Following Abdullah Öcalan’s call for “Peace and Democratic Society” on February 27, debates and developments continue around the democratic resolution of the Kurdish question. Steps to be taken toward building social peace and a democratic order carry critical importance both for the common future of peoples and for regional stability.
ANF spoke with politician and academic Ufuk Uras about the stage the process has reached and the discussions about it.
After MHP Chair Devlet Bahçeli’s call in October, and following Kurdish People’s Leader Abdullah Öcalan’s February 27 call for “Democratic Society and Peace,” the PKK convened its 12th Congress, taking a series of historic decisions, including the possibility of dissolving the movement. Although the process continues with the work of a commission established under the Parliament’s roof, the government has not yet taken concrete steps in response to moves from the Kurdish side. Where does the process stand today?
In fact, where we’ve reached is extremely positive. The best summary of this was also made by Devlet Bahçeli himself. He said very clearly that Öcalan has done everything he needed to do on this issue, has taken all the necessary steps, and that from this point on, the political power must act.
Indeed, the establishment of a parliamentary commission in the Turkish Grand National Assembly with the participation of all parties, and opinion leaders of society also taking positions on this process, is an extremely positive development. I estimate that by mid-autumn, when Parliament reconvenes, the inclinations of the commission will become more concrete through economic committees in the general assembly, and we will have left behind an important phase. Public support also seems quite favorable.
Lately, the issue of Rojava has been especially highlighted. It is said that Öcalan’s call covers not only the PKK but also the armed forces in Rojava. Both Bahçeli and President Erdoğan made statements about this. What is the purpose of repeatedly bringing up Rojava?
Again, Bahçeli claimed that Öcalan needs to clarify this issue. But in my view, the matter is already very clear. From a procedural standpoint, the PKK transforming itself, dissolving, and bringing open politics to the forefront naturally includes everyone.
From a substantive perspective, however, the situation in Turkey and in Syria (Rojava) are different. On the Syrian axis, the ongoing talks between the central government and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) are quite significant and must continue. This is not about “disappearing,” but about transformation.
Öcalan’s emphasis on an “integration” perspective is important here. Integration and assimilation are different. The model that has emerged in Rojava itself carries critical importance for Syria. The Syrian central administration must agree on a pluralistic constitution, redefine content through methods like decentralization, and SDF must also transform. This should be seen as a process of “transformation.”
Once that happens, a more integration-oriented perspective will take flesh. Its intellectual background is also very important. Öcalan is describing a ground that expands the space of politics, beyond organizational dissolution.
Öcalan’s approach can also be defined as the convergence of Turkish enlightenment with the more recent Kurdish enlightenment on a common ground. This is immensely valuable. In the traditions we come from on the left, it is rarely seen that organizations confront themselves and show the will to transcend themselves.
Therefore, the matter is not only administrative or organizational, but also presents a transformation perspective at the level of mentality and worldview.
You said the Rojava model could serve as an example for Syria. Yet despite this, Erdoğan’s government and Turkey still view Rojava as a threat. Shouldn’t this perspective now be abandoned?
I believe that alongside the Rojava model, what I call the “Süleyman Shah model” could be turned into a political model, meaning that, in the face of the ISIS threat, Turkey and these structures taking a joint stance could be institutionalized.
The so-called Rojava model is essentially an adaptation of the European Charter of Local Self-Government to regional conditions. It is not an alternative to central government. Looking at SDF’s perspective, we see it advocates a federalist approach. In Turkey too, there are parties that defend federalism.
Ultimately, it is the Syrian people who will decide what this model will look like. Moreover, all colors within Syria converging on a common constitution also means the transformation of the Damascus government. A united Syria gathering around a joint constitutional text would also serve as an important guarantee for Israel.
That is, Syria’s diversity coming together in rebuilding the future without melting away into homogeneity is one of the strongest assurances for the security of a state like Israel. Therefore, what can address Turkey’s concerns in this process is continuing diplomacy and negotiations. We already know these talks are continuing de facto. What must be done here is to reach agreement. The global network’s creation of a suitable environment in this regard also facilitates the process.
This should not be seen as dissolving into the Syrian central administration and submitting to it, but rather as building a model unique to itself. Looking at other countries, for example, in the Yugoslav experience, the restructuring of the army along certain ethnic lines and the arming of other ethnic identities under Milošević led to disaster—this is an important lesson.
Turkey’s anxieties about YPG, SDF, and similar structures partly stem from the Assad era. But a return to the Assad period, or to the pre-Assad period, is out of the question.
On the contrary, the Assad regime lost legitimacy precisely because it homogenized a heterogeneous geography. The biggest trap for Damascus today is the possibility of moving toward a model resembling the Assad regime it once opposed. Yet we all know such a model has no reality in Syria.
Returning to the commission established under Parliament’s roof: it has so far met with different social groups. One of the most important steps the commission will take, I assume, is meeting with Abdullah Öcalan, one of the key actors in the process. While everyone is waiting for this, the DEM Party announced that an expanded delegation will go to İmralı in the coming days. But it was stated that only representatives of DEM and its component parties will be part of this delegation. Shouldn’t AKP, CHP, and MHP figures also be included?
Of course, they should. But ultimately, this process is proceeding on the basis of voluntariness. If a party, for example the CHP or the Yeniden Refah Party, says “We do not want to take part,” and thus chooses to remain outside the process, given that we cannot change these actors’ positions in the short term, the most reasonable path is to continue through DEM. At least having talks through DEM and transmitting them to the Parliamentary Commission, though not ideal, is better than nothing.
As I understand it, the process will mainly proceed through DEM. Even if Öcalan’s perspective, strategies, and tactical inclinations are addressed in the commission limited to DEM and perhaps a few other parties, this is still a very valuable step.
