Report on Kulp workplace deaths highlights chain of negligence

The Chamber of Civil Engineers, part of the Union of Chambers of Turkish Engineers and Architects, released its preliminary report on the death of four workers in Kulp (Pasûr), where the scaffolding of a bridge under construction by the General Directorate of Highways and the State Hydraulic Works collapsed.

According to the report, the workers died during viaduct construction carried out as part of the Silvan Dam Relocation Road. The collapse occurred when the slip-form system gave way during the pouring of concrete for the header beam on the bridge’s final elevation pier.

The Chamber of Civil Engineers stated: “This tragic incident once again exposes, in the most painful way, that occupational safety measures, engineering oversight and technical responsibilities in large-scale infrastructure projects in our region are not being fulfilled at an adequate level.”

Based on the initial technical observations and the information available, the collapse was attributed to deformation and a loss of stability in the connection elements supporting the slip-form system. The likely technical factors were outlined as follows:

– Insufficient cross-section and inadequate integrity in the load-bearing connection details of the work system,

– Deficiencies in calculating the lateral pressure forces generated during concrete pouring,

– Failure to carry out preliminary inspections, load testing and stability analyses of the formwork system,

– Incomplete independent technical review and approval procedures prior to concrete pouring.

The report emphasised that in such systems, particularly in vertical elements like high bridge piers, it is essential to apply concrete placement pressure gradually, monitor deformation at each stage, and ensure real-time observation for any signs of rigidity loss in the system.

The report noted several systemic shortcomings in current practice:

– It was determined that a safety culture had not been institutionalised at the construction-site level,

– That engineering approval procedures often remained limited to administrative obligation,

– That technical responsibilities within contractor–subcontractor relations were not clearly defined,

– And that occupational safety specialists had limited authority on site, while technical inspection mechanisms remained weak. This situation indicates not only individual negligence, but also structural deficiency in oversight.

– The preliminary technical assessment concluded that the incident occurred due to a loss of stability in the structural system and a break in the load-transfer chain.

– There was a sudden failure in the load-bearing elements of the slip-form system, and the structure collapsed before the concrete in the header beam had set.

The statement noted that the technical assessments presented constitute a preliminary evaluation based on the information currently available from the scene. The causes described represent possible technical scenarios, and definitive results will emerge only after detailed expert reports and laboratory analyses are completed.