The conflict between the Turkish state and the Kurdish Freedom Movement, ongoing for decades, continues to be one of the most critical issues at the intersection of regional balances, political transformations, and social demands. Throughout the different phases of this historical conflict, efforts toward dialogue and negotiation have occasionally come to the fore, and there have been periods when hopes for peace began to flourish.
In particular, Abdullah Öcalan’s historic Call for Peace and a Democratic Society on February 27 created a new platform for discussion on the democratic solution to the Kurdish question, rekindling hope among various segments of society.
However, despite the time that has passed and the numerous initiatives undertaken, the search for a lasting and sustainable democratic solution remains uncertain. Despite the unilateral and concrete steps taken by the Kurdish Freedom Movement, the lack of political will on the part of the state, the failure to give the process a legal and institutional framework, and the ongoing avoidance of direct negotiations with the key actors, Abdullah Öcalan and the PKK — continue to pose serious obstacles to the resolution process.
In this context, we spoke with Prof. Vicenç Fisas Armengol, an expert on peace negotiations known worldwide for his work on peace processes. Drawing on his extensive experience in conflict resolution and dialogue processes, Fisas talked to ANF about the ongoing efforts toward a democratic solution to the Kurdish question.
How would you describe, from your perspective, the current peace process in Turkey? Does this process mean that the State has in some way recognized the Kurdish question?
Well, partially, because in reality we cannot talk about a typical peace process comparable to others, since there is no direct negotiation between the parties, which is what is usually done. It is carried out through intermediaries, namely the DEM party, following a pattern similar to the previous negotiations from 2012 to 2014. Therefore, I would speak of a process of arrangements or management rather than a peace process, because there is no agenda, no prior commitment on the part of the State.
Thus, what we have here is a unilateral process on the part of the PKK, which has been making decisions — first, to abandon armed struggle, and later, to propose a political project through conventional political channels, via Parliament.
Disarmament had begun, but it was stopped at one point. The problem, in my view, is that the government is not making any commitments in response to the PKK’s advances. The PKK has dissolved as an armed group, even though it has not completely given up its weapons. However, since it has decided to abandon armed struggle, it would be normal for the government to make it easier in legal, judicial, and security terms for PKK members.
The fact that the process still has no legal framework and maintains the Turkish government’s approach of a “Turkey without terrorism,” how does that affect the process? Does it build trust, or on the contrary, create a problem?
At the moment, it does not create trust because, as I mentioned before, there has been no reaction from the government. It should already have taken confidence-building measures to strengthen the process. Everything has been left in the hands of Parliament, to the committee working on this issue, but the government had, and still has, the possibility to do many things.
It should, above all, provide guarantees to former combatants, because we can already call them that. For example, it should have begun by releasing several significant people, for instance. Öcalan should be free, or at least placed under house arrest, or, at the very least, allowed an office in prison with unlimited visits so that he can carry out the necessary steps to advance the process.
Many intermediate steps could be taken, and once the PKK has completely laid down its arms, a program for disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration, a DDR, should already have been planned, as is done in every country in the world. Normally, in all peace processes, when there is an agreement, but of course, an agreement means there are negotiations, which is not the case here. What we have here are arrangements.
This limits the process considerably, because the state does not feel obliged to respond quickly or immediately, and that is why everything is moving so slowly. And something that should already have been discussed and approved is an amnesty for Kurdish political prisoners. That is standard in all peace processes, and it is what is missing in Turkey.
You have partly mentioned it, but if you had to make a list of steps the State should take, what would you include?
Well, what surprised me from the beginning, after the PKK Congress, when the decision to abandon armed struggle was made, was that the government did not declare a bilateral ceasefire, since the PKK had already done so months earlier. That should have been the first step: a bilateral ceasefire. Secondly, as I said, to resolve the legal situation of people who are in prison or in exile.
These people should have the opportunity to return with guarantees. And thirdly, as I mentioned before, a program should already have been developed to ensure that PKK combatants can return to civilian life without problems. The reports I’ve seen suggest that perhaps some guerrillas will be given this opportunity later, but not others. They are saying that some will have to remain in exile.
This is not normal. This is not how negotiated peace processes work. But again, the core problem with the current process is that there is no direct negotiation.
