The Peace and Democratic Society Process, launched through the initiative of Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) Chair Devlet Bahçeli and later given political definition by Abdullah Öcalan’s 27 February Call, now appears to be entering a new phase. The shift comes after a three-member delegation from the Parliamentary Commission on National Solidarity, Fraternity and Democracy visited Imralı Island on 24 November. The delegation will brief the Commission, whose findings will be compiled into a report and submitted to the General Assembly of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey.
The delegation that traveled to Imralı to meet Abdullah Öcalan included representatives from the MHP, the Justice and Development Party (AKP) and the Peoples’ Equality and Democracy Party (DEM Party). The Republican People’s Party (CHP), which presents itself as the guarantor of democracy, and the New Welfare Party did not attend the Commission’s decision-making session. The New Path Group, which had consistently expressed openness to participating in an Imralı visit throughout the Commission’s work, ultimately chose not to nominate a member. The Democrat Party (DP), the Democratic Left Party (DSP) and Hüda Par (an Islamist Kurdish-rooted political party in Turkey) voted against sending a delegation to the Imralı island.
The Commission’s decision to visit Imralı and meet Abdullah Öcalan on what came to be called “Good Friday” has sparked intense public debate. The focus has largely been on the decision itself and on the contrasting positions of those who joined the delegation and those who refused. As the outcomes of the Imralı meeting become known, or at least partly understood through informed speculation, these debates are gaining further momentum. Last week was dominated by questions about what decision the Commission would ultimately reach; this week, attention has shifted to the implications of that decision and to the substance of the meeting held on the island. For Kurds and their allies, these political discussions intersect with two significant dates: the 25 November women’s mobilisations and the 27 November celebrations marking the forty-seventh anniversary of the founding of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). This overlap has infused the wider political climate with added meaning and urgency.
What is clear is that both the decision to travel to Imralı and the results of the talks conducted there will continue to be discussed for a long time. Competing arguments over which choices were right and which were wrong are already beginning to take shape. Yet on what basis are these judgments to be made? Setting out the criteria for such evaluations is essential before drawing conclusions, as this will help bring greater clarity and coherence to the ongoing debate.
A number of core points, each carrying the weight of a political thesis, can be outlined as follows:
* Regardless of individual intentions or subjective perspectives, the ongoing Third World War unfolding across the Middle East will inevitably extend its impact to Turkey. The external and internal pressures generated by these developments will force some degree of transformation within the Republic of Turkey. A newly reconfigured Middle East cannot leave untouched a Turkey whose foundations were shaped by the aftermath of the First World War.
* Although several factors may drive change in Turkey, the most decisive among them is the Kurdish question. The mindset and policy of denying and eradicating Kurdish people, the defining approach of the past century, cannot continue into the new century. Meaningful shifts in what is commonly described as the century-old Kurdish question are therefore unavoidable. This gives rise to a central question: In what direction, and through what means, will a problem rooted in a century of Kurdish denial evolve?
* Two answers are currently on the table. The first is a democratic transformation that ends the mindset and policy of Kurdish denial and rebuilds the historic Kurdish–Turkish fraternity under contemporary conditions. The second, should the first fail, is the deepening of conflict and fragmentation inside Turkey, driven by the possibility of forces such as Israel or Iran forming alliances with Kurds and drawing Turkey’s Kurdish population into their orbit. The first path clearly serves the interests of both Turkey and the Kurds. The second would bring serious harm to each. The Peace and Democratic Society Process reflects the first option, a path that benefits Turkey above all. This is the context that gives meaning to the parliamentary delegation’s decision to visit Imralı and meet Abdullah Öcalan.
Why underline all of this here? Because the Peace and Democratic Society Process is not merely one option among many for Turkey, it is the option. Its success will shape the second century of the Republic of Turkey. For this reason, the state’s engagement with Imralı and its dialogue with Abdullah Öcalan, the Kurds’ Chief Negotiator, is nothing less than a matter of political existence. Moreover, a Turkey that has failed to democratise for a full century can achieve democracy only through such a process. In other words, if Turkey is to free itself from the dangers it now faces, it must change and democratise and that is only possible by recognising the Kurdish people and their democratic rights.
These considerations make fully intelligible the reactions and positions that emerged in response to the Commission’s decision on 21 November and the subsequent visit by the Commission’s delegation to Imralı on 24 November. From this perspective, it becomes clear that the stance taken by the CHP on both matters does not reflect a concern for the country’s or the state’s future. Rather, it is evident that the decision was driven by a narrow focus on political power, one that ultimately benefits the AKP. We had assumed that the CHP’s new leadership had moved beyond the political line and role associated with the tenure of Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu. We believed this administration would no longer serve as a crutch for the AKP government. We were mistaken. It appears that, in reality, very little has changed within the CHP. In last week’s column, we noted that the party should, in its own interest, support the Imralı visit and join the delegation. That would have been the position most aligned with the CHP’s long-term benefit. Yet we were wrong, the old mission evidently continues.
Since last Friday, numerous commentators have been scrambling to justify the CHP’s decision, each offering their own rationale. The sheer effort they put into this defence is astonishing. Why? Because they themselves do not believe the arguments they are putting forward. There is a saying: “The excuse only makes the mistake look worse.” The attempts to rationalise the CHP’s misguided decision resemble precisely that, the justifications end up being even more flawed than the decision itself.
One claim is that the CHP was compelled to take this position because of strong reactions from its grassroots base. To those making this argument, we can only respond as follows: Kurds, too, have reacted, strongly, overwhelmingly, unmistakably, to this decision. Had the Kurdish political movement not stepped in to contain and channel this public reaction, those offering unsolicited advice to the CHP would have seen its force first-hand. Moreover, Kurds have taken note of this moment, and they will not forget it.
In truth, the CHP leadership knew their decision was wrong. This is precisely why they felt obliged, immediately afterwards, to issue a statement declaring their support for “a democratic solution to the Kurdish question.” But both Kurds and broader Turkish society now fully understand what the CHP means when it speaks of democracy. According to the party, it is so democratic that it even claims the authority to decide who represents the Kurds, the very people whose problem it claims it wants to solve. Their stated reason for refusing to visit Imralı was that Abdullah Öcalan is “responsible for a forty-year war.” Of course, peace is being sought and peace can only be made with the party engaged in the war. It is precisely because Abdullah Öcalan has been held responsible for the conflict over Kurdish existence and identity that he has become both the representative of the Kurds and a central party to any peace process. How can peace be made with someone who is not a party to the conflict? How can the Kurdish question be resolved through someone who does not represent the Kurdish people?Those who refuse to acknowledge the will of the Kurdish people and who do not recognise Abdullah Öcalan as the expression of that will are clearly continuing the mindset and policy of denying Kurdish existence.
It is abundantly clear that efforts to defend the CHP’s position amount to little more than stalling for time. Through the Peace and Democratic Society Process, Turkey has entered a period of democratisation and of addressing the Kurdish question. From this point forward, the country’s future will be shaped by this process. Those who participate at every level and contribute to its success will have a role in shaping a new, democratic Turkey; those who refuse to engage will inevitably lose. It is with this in mind that the CHP, the New Path Group, and all others who have taken misguided positions should reassess the realities before them and ensure that they engage with the process in a responsible and constructive manner.
Source: Yeni Özgür Politika