The recent assaults on the Kurdish neighborhoods of Sheikh Maqsood and Ashrafiah in Aleppo are not merely local security incidents. They signal the collapse of the March 10 understanding and the April 1 agreement, revealing how the new dynamic between Turkey and its mercenaries on the ground poses an escalating threat to the Kurdish presence.
Over the past 24 hours, the members of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) and the Syrian National Army (SNA) have intensified their bombardments using heavy weapons, anti-tank missiles, and mortars. The attacks resulted in the martyrdom of one civilian and injuries to at least twenty others, while Internal Security Forces downed an HTS drone and continue to repel assaults.
It is becoming increasingly evident that the war in Syria is set to escalate once again. Power balances between competing forces will be defined not through dialogue or negotiation, but through renewed warfare and confrontation. Global actors with interests in Syria aim to strengthen their positions and make their influence permanent by fueling conflict among Syria’s peoples.
Following massacres targeting Alawite and Druze communities, a new genocidal offensive now targets the Kurdish population as part of attempts to reshape Syria’s future. The use of tear gas and live ammunition against civilians has further tightened the siege on these neighborhoods, endangering the lives of more than 400,000 people under blockade.
The fact that clashes have begun in Sheikh Maqsood and Ashrafiah, Kurdish neighborhoods disconnected from the Autonomous Administration, carries significant meaning. Their isolation may make them appear as easy targets for the Turkish state and its mercenaries.
The attacks have been aimed at multiple targets simultaneously. It appears they are intended to achieve several objectives with a single action. To summarize the likely plans:
Empowering SNA mercenaries
It is clear that while the Turkish state seeks to legitimize its occupation in Syria through HTS, it also aims to assert control over HTS from within by deploying the SNA mercenaries under its command.
During the intense clashes that began last night, fierce fighting broke out between HTS forces and the Internal Security Forces around Al-Jalaa, the Al-Jazira checkpoint, and the Greek Hospital. However, the attacks were successfully repelled by the Internal Security Forces.
Ahmed al-Sharaa (al-Jolani) remains in a weak position. In this situation, he appears to view coordinated action with the SNA mercenaries as a way to secure his position. If successful, he would strengthen his hand against the Kurds, Alawites, and Druze.
Indicators point to an al-Jolani–Turkey alliance
Signs indicate that the Turkish state, through this alliance, aims both to project its ideological line and to consolidate its de facto occupation on the ground. To this end, it is indirectly positioning its proxy SNA mercenaries alongside HTS to transform its field presence into an effective force in Damascus’s politics.
Because Turkey treats domination on the ground as an existential necessity, it prefers to align itself with Damascus; from this perspective, a plan that envisages the liquidation of the Kurds appears to it as the most suitable option.
Through such a maneuver, Tayyip Erdoğan seeks to demonstrate on the ground that the Kurdish gains he once described as a “mistake” when they emerged through Northern Iraq will not be allowed to repeat in northern Syria, while simultaneously attempting to strengthen Turkey’s position as a decisive actor in Syria’s future.
However, to become a decisive actor in Syria, Turkey deems it necessary to delicately balance relations between regional and global powers. In its calculations to secure field and political dominance via Damascus, Turkey also aims to present itself as a counterweight to Israel’s regional expansionism and, for that purpose, it is pursuing policies that crush the Kurds on the ground.
Reading Turkey’s Kurdish policy in two directions
Turkey is pursuing two possible outcomes simultaneously while attempting to eliminate the Kurds. The first is to weaken the Kurds through direct attacks: by whipping up nationalist reactions among Arab populations, especially tribal groups, to provoke internal conflict and thereby expand occupation on the ground. The second is a propaganda and diplomatic gambit linked to neutralizing the Israeli threat: if an alliance with Israel is formed, Turkey foresees mobilizing a regional reaction by alleging that Kurds are acting against Arabs or Palestine and collaborating with Israel. Even if such an alliance does not materialize, isolating the Kurds to create international silence could facilitate genocide.
In short, all roads lead to Turkey’s plan to secure dominance in Damascus politics and on the ground through its mercenaries.
Notably, at the October 1 opening of Parliament, Erdoğan said a new déjà vu would not be allowed to occur.
What exactly is this déjà vu?
This refers to a form of déjà vu of the post-Saddam federation declared in Southern Kurdistan (Başur). Erdoğan has repeatedly stated that he will never allow a similar formation in Northern Syria; this is not a first-time claim but one he has stressed thousands of times. In other words, Kurdish possession of a recognized status in Syria will be absolutely refused, which in practice means a new genocidal war.
In essence, the indicators on the ground clearly show that Turkey is the actor conducting the war.
Is the anniversary of Oct. 6–8 events a coincidence?
The attacks on the Sheikh Maqsoud neighborhoods coinciding with the anniversary of the Kobanê events are not accidental. Those who lost in Kobanê now seek to win in Sheikh Maqsoud. Notably, Erdoğan appears intent on sidelining Northern Kurdistan (Bakur), creating the impression of a process in the north to leave Kurds torn, hesitant and ultimately neutralized on the ground.
In response to these assaults, thousands of Kurds in Qamishlo and Kobanê took to the streets in solidarity demonstrations for Sheikh Maqsood and Ashrafiah, condemning the attacks.
Recent digital-media campaigns promoting Demirtaş and his associates have emerged as part of this strategy. These campaigns manufacture a perceptional fog, attempting to hide facts in a thick cloud of misinformation.
The mentality and politics that have carried out massacres against Kurds in Rojava cannot conduct a process with Kurds in Northern Kurdistan. That is clear. I believe the sensitivity of the people of Northern Kurdistan on this issue is of vital importance. If they recognize that history is at a critical turning point and define their role, mission and position accordingly, they will be in a decisive position to determine their fate.
The logic that calls the gains in Southern Kurdistan a “mistake” and vows not to repeat that mistake in Rojava will not act differently in Northern Kurdistan.
Will Turkey’s plans hold?
If Turkey’s Syria policy unfolds as planned, the country would become a major power broker in regional politics. But will things truly go according to plan? That depends on the resistance to come. Should strong resistance emerge within the Autonomous Administration region, Turkey’s calculations on the ground will collapse, compelling Damascus to recognize the Administration’s autonomy. If Turkey fails to establish control on the ground, it will also lose its current influence over Damascus politics. Such an outcome would strengthen popular ownership of the Autonomous Administration’s system, while enhancing its prospects for regional and international legitimacy and legal recognition. In that case, the Kurds would become a key actor in shaping the region’s future, and Turkey’s use of Islam to fuel anti-Kurdish propaganda would once again be defeated.
The Internal Security Forces’ declaration that the neighborhoods are a red line and their preparation for a full-scale response, further reinforces the determination of the resistance.