Professor Hamit Bozarslan, known for his work on Middle East politics, the Kurdish question, violence, the state and social movements, spoke to ANF.
The first part of this interview can be read here.
Do you think the main obstacle standing in the way of the process is still the continuation of this ideology?
Yes, this ideology continues. At the same time, one must recognize that ideology is never something that can be reduced merely to the level of discourse. Ideology is a practical phenomenon. It is about how power structures are organized. We are talking about a transmission that takes place across generations. We are talking about mechanisms that reproduce this ideology through military academies, police academies and the national education system. For this reason, ideology should not be approached solely at the level of rhetoric. Ideology is always a phenomenon with extremely sharp and concrete practical consequences. In this sense, what is required is a change of power.
A change of power does not simply mean that one party leaves office and another comes to power. It means a transformation of the mechanisms of power and the reconstruction of authority on a democratic basis. This should be compared with what took place in Greece, Portugal and Spain in 1974 and 1975. In those countries, the process of democratization became possible through the re-establishment of power, the rethinking of authority, the democratization of institutions, making institutions accountable, and the creation of a legal system independent from centers of power. It was through all these steps that those three countries were able to democratize. Without such transformations, it is truly very difficult to imagine Turkey’s democratization.
Integrated into the law only after legal transformation
When we look at the demands of both the DEM Party and Abdullah Öcalan, the demand to include Kurds within the legal system stands out in this process. Do you think including Kurds in the law is sufficient?
It is not sufficient, but it is very important. The concept of inclusion in the law needs to be examined more deeply. What is at stake is the redefinition of law itself. Who is the subject of law? It is not possible to conceive of a legal system that is independent of society, social problems or national questions. Law is also a matter of subjects. Kurds’ own legal frameworks must become part of Turkey’s legal system; Kurds must become subjects of the law and gain the right to have a say over it.
Hannah Arendt speaks of the “right to have rights,” but this does not merely mean benefiting from existing rights. It also means changing the law and giving it an egalitarian character. This applies not only to Kurds, but also to women. Women becoming subjects of the law also means that women transform the understanding of law and put forward a new legal framework. The same applies to other marginalized groups. Without legal transformation, it is not possible to speak of integration into the law. Legal equality also means that the law is accepted as legitimate by its subjects.
Redefining the legal system
Will Kurds be recognized as subjects of the law, and what does it mean to be a subject of the law?
Kurds being able to think about their own legal frameworks would mean fundamentally redefining Turkey’s future legal system. This could take shape in matters of language, autonomy, representation and education. What kind of education system will Turkey have tomorrow? Will Sheikh Said be portrayed as a separatist leader, or as one of the most important figures of the Kurdish Movement? How will the Dersim issue be addressed? How will the founding of the PKK in 1978 be taught? Will it be framed as a matter of terrorism, or understood within the context of internal transformations within the Kurdish Movement and Turkey’s refusal to recognize the Kurdish question? How will the period after 1984 be presented in the education system? Will it be reduced to a terrorism issue, or described as the beginning of a guerrilla movement followed by a period of intense violence, including village burnings and unsolved killings? All these questions need to be openly addressed.
Of course, none of this can be done overnight. But when we speak of law, we are also speaking of education and the media. What will the media landscape of future Turkey look like? What will political discourse look like? In legal terms, we are speaking of a reality that encompasses all these fields. For this reason, it is not possible to speak of an abstract or fixed legal system. Democracy is a system in which the legal order is never fixed but constantly evolving and being rethought. Had such change not been possible, women would not have been able to participate in elections. Issues of race, racism, and the criminalization of racism would not have emerged. For example, in much of Europe, homosexuality was prohibited forty years ago; today, homophobia is prohibited. These are changes brought about by struggle, and they make such transformations visible.
There is a need for a contract, not a pact
Are you saying that determining such a legal framework requires an entirely new social contract?
Yes, a contract. I would not say a new contract, but a contract, because it is not possible to speak of an existing contract at present. What exists today is, in fact, a pact. The French thinker Jean Baudrillard draws a distinction between a contract and a pact. A pact refers to a relationship imposed through blood ties or coercion by force. A contract, by contrast, is a relationship that emerges from negotiations between different parties. For this reason, it is not possible to speak of a contract in Turkey. What exists is an imposed understanding of a pact. At this point, it is necessary to move away from this pact-based approach and transition toward a contract. Such a contract has not yet been formed.
Is it possible for the kind of contract you describe to emerge in this process, and how realistic is it without the participation of the CHP?
First of all, there is no such development at the level of the AKP or the MHP. For these parties, a contract is not on the agenda; even contemplating a contract is not on the agenda. This is true not only for the Kurdish question, but for other issues as well, because what a contract implies is democratization. The current presidential system is, in fact, the imposition of a pact.
