastal massacres starkly exposed how fragile expectations of security and social peace were following the regime change, while also standing in sharp contrast to the political negotiations taking place during the same period.
The March 10 agreement
As the massacres continued, an eight-point agreement was signed in Damascus on March 10, 2025, under United States mediation, between the head of Syria’s Transitional Government, Ahmed Al-Sharaa (Al-Jolani), and Mazloum Abdi, the General Commander of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). The agreement covered issues including guarantees of political participation, recognition of the constitutional rights of all components, the declaration of a ceasefire, the institutional integration of the SDF, the dissolution of armed groups, the return of displaced persons, and the establishment of social peace. It also explicitly called for preventing massacres against the Alawite community.
Considered one of the most significant political steps taken since the fall of the Assad regime, the agreement was welcomed by international actors. It stipulated that implementation committees would begin work “before the end of the year.” However, within a short time, numerous violations emerged both on the ground and at the political level.
The agreement also triggered a notable shift in Turkey’s rhetoric. While Turkey continued to demand the dissolution of the SDF and the complete dismantling of the Autonomous Administration, it simultaneously began insisting that the SDF comply with the March 10 Agreement and enter the integration process.
A controversial draft constitution
Just three days after the March 10 Agreement, the Damascus administration unveiled a provisional draft constitution on March 13. Around the same time, an Ankara delegation consisting of Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan, Defense Minister Yaşar Güler, and National Intelligence Organization chief Ibrahim Kalın was in Damascus, where a separate draft was also presented. However, the text that was announced made no reference to the March 10 Agreement, effectively ignoring its existence.
The draft drew strong criticism from a wide range of political and social actors, particularly Kurds, for retaining the designation “Syrian Arab Republic,” defining the president’s religion as Islam, and identifying Islamic law as the primary source of legislation. Critics stressed that this approach reproduces the same centralist and exclusionary mindset that characterized the Assad era.
Dialogue process and joint commissions
The first official contact following the agreement took place on March 19. At a meeting held on April 12 in Hasakah (Hesekê), representatives of the Damascus administration and the command of the SDF agreed to establish a joint working commission to oversee the implementation of the March 10 Agreement. The commission was formed with figures representing the diverse peoples and faith communities of North and East Syria.
This process, however, was repeatedly disrupted by military developments on the ground.
The Sheikh Maqsoud and Ashrafieh agreement in Aleppo
A 14-point agreement was signed on April 1 concerning the neighborhoods of Sheikh Maqsoud (Şêxmeqsûd) and Ashrafieh (Eşrefiyê) in Aleppo. The agreement stipulated that security would be ensured by the Internal Security Forces and also included provisions for a prisoner exchange. Within this framework, a two-stage exchange was carried out in April and June.
The People’s Protection Units (YPG) and the Women’s Protection Units (YPJ) officially transferred military responsibility in the neighborhoods to the Internal Security Forces. However, violations of the agreement by the Damascus administration and the buildup of military forces in the area once again underscored the fragility of the process.
The Tishrin Dam and strategic tension
On April 12, an agreement was reached between the SDF and the Damascus administration on the joint management of the Tishrin Dam. The agreement stipulated the establishment of a joint technical committee responsible for the dam’s security and operation.
Despite this, in the months that followed, the dam and its surroundings were targeted with heavy weapons. The SDF stated that these attacks constituted violations of the ceasefire.
Conferences and political initiatives
On April 26, the Kurdish Unity and Common Stance Conference held in Qamishlo issued a final declaration aimed at strengthening a shared Kurdish political will and contributing to the search for a democratic solution in Syria.
The North and East Syria Common Stance Conference, convened on August 8 in Hasakah, brought together Arab, Kurdish, Syriac, Armenian, and all other ethnic and religious components, issuing a call for a democratic constitution and justice.
Damascus withdraws from the Paris process
Following Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan’s visit to Damascus on August 7, the Damascus administration announced on August 9 that it would not take part in the meetings planned in Paris under the mediation of France and the United States. As justification, it claimed that the North and East Syria Components Common Stance Conference had harmed the negotiation process.
Shortly after this announcement, attacks targeting civilians were reported in the countryside of Deir ez-Zor (Dêrazor).
