Preparations have begun for the parliamentary elections scheduled for 11 November in Iraq, and the official election process started a week ago. Taking place in a period when political stability remains elusive, these elections will make the country’s internal conflicts and regional rivalries even more visible. Iraq’s political and military situation remains chaotic, and elections often become a process heavily influenced by external powers. Therefore, Iraqi parliamentary elections are generally viewed as a reflection of domestic power struggles and regional rivalries. Although the Iraqi Constitution mandates elections every four years, since 2005 there has been little real change in the system of governance. The political balance in the country continues to be maintained among three main forces. Thus, the elections in Iraq function more as a compulsory political procedure than as a genuine democratic process.
Muqtada al-Sadr and his party boycotted the 2021 parliamentary and 2023 provincial elections, creating a major vacuum in Shia politics. Although the boycott led to a drop in voter turnout, control over parliament shifted into the hands of pro-Iranian groups — a development that those circles considered a success. Iran’s influence in Iraq is not limited to politics; Iran-backed armed groups, such as the Hashd al-Shaabi (Popular Mobilization Forces), also play a decisive role in domestic decision-making mechanisms. Consequently, the issue of expelling U.S. and Turkish troops from Iraq has become one of the central themes of election campaigns. Political divisions in Iraq continue to deepen, particularly among Sunni and Kurdish communities.
Each group seeks to safeguard its own interests by strengthening ties either with Iran or with the West, particularly the U.S. and Europe. The U.S. and several Western countries aim to curb the influence of Iran-aligned Shia groups. As a result, some individuals and organizations linked to Iran have been placed on “terror lists.” The objective is to cut off Iran’s financial resources and weaken these groups’ power. Similarly, efforts are underway to limit the influence of Iran-backed structures like Hashd al-Shaabi within state institutions. While the Iraqi government struggles to bring these groups under control, it faces international pressure to remove them from official positions. The main goal of the U.S. and anti-Iran forces is to reduce Iran’s military influence in Iraq and prevent the country from turning into an “open battlefield.” However, due to Baghdad’s close ties with Tehran, these objectives have not been fully achieved.
Turkey and Iran’s influence over Baghdad
Both Iran and Turkey are key regional actors with significant interests in Iraq. Iran seeks to keep a Shia-dominated government in power and strengthen an administration loyal to its agenda, using Shia parties and militias to maintain leverage in Baghdad. Turkey, meanwhile, exerts both economic and military pressure. Seeking to benefit from Iraq’s instability, Ankara aims to strengthen its ties with Baghdad and Hewlêr (Erbil) in the fields of energy and trade. Turkey’s military occupations in Southern Kurdistan directly influence Iraqi electoral politics. Both Turkey and Iran attempt to shape election outcomes through the parties and alliances they support to suit their own interests.
Kurdistan Region President Nechirvan Barzani and Iraqi Foreign Minister Fuad Hussein recently visited Turkey ahead of the elections. This visit took place during a highly sensitive period, coinciding with the anniversary of the International Conspiracy. In 1998, the KDP supported Turkey’s role in that conspiracy against Abdullah Öcalan. On 9 October 2019, Turkey invaded Serêkaniyê and Girê Spî with full military force, while the KDP closed the Habur border gate, halting all crossings to Rojava. Again, on 9 October 2022, the Iraqi government, the KDP, and the United States signed the 9 October Agreement against the Yazidi people. That agreement continues to serve as a political tool targeting the Yazidi community today. Both Nechirvan Barzani and Fuad Hussein are trying to strengthen their positions within the Baghdad government with Turkey’s support — efforts that have intensified as the elections approach.
Shengal has always been a critical region in Iraqi elections. Every political force, especially the KDP, seeks to expand its influence there. After abandoning thousands of Yazidis to ISIS gangs during their attacks, the KDP is now trying to reassert control over Shengal. The signing of the 9 October Agreement between Baghdad and Hewlêr amounted to a denial of the Yazidi community’s will. The KDP repeatedly pressured the Iraqi government to enforce this agreement but faced strong resistance from the Yazidi people each time. The presence of the Iraqi army and other political forces in Shengal directly affects both the elections and the return of displaced residents. In the 2023 local council elections, the votes of the Yazidis living in camps were largely shaped by the influence of regional political parties. For the past 11 years, the KDP has used these votes to serve its own interests and manipulate election outcomes.
KDP’s electoral strategy and objectives in Shengal
The candidate selection process generally depends on the decisions of the Iraqi High Electoral Commission. The quota reserved for the Yazidis often becomes an open instrument of political manipulation, frequently used to favor candidates supported by the KDP or other major parties. This results in the suppression of Shengal’s self-governing will at both political and institutional levels, leaving Yazidi representation under the control of external parties. In the 2023 provincial elections, the KDP aimed to maintain and strengthen its position in Nineveh province, particularly in Shengal, but failed to do so and subsequently altered its strategy. This time, it has sought to expand its influence by embedding loyal forces within the Yazidi community.
The KDP’s main goal is to dismantle the existing autonomous administration in Shengal through cooperation with Baghdad. It seeks to exploit the Yazidi community’s electoral representation for its own benefit and to reshape the balance of political power in the region. After suffering setbacks in local elections, the KDP now plans to regain ground in Shengal either with the support of the Baghdad government or through military pressure.
In conclusion, the Iraqi elections are seen as a crucial stage in determining both internal and regional power balances. Shengal, however, remains one of the regions most deeply affected by this ongoing power struggle.