Developments in Turkey over the past twenty to thirty years, including what has unfolded since Susurluk, show that this pact has also been established through blood, and that it is assumed it can be dissolved through blood as well. This has many dimensions. Even the videos released by Sedat Peker demonstrate how central this pact phenomenon is.
The problem is not limited to the CHP alone. However, if there were a tendency within the CHP toward such a contract, it could create certain effects at the societal level and help legitimize the concept of equality.
In one or two talks, I have mentioned the idea of democratic pedagogy. Speaking of democratic pedagogy refers to a framework that could make it possible to discuss issues of this kind. At present, there is a discourse on justice within the CHP, and this discourse genuinely needs to be supported, because it is not possible to think that there is a just system in Turkey. The issue surrounding Ekrem İmamoğlu is a complete scandal, a legal scandal. Even if we set aside all its other dimensions, everyone knows that this is not a legal matter. For this reason, the CHP’s discourse on justice should be supported. Yet the CHP is unable even to articulate the issue of democracy. If it truly wants to move beyond Kemalism and transform into a genuinely social democratic party, it needs to place the Kurdish question at the top of its agenda. We are not at that point yet.
Confrontation must be articulated
One of the most fundamental elements in processes like this is historical confrontation and reckoning with past traumas. When we look at examples from around the world, this point is crucial. Despite a process lasting more than a year, these issues are still not being sufficiently raised or debated. Is it possible to articulate or implement other dimensions of the process without confronting these traumas?
Yes, the Kurdish Movement needs to articulate this. It is essential. At the same time, this is part of what can be called democratic pedagogy. What is Kurdish history? What happened in the 1920s? Would the Kemalist Movement have succeeded in 1919 if a significant portion of Kurds had not supported it? What happened in Koçgirî in 1921? What was the Sheikh Said uprising of 1925? The Zîlan massacre, the Dêrsim issue… the denial of Kurdish existence. The Renda reports, reports in which Kurds were defined as a biological threat in 1925. All of this must be articulated by the Kurdish Movement, yet this alone is not sufficient.
For this reason, it may be important to draw a comparison with the first resolution process. In 2013 and 2014, many issues were being discussed in Turkey. The Kurdish question was being debated, not merely as a security issue, but as a historical problem. Large conferences were being held at the time. Not only the Kurdish question, but also the Armenian genocide, the situation of the Greeks, the antisemitic events of 1934, and the issue of women were being discussed. Today, however, we are very far from that climate of debate. The DEM Party must certainly take on this responsibility. Within Turkish society, at least for now, we do not see a comparable level of sensitivity.
There are factors that go beyond the DEM party
Do you think the DEM Party is not articulating these issues sufficiently?
The DEM Party does articulate these issues. It would not be accurate to say that the DEM Party does not raise them. The real question is whether these issues resonate, to what extent they resonate, whether fault lines shift, whether new milestones become possible, and whether space for discussion can actually emerge. At this point, however, we are faced with problems that go far beyond the capacity of the DEM Party. We have discussed this on various occasions before, and everyone is aware of it. Turkish society has been profoundly numbed over the past fifteen to twenty years. It is a society whose movements have been crushed, whose rationality has been eroded; a society that does not think about its past or its future, but one that is afraid. It is also a society that has been living through an economic crisis for eight or nine years. A society in which children faint at school because of hunger. All these factors must be taken into account. At present, there is no ground for debate in Turkey, not only on the Kurdish question. How is it that a system such as the Presidential System can be accepted so easily? How is it that earthquakes can be so devastating? How is it that a group referred to as the “Gang of Five” can be spoken of openly, while at the same time seizing all of the state’s material resources and sustaining itself through them? All these problems are known, yet there is no space in which they can be discussed. Despite everything, the DEM Party needs to be extremely persistent. Still, we are confronting realities that go beyond the DEM Party itself.
You often draw attention to the Turkish dimension. At the same time, does the current process, much like the 2013–2015 period, create hope within Kurdish society on the one hand, while also generating a sense of political fatigue on the other?
It does, of course. Inevitably, it does. As you also mentioned, we are faced with a process that has been ongoing for a year, yet concretely, nothing has changed. At least for now, nothing has changed. In the conditions of Kurds, across Turkey as a whole, there has not been a tangible transformation. Perhaps certain freedoms have expanded. People can speak a little more freely. Conferences can be held in Kurdish cities. A peace conference was even organized in a city like Istanbul. That was a very important step. From a Kurdish perspective, there are positive developments; a space and an opportunity for discussion have emerged. At the same time, Kurdish society is a tired society. It is a society that has been mobilized for sixty or seventy years. A society living under extremely difficult conditions. A society that has been subjected to immense repression. A society with thousands of its politicians in prison. Everyone is also anxious. Is there optimism? I am not sure. There is the question of legitimacy, and Kurds are aware of this. Because of this unresolved legitimacy issue, perhaps a strong sense of optimism does not fully emerge. There is a sense of unease. All this needs to be regarded as entirely normal.