Blockade, clashes, and a fragile ceasefire
Since late September, the neighborhoods of Sheikh Maqsoud and Ashrafieh in Aleppo have been placed under a de facto siege. Roads were sealed off, military checkpoints established, and intensive surveillance carried out using unmanned aerial vehicles. On October 6, following attacks on peaceful protests, the Damascus administration attempted to seize the two neighborhoods with tanks and heavy weaponry.
Forces affiliated with Syria’s Ministry of Defense, alongside armed mercenary groups backed by the Turkish state, launched heavy-weapon attacks on the neighborhoods. Two people were killed and around sixty civilians were wounded in the assault.
Mercenary groups operating within HTS were forced to withdraw before dawn after the Internal Security Forces responded in self-defense.
After popular will prevailed, a delegation from the Autonomous Administration took part in talks in Damascus on October 7, and a comprehensive ceasefire was declared. The ceasefire, however, was soon violated, with attacks continuing against the Tishrin Dam and its surroundings.
In a message marking the tenth anniversary of the SDF, General Commander Mazloum Abdi stressed that “the struggle is being carried forward with the aim of a unified, secure, and pluralistic Syria that reflects the will of all Syrians.” Abdi also announced that a military delegation would travel to Damascus to discuss integration and that the Anti-Terror Units (YAT) would continue operations across Syria against ISIS.
United States–Damascus talks
On October 10, United States President Donald Trump hosted Al-Jolani at the White House. Trump recognized Al-Jolani, previously designated by Washington under his former name, Abu Mohammad Al-Jolani, with a bounty, as Syria’s legitimate leader and called on the Damascus administration to join the Global Coalition against ISIS.
Following the meeting, talks were expected to take place between the Damascus administration and the Autonomous Administration; however, no such meeting occurred and Damascus remained silent for an extended period. In contrast, and in sharp divergence from the stalled Damascus–Autonomous Administration track, the Turkish state intensified intelligence and diplomatic efforts aimed at dismantling the Autonomous Administration’s gains and military capacity. At the same time, jihadist groups operating within HTS were seen drawing strength from this momentum and issuing open threats against the Autonomous Administration.
Amid negotiations long described as “deadlocked” since the U.S. meeting, a notable development took place in December. The Damascus government reportedly presented the Autonomous Administration’s representatives with a written text for the first time. While the draft was viewed as a positive step toward restarting the process, its overall framework has been assessed as a reiteration of insistence on a monolithic, centralist approach.
2026: A new beginning
On December 19, Mazloum Abdi spoke to Aryen TV, saying that the Baath mindset has not fundamentally changed. “There is still an insistence on Syria being ruled by a single group. No genuine debate has taken place for a Syria in which the rights of all social components are recognized,” he said. Pointing to 2026, Abdi stressed that the coming year could mark a new beginning for the SDF and for the peoples of Syria.
At this stage, Syria is experiencing the strains of a transition process that has failed to undergo a true transformation of mindset, despite the change of regime. The March 10 Agreement had offered a historic opportunity for an inclusive and pluralistic Syria, but the Damascus administration’s insistence on a monolithic approach, military violations on the ground, and the contradictory interventions of external actors have continually weakened that opportunity.
On December 22, Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan, Defense Minister Yaşar Güler, and intelligence chief Ibrahim Kalın traveled to Damascus, where they held talks with Al-Jolani and Syrian officials. Following the meetings, Fidan and his Syrian counterpart held a joint press conference. From start to finish, the statements included language threatening Kurds, with the Turkish state continuing to threaten the SDF and pressing for capitulation under the guise of “individual integration.”
Asked about the Damascus–SDF integration process, Asaad al-Shaibani said, “A proposal was submitted from the military side to activate the integration process. It was made by the Ministry of Defense. We received a response yesterday. Of course, Syria’s sovereignty will be decisive. The proposal is currently under discussion and will be announced very soon.”
As these statements were being made, armed mercenary groups backed by the Turkish state and aligned with Damascus launched heavy-weapon attacks on the neighborhoods of Sheikh Maqsoud and Ashrafieh in Aleppo. Nineteen people were wounded and one woman was killed.
The SDF integration process is not merely a military arrangement; it represents a fundamental political choice about what kind of state Syria will become: a democratic Syria based on decentralization and equal citizenship for all peoples, or a centralized restructuring that suppresses diversity.
The period ahead will determine the answer to that question. The year 2026, then, may be more than a change on the calendar, it could mark the threshold of a new beginning for the shared future of Syria’s peoples.