Turkey continues to work relentlessly to draw Syria into a new war. While holding talks with Imrali and claiming to seek an end to the conflict, it speaks of Kurdish–Turkish brotherhood. These debates have entered a new phase as the parliamentary commission has completed its hearings and moved into the report-drafting stage.
In the reports, the Justice and Development Party (AKP) and the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) offer nothing concrete regarding a solution to the Kurdish question. Despite these shortcomings, the process continues in one form or another. On the issue of North and East Syria, however, the government and its allies persistently remain on a line of hostility. The Turkish media does not publish content aimed at fostering a climate of peace or building its social foundations. On the contrary, Rojava is portrayed as a threat, and the language of special warfare is widely employed.
Statements by Turkey’s Ministry of Defense consistently rely on a discourse of threat. The foreign minister, acting as if specially tasked with the Syria file, raises the issue of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and the Autonomous Administration at every stop, issuing warnings and threats. In its most recent statement, the ministry said the SDF would be integrated into the army not as divisions, but only through individual enlistment. This stance contradicts the understanding reached in talks between the Syrian interim government and the SDF, where agreement had reportedly been reached on participation in the form of several divisions. The Damascus administration accepts this framework, yet Turkey’s defense minister rejects it outright. The United States has played an active role in these negotiations. Nevertheless, the Turkish government has set all of this aside and continues to impose its own position on Syria and on the parties involved.
Turkey prioritizes its own security concerns over Syria’s future and gives no consideration to the existence or security of the Kurdish people. The SDF do not pose a threat to Turkey; they were not established for that purpose. Turkey possesses the second-largest army in NATO. The SDF fought ISIS alongside the international coalition and protected the people in their areas. Beyond this, they have carried out no other activity. They also lack large armies, air power, or similar capabilities. The autonomous region and the SDF have, however, been subjected to attacks by the Turkish army. Areas such as Afrin (Efrîn), Girê Spî, Serêkaniyê, and Manbij have been occupied, and large parts of Syria remain under Turkish military occupation.
The Turkish state does not act in accordance with a principle of brotherhood with Kurds. Its rhetoric suggests one thing, but its practice reflects the opposite. In practice, hostility toward Kurds continues. With massacres against Alawites and Druze already evident, disarming Kurds would amount to opening the door to genocide. If Kurds are truly regarded as brothers, should the Turkish state not protect them and work to guarantee their security? Turkey confronted the world to protect Turkish Cypriots and has worked for fifty years to establish a Turkish state on that small island. Yet it pushes its so-called “Kurdish brother” into the arms of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS).
Turkey’s intellectuals and democratic circles are following developments from far behind. They remain indifferent and largely passive in the face of what is happening to Kurds. Does leaving Syrian Kurds exposed to massacre, abandoning them to the mercy of HTS, not concern them? Has this deep hostility been normalized and internalized? Why is HTS seen as closer to Turkey than the Kurds? Why do political alliances and preferences consistently tilt toward HTS? Are Turkey’s political actors and intellectuals not going to ask themselves these questions?
These questions could easily be multiplied. At a time when resolving the Kurdish question and ending armed conflict are on the agenda in Turkey, preparations for massacres against Kurds in Syria cannot be treated as normal. Brotherhood in Turkey cannot coexist with hostility in Syria. Hostility practiced in Syria inevitably turns into hostility in Turkey as well, there is no other explanation.
At its core, Turkey has neither recognized nor accepted Kurds. For this reason, it does not want them to attain any form of political status. It seeks to block Kurds in Syria from gaining legal and constitutional rights. The integration of the SDF and the Autonomous Administration into the Syrian state is not a one-sided process. The agreement in question also covers political, constitutional, and administrative structures. By ignoring all of this and focusing solely on the SDF, Turkey aims to dismantle the Autonomous Administration altogether. The agreement is not a document drafted solely around the SDF.
The Turkish state, it argues, seeks to hand Syria over to the dark mindset of HTS. The message conveyed is stark: Kurds should not exist, their existence should not be guaranteed; instead, let HTS, Al-Qaeda, and ISIS rule. Turkey is not approaching integration in a fair manner. It is not playing a constructive role but continues to pursue a disruptive and provocative stance. Rather than acting as a mediator itself, something it could do instead of the United States to facilitate a solution, it is preparing for war and maintaining an unbroken line of threats.
Alongside all these negative approaches, the Turkish government is also demanding that Abdullah Öcalan issue a call for the SDF to lay down their arms. Instead of adopting a genuine approach toward Öcalan, it continues to hold him as if he were a hostage. Under these circumstances, who can trust Turkey, and how can Imralı play a positive role? The government must first clarify its own position.
(Source: Ronahî newspaper)