Last year, following the collapse of the Baath regime and the rise of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) to power, Syria’s Interim Government carried out a series of political, military and media actions. These actions created deep repercussions on Syria’s social fabric and on the relationships among its diverse components.
Despite promises to build a unified state, the policies implemented on the ground led to rising tensions and the emergence of new conflicts in different regions of the country. This process can be briefly reviewed as follows.
Victims of sectarian conflict and the absence of social cohesion
Documented data shows that from the fall of the regime until November 2025, 3,908 people were killed on sectarian and religious grounds. During the same period, an atmosphere of incitement was cultivated, turning public gatherings into platforms for hate speech and provocation against different sects and groups.
This environment triggered violent attacks targeting Druze students and Kurdish youth, while dozens of civilians from the Alawite community faced assaults and assassinations.
Syria’s coast… the stalling and obstruction of civil mobilization
Syria’s Interim Government relied on rhetoric that excluded members of the Alawite community and associated them with the security and political legacy of the former regime. This approach turned the coastal regions into targets of various attacks; in March 2025, widespread calls for aggression were issued both through the media and from the pulpits of mosques in Idlib, Aleppo, Hama and other Syrian cities.
Despite repeated appeals from Alawite leaders and representatives to establish a civil and political platform for dialogue with the government, these efforts were ignored. In February 2025, the “Council of Syrian and Diaspora Alawite Islam”, a religious-political framework bringing together various assemblies and institutions, was founded. Its president, Sheikh Xezal Xezal, called for demonstrations following the recent events in Homs and demanded guarantees to end the attacks targeting Alawites.
In August, the “Central and Western Syria Political Council” was also established, yet its activities remained limited and failed to create any tangible impact on the ground.
Sweida: considering internal organization against government pressure
In Sweida (Suwayda), government policy has long ignored the local forces that have protected the region from ISIS, despite attempts to integrate these forces into state institutions.
In 2025, however, the Interim Government intensified its attacks on the Druze community both inside and outside Sweida. This escalation manifested in assaults on Druze neighborhoods in the rural outskirts of Damascus and, subsequently, in the deadly attack carried out in July 2025 under the guise of local tribes, targeting Sweida and its surrounding areas and resulting in the deaths of hundreds.
In response to these attacks, the High Legal Committee established a temporary administrative office in Sweida to oversee service and security affairs, and additional committees were formed for investigation, relief, and human rights monitoring. Meanwhile, local armed groups united under the banner of the National Guards, with the aim of organizing under a unified religious and social leadership led by Hikmet al-Hijri.
Rojava continues on its path with autonomous governance
The region of Rojava (Northern and Eastern Syria) was not exempt from the media campaigns and hate speech launched by the Interim Government. The Autonomous Administration was accused of promoting division and of being linked to foreign political parties. Nevertheless, the Administration relied on its own social contract to contain these pressures.
In March 2025, the Autonomous Administration signed an agreement with the Interim Government aimed at unifying administrative, military and economic institutions. However, according to representatives of Rojava, the agreement could not be fully implemented due to government negligence and, more importantly, Turkish intervention.
Kurdish political forces expressed their shared views at the Kurdish Unity and Solidarity Conference. In August, a conference was held in Hasakah (Hesekê) with the participation of various Syrian components to promote dialogue between different parties, an initiative that provoked strong reactions from the Interim Government.
Following the attacks, the Administration delivered humanitarian assistance to the people of Sweida, while also helping to extinguish fires along the coastal areas.
Despite the efforts of the Interim Government, its political media and its supporters, the people of Rojava reaffirmed their commitment to implementing the 10 March agreement, declaring that Syria would not return to its pre-2011 state.
The current situation in Syria
The situation in Syria has remained open to both the escalation of violence and the possibility of stabilization. The present reality shows that the absence of a unified governing authority has become one of the most significant obstacles to restoring stability across Syrian society and rebuilding trust among its various components.
Source: ANHA