Esenyurt is one of the largest districts of Istanbul. Although pro-government writers and mainstream media outlets have portrayed it as “one of Turkey’s most dangerous districts,” the area has become a key target of the government due to its large Kurdish population and the strong presence of the Peoples’ Equality and Democracy Party (DEM Party).
In this context, Esenyurt stands out as a district exposed to the full apparatus of the state’s special warfare strategy, one that has been designed to infiltrate almost every aspect of daily life. As Istanbul’s largest district and a stronghold of the Kurdish Freedom Movement, Esenyurt first encountered these special warfare practices through demographic engineering: relocating “Turkist, fascist, racist, and Salafi organization members” into certain neighborhoods to alter the district’s social composition.
A district shaped by the war in Kurdistan
Esenyurt holds a special place for Kurds. Officially recognized as a municipality in 1989, the district became a central gathering point for Kurds during the war in Kurdistan, when the Turkish state burned villages and forcibly displaced residents. Aside from Tarlabaşı and Küçükpazar, Esenyurt became the area in Istanbul with the highest Kurdish population, and from the 1990s onward, it grew into one of the strongest centers of the Kurdish Freedom Movement.
As the state recognized the growing influence of the Kurdish Freedom Movement in the area, its targeting of Esenyurt intensified, particularly in the early 2000s. The special warfare apparatus, unwilling to accept that the largest district of Turkey’s largest city had become a Kurdish Freedom Movement stronghold, began implementing its full range of psychological and social operations in Esenyurt.
After 2005, the Turkish state took initial steps to alter the district’s demographic structure, seeking to weaken the long-standing influence of the Kurdish Freedom Movement. As part of this strategy, it also facilitated the relocation of state-aligned Kurds into neighborhoods within the district.
ISIS members settled to alter the demographic structure
In Esenyurt, the disruption of the neighborhoods’ demographic composition and the sudden settlement of outsiders unlike the long-time residents has significantly changed everyday life in the district. This transformation has also affected relations with government authorities and their local representatives. The Turkish state, using its media outlets and social media networks, has portrayed Esenyurt and nearby districts such as Bahçeşehir as “the most dangerous areas of Istanbul,” thus creating a judicial pretext for its special warfare practices in the region.
One of the most critical elements of this demographic engineering was the settlement of members of ISIS and other Salafi organizations who had taken part in attacks against Rojava. During that period, many ISIS members involved in massacres targeting Kurds and other peoples were placed in homes in Esenyurt under different identities. They were allowed to live freely and integrate into daily life. Over the past decade, the frequent police raids and arrests carried out in Esenyurt during almost every ISIS operation in Istanbul have revealed the extent of this reality.
Beyond this, the district has become a place where dozens of criminal incidents occur daily, with drug trafficking and prostitution now normalized as part of everyday life, clear consequences of these special warfare practices.
Confessions of a Turkish mafia leader
Turkish mafia leader Sedat Peker, through a series of video statements he once released, revealed how numerous gangs, both large and small, were entangled in corrupt relationships with state officials. Today in Esenyurt, these criminal groups maintain similar ties with law enforcement and judicial authorities to conceal their crimes. The district now hosts more than a hundred gangs, all involved in serious offenses, including murder. Yet, due to their connections with local state officials, their crimes remain unresolved and go unpunished.
Another aspect worth highlighting is the stance of certain leftist and opposition circles. Unable to offer any real alternative to the Justice and Development Party (AKP) government and the Turkish state’s special warfare policies, some have found themselves nearly defending mafia figures like Sedat Peker and Muhammed Yakut after their so-called exposés. Particularly alarming is that some journalists and writers publicly regarded as “opposition voices” have published content praising or even defending these mafia leaders, simply because their conflicts with the government aligned with their own opposition narratives. As a result, segments of Turkish society, already deprived of genuine political alternatives have begun to see mafia figures as sources of hope. The fact that thousands of citizens now appeal to Sedat Peker for help on social media reveals the depth of this crisis.
The attempt to portray a mafia leader, who once organized rallies calling for massacres against revolutionaries and vowed to “drink their blood”, as an alternative figure against the government today, exposes the full scale of the Turkish state’s special warfare policies. The absence of true alternatives for the peoples of Turkey has made it appear almost normal for citizens to seek help from such figures.
The murder of journalist Hakan Tosun
Journalist Hakan Tosun was beaten to death on October 10, 2025, while on his way to visit his mother in Esenyurt. After hours of being unable to reach him, his family filed a report with the police and learned that Tosun had been taken to Çam Sakura City Hospital. When they arrived, they found him, in intensive care and in critical condition. Following public pressure and widespread attention on the case, authorities announced that Tosun had been attacked by two individuals on his way home and that the perpetrators had been arrested. A few days later, the police returned Tosun’s missing belongings to his family, and footage of the attack was shared with the press by his lawyers.
The released footage in the Hakan Tosun murder case has become significant in exposing the depth of the corrupt ties between criminal gangs and law enforcement in Turkey. Investigations carried out in response to public questions revealed that a local gang had close relations with neighborhood police officers, further highlighting how unsafe the country has become for its citizens.
Despite identifying the assailants as residents of the neighborhood in their initial inquiry, the police chose to call them by phone to give statements instead of detaining them immediately. This approach, especially following such a brutal assault, raised serious doubts about the police’s familiarity and connection with the attackers. After public outrage and pressure grew on social media, the two perpetrators were eventually arrested and charged with “attempted murder.”
Later, it emerged that the family of one of the detainees had met with the investigating police officers at a grillhouse, where they discussed their son’s innocence. This revealed yet another layer of corrupt relations. Locals stated that the father of one of the main suspects, Abdurrahman Murat, named Cafer Murat, had long collaborated with the police, repeatedly paying them to cover up his son’s and his associates’ crimes. They added that the meeting at the grillhouse was intended to secure an agreement to protect his son but that public outrage following Tosun’s death prevented this from succeeding.
The murder of Hakan Tosun has sparked intense debate about the close ties between local gangs, police, and judicial authorities in Esenyurt, a district already heavily criminalized and plagued by daily incidents. From its foundation, the Turkish state has expanded its special warfare policies, originally developed against the Kurdish Freedom Movement and the Kurdish people to encompass all of Turkey, leaving citizens across the country increasingly powerless before the state.
Struggle against gang structures
The Kurdish Freedom Movement continues to wage a determined struggle against gang structures, which have emerged as a form of special warfare both in Kurdistan and across Turkey. Through its campaigns against organized criminal networks, the movement persistently seeks to offer young people a revolutionary alternative, reaffirming collective resistance as a means of social renewal.
Over the past decade, the Kurdish political movement and Kurdish youth have organized numerous marches, demonstrations, and public events. Most recently, the DEM Party held a march against gang networks in Istanbul’s Bağcılar district, followed by a series of public assemblies aimed at discussing what could be done to counter gang proliferation and showing that the people are not alone in this struggle.
In Esenyurt as well, both the DEM Party and various institutions affiliated with the Kurdish Freedom Movement continue their resistance against state repression and the manipulation of Kurdish youth through gang culture. Despite ongoing pressure, arrests, and detentions, their efforts to confront gang structures and social decay in the district remain unwavering.