Abdullah Öcalan, in his “Peace and Democratic Society” Call issued on 27 February, stated that “separate nation-states, federations, administrative autonomies and culturalist solutions, the compulsory outcomes of extreme nationalist drift, cannot respond to the sociological reality of historical societies,” making clear that he had renounced the nation-state model and all structures that lead toward it.
The call for democratic integration draws on Abdullah Öcalan’s long-held conviction that the deeply rooted chauvinist, nationalist and assimilationist policies, the very attitudes that have fractured the thousand-year bond between the peoples of Turkey, must finally be abandoned. In his 27 February “Peace and Democratic Society” Call, Öcalan set out this vision, saying: “Respect for identities, the freedom to express themselves and to organise democratically, and the ability of all segments to build the socio-economic and political structures they consider fundamental to their existence, are possible only with the presence of a democratic society and a democratic political sphere.” Peace envoy Sırrı Süreyya Önder later explained how Öcalan sees this framework taking shape in practice. Önder said: “In putting forward this framework, it is clear that laying down arms and the dissolution of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), together with the recognition of democratic politics and a legal framework, are required.”
Nearly a year has passed since that declaration. At the beginning of March, the PKK announced a unilateral ceasefire. Between 5 and 7 May, it held its 12th Congress and formally dissolved itself. By 11 July, a group that included Kurdistan Communities Union (KCK) Co-Presidency Member Bese Hozat and PKK Central Committee Member Nedim Seven, together with several fighters from the People’s Defense Forces (HPG) and the Free Women’s Units (YJA Star), publicly burned their weapons and declared their intention to move from armed struggle to political engagement. Two months later, a further step followed. In a statement read by KCK Executive Council Member Sabri Ok, “We are withdrawing all forces within Turkey that create a risk of clashes and are vulnerable to possible provocations”, a group of 25 HPG and YJA Star fighters, including HPG Command Council Member Devrim Palu and YJA Star Serhat Commander Vejin Dersim, left Northern Kurdistan (Bakur) for the Media Defense Zones. Their withdrawal underscored their commitment to supporting the “Peace and Democratic Society” process initiated by Öcalan on 27 February and their determination to pursue democratic integration.
However, the response of the Republic of Turkey has revealed a markedly different approach to this process. Beyond the establishment of the “National Solidarity, Fraternity and Democracy Commission” under the Parliament’s roof in July, Turkey has taken no further legal or institutional steps, a stance that clearly signals how it interprets the notion of integration. For Turkey, integration appears to mean dissolution, erosion and the stripping away of identity, a process in which a community is expected to melt into the dominant culture, deprived of its language and original cultural foundations. Yet both the conceptual definition of integration and the ways in which states around the world implement it stand in clear contrast to this perspective. A brief look at several international models makes this difference unmistakably visible.
France model
Article 75-1 of the French Constitution states that “regional languages belong to the common heritage of France,” placing all regional and minority languages under constitutional protection. In French schools, six regional languages are officially recognised as languages of instruction alongside French.
Religious minorities in France also have the right to practise their faith freely and to maintain their religious distinctiveness without interference.
Beyond these principles, France places particular emphasis on “legal and administrative minority rights” as the foundation of its approach to integration.
Spain model
Spain was ruled from 1939 to 1975 by the Franco dictatorship, a regime that subjected the country and its peoples to brutal repression. In an effort to impose a fascist, nation-state identity on all communities living within Spain, the regime carried out unimaginable forms of torture, massacres, and systematic policies of cultural destruction and social degradation. When this oppressive and assimilationist order finally came to an end after 36 years, Spain adopted a new constitution in 1978. Article 2 of that constitution states: “The Constitution is based on the indissoluble unity of the Spanish Nation, the common and indivisible homeland of all Spaniards; it recognises and guarantees the right to autonomy of the nationalities and regions that comprise it, and the solidarity among them.”
The Spanish model is built on autonomous systems. Today, Spain consists of 17 autonomous regions and two autonomous cities.
Each autonomous community elects its own representatives through local elections, forming its own legislative assembly. Both legislative and executive authority in these regions are exercised through their respective autonomous parliaments.
United Kingdom model
Although the United Kingdom is a unitary state, it operates through a strongly decentralised system. England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland each possess broad forms of autonomy. These nations hold the authority to legislate and to implement legislation in areas such as education, health, the economy, transport, local government, the environment, agriculture, culture, fisheries, and both civil and criminal law, as well as matters related to public finance.
Belgium model
Belgium, which gained its independence in 1830, defines itself in the very first article of its constitution as “a federal state composed of communities and regions.” The country is organised around three main communities: the Flemish, the French-speaking Walloons, and the German-speaking community. Local administrations and community structures in Belgium hold authority in areas such as education, health, local security and environmental policy.
Countries that follow these types of models demonstrate both how integration should function for the peoples, minorities and religious groups within them, and at what level these groups can participate in and contribute to the state. Against this backdrop, a key question emerges: What kind of integration policy will Turkey pursue?
For the Kurdish people in particular and for all communities, minorities, religious and faith groups, and cultural or political factions living in Turkey, what path will be followed to achieve meaningful integration? And how will Turkey move away from its existing constitution and the entrenched monolithic, nationalist, religious and gendered frameworks that underpin it, toward a more democratic, people-centred and freedom-oriented political and legal order? The coming period will reveal these answers. The hope is that this process will open greater space for peace, democracy and freedoms, and that it will contribute meaningfully to the social fabric. For this to happen, a fundamental shift in mindset and political approach is essential. This must be followed by the establishment of a legal and constitutional framework grounded in the principles of peace and fraternal coexistence. To reach that stage, the concept of integration must first be understood correctly, clarified conceptually and applied in practice and this requires listening to those who are parties to peace. Abdullah Öcalan, as well as the political and social institutions of the Kurdish Freedom Movement, must be heard. The most urgent step is to listen to Öcalan himself and to improve his conditions in order to accelerate the process and ensure his physical freedom. In addition, legislation on democratic integration must be introduced so that groups willing to contribute to peace can do so through political and democratic channels. Under the principles of the Law of Peace and Fraternity, these steps must be taken without delay.