What’s more, President Erdoğan never uses the term “PKK.” Never. He speaks of terrorism, of a Turkey free of terrorism, but he does not recognize the PKK as a legitimate interlocutor, which is the norm in all peace processes. That’s why there is no direct negotiation. Although everyone knows that before this process began, about a year ago, the State had contact with Öcalan in prison, but we don’t know, at least I don’t, what agreements may have been reached.
In any case, I believe that both Öcalan and the government, particularly President Erdoğan, should distance themselves somewhat from what is happening in Syria. The Syrian process must follow its own pace, its own dialogue with the current Syrian government.
They are negotiating a status, and we will see how it ends. But when Öcalan said that Syria is a red line, I think that was a mistake. We should be in solidarity with what is happening to the Kurds in Syria, but they must follow their own path, and the Kurds in Turkey their own.
Because the ultimate goal is to make Turkey a democratic country, or better said, to make it more democratic, since right now there is very little democracy; the quality of democracy is extremely poor. That is the main goal.
To the extent that democracy improves, the problems of the Kurdish community will be easier to raise, discuss, and resolve politically.
You have closely followed Colombia’s peace process between the FARC and the Colombian government. One of the key points of that peace agreement was the transition toward democratic politics and the participation of ex-combatants in civilian life.
From the organization’s perspective, in that case, the FARC, but here, the PKK, how should the transition toward democratic politics and civilian participation be structured? And what guarantees should accompany that transition?
This depends on whether or not there is direct negotiation. For me, that is the key problem: there is no table where the government and the PKK are sitting down to discuss an agenda, how to do things, at what pace, and in what order.
That is not happening, because all actions are conducted through third parties, the DEM negotiators. This imposes limits in every aspect. In Colombia, negotiations with the FARC lasted four and a half years. Four and a half years. And before that, the pre-negotiation, or exploratory phase, lasted two years, so in total, six and a half years of constant dialogue.
I had the opportunity to be involved from the very beginning, during the exploratory phase. I could participate by reviewing the exchanged documents. Later, when negotiations started, I was able to travel to Colombia and Cuba to speak with both sides.
And when there were moments of crisis, and there were many, I could talk to them and make proposals. One of the things I noticed early on was that discussions planned for the end of the agenda were being delayed far too much. Those need to be prepared well in advance.
You need teams thinking about the later stages from the beginning, not on the last day. But in Turkey, there is no agenda, that’s the problem.
Even in the previous process, from 2012 to 2015, one of the issues was that they did not even draft an agenda until two years later, in December 2014, when Öcalan proposed a draft agenda. Two years had already passed.
That is not normal. Normally, the agenda is prepared at the beginning. During the exploratory phase, which is usually not public. That’s when both sides discuss what they are going to do and how, at what pace, and with what support.
In Turkey, that was not done before, and it is not being done now. That heavily affects the development of the process. So, we are working under very difficult conditions because there is no direct dialogue. This places a big challenge and responsibility on the DEM party, which is handling the process.
But what I miss most is that it has already been a year since Bahçeli’s gesture in Parliament, shaking hands with MPs.
In this year, the government should have taken confidence-building steps, actions to reassure the other side and speed up and strengthen the process. But instead, many obstacles have been created.
When the PKK wanted to hold its Congress, normally, in other countries, every facility is provided for that. But it wasn’t easy; there were clashes. That makes no sense.
So, I see that the government is failing to react to an opportunity. Instead, it just uses abstract words about brotherhood and reconciliation, which sound good but mean nothing.
What matters is what laws will actually be passed, what confidence-building measures will actually be taken. And again, there are people who should already be out of prison, not behind bars.
The government should have sent a team to Colombia. I proposed this months ago, almost a year ago, a joint delegation of DEM and government representatives to learn from Colombia’s long experience in reintegrating ex-combatants. They have experience with more than 30,000 people.
I spoke in February with the director of that Colombian agency, and she told me she would welcome a mixed delegation from Turkey with open arms. These are the kinds of things that should already have been done.
And if they haven’t been done yet, then at least there should be technical groups from civil society and political parties planning this next phase.
Now all of this responsibility has been placed on the parliamentary committee, which still has a lot of work to do. Hopefully, they can finish as soon as possible and the government will finally react, taking real, concrete measures to bring about genuine reconciliation, not just words.