A significant threshold has been crossed in the process that began after Abdullah Öcalan’s historic call on 27 February. Three members of the parliamentary commission formed to address the ‘Peace and Democratic Society Process’ held a three-and-a-half-hour meeting with Abdullah Öcalan on Imrali on 24 November. The Republican People’s Party (CHP) did not take part in the commission that attended the meeting.
Peoples’ Democratic Congress (HDK) co-spokesperson Ali Kenanoğlu spoke to ANF about the CHP’s vote against a meeting with Abdullah Öcalan, the public reaction that followed, and the significance of the meeting.
This is the first part of the interview.
Ali Kenanoğlu said the visit was a necessary one and essential for achieving a meaningful outcome. He added that persistent attempts to create an alternative counterpart have now come to an end, and continued with the following words: “We need to examine the insistence on the Imrali visit on several levels. When we look at how such conflict processes are concluded and transformed into peace anywhere in the world, there are clear counterparts. On one side is the state, those who govern the state; on the other side is the leader of the party to the conflict. Negotiations are conducted with that person. In this sense, there is nothing more natural than meeting with Mr. Öcalan.
Moreover, a commission was established to resolve this issue, and the commission took opinions from almost everyone, from civil society groups to associations like the Canary Lovers Society. But without meeting the essential counterpart of this matter, the person who owns the issue, defends its philosophy, implements it, initiates it and directs every stage of it and without establishing direct contact with him, it is impossible to make progress or achieve a meaningful result. Technically, this was a fundamental necessity.
On the other hand, a certain policy has long been pursued in Turkey’s public sphere. Not only by the government but also by other parties, especially the CHP, and the public is being prepared for it, accustomed to it. It goes like this: ‘Yes, there is a Kurdish question; but the Kurdish question does not necessarily mean the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), it does not mean Öcalan, and if possible, it should not even mean the Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP) – Peoples’ Equality and Democracy Party (DEM Party). There is the Kurdish people, a large people, and no one can represent them; there are Kurds in every party.’
In parliamentary debates, the Justice and Development Party (AKP) would say, ‘We have the most Kurdish deputies,’ and, ‘We receive the most votes from Kurds.’ By denying the real counterparts, they tried to establish a counterpart framework of their own and attempted to solve the issue through that. They tried this many times. They tried it through HÜDA-PAR, saying, ‘We are all Muslims, we can solve this within the unity of Islam, and Kurds are mostly Muslim.’ They attempted to pursue this policy. Süleyman Soylu even openly said, ‘We support HÜDA-PAR as a state policy, and we will see the results of this in 10–20 years.’”
Demirtaş stopped the CHP’s bid to cast him as the counterpart
Ali Kenanoğlu said that attempts to create an alternative counterpart had no basis on the ground, noting that the CHP especially tried to do this through Selahattin Demirtaş, but that Demirtaş himself prevented it and added: “None of these attempts matched the reality on the ground, because the reality is clear and the counterpart to this issue is also clear. In this sense, the visit would put an end to this debate as well. One dimension of the insistence was precisely this: it was important to prevent the state and the public from creating a false counterpart.
Moreover, the CHP also tried to create a counterpart out of Demirtaş. Demirtaş objected by saying, ‘I am not the leader of the organization; what can I say about this?’ But the general public opinion kept pursuing an alternative counterpart. In this sense, the Freedom Movement insisted that the visit to the Island must take place, because recognizing and acknowledging the official counterpart was important.
For the continuation and resolution of this issue this insistence was also appropriate. When you try to resolve the matter through a false counterpart, the problem cannot be solved, because that is not the counterpart of the issue.
Thirdly, the following should be noted: the government constantly framed this process as a ‘Terror-Free Turkey’ process and presented it that way to its own base. What we encountered most frequently on the ground was this: a psychology of ‘We are making them surrender; they are already finished; they have nothing left to do; they are giving up.’ The underlying reason was the policy of ‘We are making them surrender, and we will create a Terror-Free Turkey.’
At this point, the meeting with Mr. Öcalan also helped the Kurdish base psychologically. The Kurdish base saw the following: ‘Yes, this matter is being conducted through a counterpart; Mr. Öcalan is the counterpart of this issue. This is not about what they claim, that they will lay down their arms because they have no other option, but the result of a mutual negotiation.’
From these three perspectives, the insistence on meeting with Mr. Öcalan was very appropriate and correct; and the meeting, in this sense, was the right step.”
Taking Öcalan as the counterpart is not easy for the CHP
Ali Kenanoğlu stated that the CHP insisted on creating a different counterpart because it suited their political interests, and continued as follows:
“This search for a counterpart is something that also serves the CHP. They prefer to conduct politics in less risky areas, in calmer waters. In this sense, taking Öcalan as the counterpart, taking the Kurdish Freedom Movement as the counterpart, and accepting the reality of this counterpartship is not easy for the CHP, considering the political line they have followed from past to present; it poses a risk for them.
According to them, Demirtaş could have been a more reasonable counterpart. This is why they were so insistent. Let me be clear: the main factor behind the public comparisons between Demirtaş and Öcalan, the narratives portraying Demirtaş as the victim, and the perception, as well as the rumors, that Öcalan is somehow keeping Demirtaş inside is the CHP’s political line. The CHP’s persistence and insistence on this issue has, from the beginning, always stemmed from the emphasis on Demirtaş. And this emphasis is not because the CHP ‘likes’ Demirtaş; it is simply an attempt to create a new counterpart for the Kurdish movement.
If you pay attention, after the Istanbul elections, İmamoğlu repeatedly thanked Demirtaş in his speeches. When there is a party and a movement that actually made the decisive contribution, saying only, ‘We thank Mr. Demirtaş,’ and, if possible, avoiding mentioning the HDP or the DEM Party, implies presenting Demirtaş as if he were independent, separate from the DEM Party. The CHP played a role in creating this perception in the public.
As I said, the CHP pursued this entirely to create for itself a less risky and more ‘legitimate’ form of counterpartship, but it had no basis in reality. Mr. Demirtaş also said: ‘I am not the counterpart in this matter; I support Öcalan.’ And in his latest article, he stated very clearly: ‘This process must be conducted properly, and the one who will carry it out is Mr. Öcalan.’”