You said many points in the process will become clearer by mid-autumn. Concretely, what steps are expected, and which developments will be critical in the coming period?
This process actually first came onto the agenda around the time of the holiday, with changes to the execution law. It is hard to say precisely what is expected, but my hope—and what we’ve seen in our contacts through the DPI (Democratic Progress Institute)—is that, though perhaps not explicitly named, steps will be taken toward expanding the scope of the execution law.
In this context, a cautious approach to prevent nationalist blocs in Turkey—like the İYİ Party and Zafer Party—from derailing the process is also important. But my main expectation is the constitutional amendment.
The constitutional amendment is, in my opinion, extremely valuable. One of Turkey’s fundamental issues is going beyond Kenan Evren’s constitution and establishing universal democratic norms. For this reason, the CHP must quickly abandon its “politics of rejection” pursued over a draft it hasn’t even seen yet, examine the draft, and perfect it with amendment proposals.
The argument that “the constitution is not implemented anyway” is not convincing, because a party aspiring to power must proceed with the claim of implementation.
Moreover, clauses can be added regarding what to do when the constitution is violated. Despite the poor record on lifting immunity this period should be seen as a process in which everyone will confront their own inconsistencies.
Among the concrete steps to be taken, does the debate over the “right to hope” also feature?
I think it should. Because there is no need to debate this issue below the threshold already set by Devlet Bahçeli. The DEM Party is extremely flexible here; it does not treat the issue as a red line. At the same time, I know it embraces the definition that this right is not personal but an anonymous right determined by international norms. I believe negotiating and debating this right is very important.
Öcalan has repeatedly stated that he does not consider it correct for this debate to revolve solely around himself.
In a process aimed at resolving a deep-rooted problem, various attacks are being directed at the CHP. Do such attacks harm the progress of the process, and what lies behind their meaning and motivation?
Of course, they cause harm; they spoil the climate. The CHP’s participation in this commission is extremely valuable. We all know that in this country there is a “municipal party”—I say this leaving DEM aside, of course—consisting of both the AKP and the CHP. Therefore, instead of getting stuck in petty quarrels, we need to find common ground on issues like local government law and public procurement law. We shouldn’t look at it as if one party is responsible for these matters while the others are somehow exempt. This is exactly what complicates the process.
Why do we care about the peace process? Because it will expand the realm of politics and increase the legitimacy of the idea of peace. Despite all the zigzags, we will not abandon this ground; but the opposition adopting a joint position and coming together on common ground allows us to turn this process into an opportunity for struggle.
The DEM Party, which has been the biggest victim of the trustee (kayyum) system, supporting this entire process does not mean it legitimizes the trustee policy. On the contrary, we see this process as creating a platform where debates on models like the Council of Europe’s local government charter or the Rojava model will no longer be taboo. Naturally, this is a process with difficult ebbs and flows, but it cannot be reduced to the excuse of “never give up” often used by the White Turks.
Because we—democrats and peace advocates—carry a serious responsibility on our shoulders, we cannot approach these issues like tourists.
If we look at global examples, such processes sometimes remain confined to the elites. Today, Turkey’s process also looks somewhat like this. There is a commission, but the debates are mostly among elites and parties. How much does this process reflect on people and society? Has the social dimension, emphasized by Öcalan, been formed, and why is it so important?
All parties, especially the DEM Party, practically toured Turkey to address this issue. This was one of the goals of the commission. However, the commission must not prolong the debate phase. The discussions need to quickly be turned into concrete policies and a defined legal framework; there’s no need to drag them out.
The issues are more or less clear. We don’t have to start over with topics we’ve known for forty years. But in terms of the socialization of the peace process, parties made good use of the summer period. Almost all parties, including the MHP and AKP, held large meetings across Turkey. There has been no objection, including from the mothers of martyrs.
Particularly the Diyarbakır mothers said, “We want our children.” The children they refer to, in quotation marks, are those involved in this process. Can anyone object to that? Such steps are extremely valuable, especially in reducing reactions from the nationalist camp.
It is said that within the People’s Alliance there are disagreements, especially between the MHP and the AKP, regarding this process. How realistic are these claims, or is there such a split?
No, I don’t believe there is. Some circles may wish it were so. But this process is not limited to the People’s Alliance alone; behind it there is also state reason.
So clearly, serious work has been done on this issue. But without societal reason, state reason alone has no meaning. And this is exactly where Öcalan’s perspective of social democracy and bottom-up construction comes into play, giving the process meaning.
Finally, I’d like to ask: At this stage, are anxieties more prominent, or hopes for peace?
Of course, hopes for peace are in the foreground. It is very natural that there are anxieties too, because there is no Plan B, and the entire Middle East is in upheaval. But it makes no sense to trivialize this by saying, “Can this really happen with this government?” As you noted, many conflict resolution processes around the world have been carried out by existing governments, and almost all of them were right-wing governments.
So, I may not like this government, but it’s not as though we’re negotiating with a government in Norway. The point is not to approve of the government, but to recognize the other side as a counterpart and to create a ground for struggle. For this reason, we need to abandon the reflex we call “canteen leftism”, the habit of dismissing the process simply because we don’t like the government. This process is being launched precisely to transform the current government, and that’s how such processes work everywhere in the world.
We have lived through times when even saying “Kurd” took ages to be normalized. Now, whichever TV channel you turn on, this issue is being discussed, even if one-sidedly, which I think is extremely important. This is what we wanted: to make politics the art of setting the agenda.
In fact, Öcalan, Bahçeli, and others have already set the agenda. What matters now is to take initiative. Ultimately, I have no doubt that we will succeed in embodying the hope for peace.