Following the collapse of Bashar al-Assad’s regime, Syria’s future system of governance has become one of the most debated issues both domestically and internationally. At the heart of this debate lies the question of whether Syria will maintain its centralized structure or evolve into a decentralized system based on local self-rule.
While interim authorities in Damascus lean toward preserving centralized rule, many influential local actors on the ground advocate for granting greater autonomy to different regions of the country. Considering Syria’s ethnic, religious, and sectarian diversity, decentralization emerges not only as feasible but also as a strategic necessity for building peace and establishing a sustainable governance system.
From centralization to decentralization: a historical background
Hafez al-Assad, who came to power in 1971, and later his son Bashar in 2000, established a highly centralized system in Syria. The 1973 constitution vested sweeping powers in the presidency; governors were appointed from above, and local councils functioned only as symbolic bodies implementing central decisions. No region outside Damascus held political, administrative, or financial autonomy.
During Bashar al-Assad’s rule, little was done to strengthen local governance. This played a significant role in the popular uprising that erupted in 2011. Citizens had no representation or decision-making power at the local level. Combined with systemic corruption and uneven development, this created widespread discontent.
In response to the uprising, Assad sought to preserve the regime’s legitimacy by adopting a new constitution in 2012 and passing Law No. 107, which nominally provided for local decentralization. Yet in practice, these reforms remained symbolic, with the central authority in Damascus continuing to control all local governance activities.
Decentralization is not only a modern political necessity but also resonates with Syria’s historical legacy.
The constitution of the Syrian Arab Kingdom, established in 1920, envisioned a decentralized system that governed the country through autonomous regions, allowing minority representation and local autonomy. Similarly, during the French mandate some federal elements were introduced, though they were quickly replaced with centralization.
After 2011, as central authority weakened in many areas, local councils, civil society structures, and autonomous administrations emerged. The Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria, under Kurdish control, became the most advanced experiment of this kind. By contrast, the dominance of Islamist HTS in the northwest highlighted the limits of local governance, with HTS ironically becoming one of the strongest defenders of centralization.
The Kurdish demand for decentralization
Kurdish people, who make up about 15% of Syria’s population, have historically been excluded and are among the strongest advocates of decentralization. Since 2014, the Autonomous Administration has implemented a multilingual, multiethnic governance model across nearly one-third of Syria. Its co-chair system ensures gender and ethnic representation, while its trilingual education policy helps safeguard cultural diversity.
In April 2025, different Kurdish political groups came together to announce a shared vision for post-Assad Syria based on decentralization. They argue that this model should apply not only to Kurdish regions but to the entire country.
The spread of decentralization demands
It is not only Kurds but also other ethnic and sectarian groups who are vocally demanding decentralization. Druze, Alawites, and Christians, driven by feelings of insecurity, exclusion, and concern over central rule, are seeking greater local autonomy. These concerns are directly linked to fears that the transitional government in Damascus is increasingly influenced by Islamists.
Moreover, the Sunni Arab majority has also been among those most negatively affected by centralization, suffering from marginalization, poverty, and infrastructure neglect. Thus, decentralization is not simply in the interest of minorities but would benefit the majority of the population as well.
Fears and realities: a risk of division?
Some sectors of Syrian society fear that decentralization could lead to the country’s partition. Yet such fears often reflect years of central government propaganda and anxieties about losing authority. In reality, carefully planned decentralization could strengthen rather than weaken national unity.
Under such a model, core sovereign functions like foreign policy, defense, and finance would remain with the central government, while powers over education, health, infrastructure, and local economies would be devolved to local authorities. This would preserve national cohesion while creating governance more responsive to local needs.
Ongoing talks between Damascus, the Autonomous Administration, and other local actors could lay the foundations for a more inclusive governance system applicable to the entire country. This would require reviewing current administrative divisions, ensuring fair resource distribution, recognizing cultural rights, and institutionalizing representation.
The international community should support Syria’s transition to decentralization. Through technical and financial assistance, it can help strengthen local governance structures while backing the constitutional reform process. Decentralization is not just a response to the Kurdish issue but a necessity for the stability, representation, and resilience of the whole country.
After 14 years of conflict and destruction, it is time for Syria to seriously consider governance models beyond centralization. This is not merely a regime change but the establishment of a new and inclusive system for the region, one that best responds to the realities on the ground.