Dr. Seevan Saeed is an academic and researcher who studies the historical and ideological dimensions of this process. In this in-depth interview, he told ANF that “Democratic Confederalism emerged as an alternative to the nation-state.”
The first part of this interview can be read here.
Democratic Confederalism is resonating in the Middle East and across the world. Why does a non-state form of organization generate so much excitement?
The Kurdish Freedom Movement laid the foundations of this paradigm fifty years ago with the PKK. Today, these paradigms are coming to life through practical examples such as the democratic autonomous administrations in Rojava, where different peoples are striving to live together freely and on equal terms. For this reason, Democratic Confederalism is not only regional but also a significant guide for struggles for freedom and democracy on a global scale.
Take the Qamishlo region of Rojava, for example. Qamishlo is a multi-ethnic area where about fifteen different peoples; Kurds, Arabs, Circassians, Turkmens, Assyrians, and Chaldeans among them, live together. Thanks to the Democratic Confederalism model, these peoples sustain their freedom and self-governance.
Of course, this model is followed not only in Kurdistan but also beyond the Middle East, in countries such as Egypt and Yemen. The twentieth century left nation-states remembered either as major dictatorships or as collapsed, ungovernable states. Iraq, Syria, Iran, and Libya are examples. These failures could not respond to the peoples’ demands for freedom and democratic self-administration.
This is why Democratic Confederalism has emerged as an alternative to the nation-state and has found hope and positive resonance among both Kurdish and non-Kurdish peoples.
What are the concrete effects of the Democratic Confederalism paradigm on Kurdish society?
These effects can be observed across the four parts of Kurdistan. In Turkey, women’s councils, cooperatives, and municipal experiences reshaped local governance even before state repression. In Rojava, the model has been implemented most comprehensively through autonomous administrations, people’s assemblies, and women’s leadership. In Iraq and Iran, although more limited, the paradigm influences organizational culture and provides a framework for unity among fragmented Kurdish groups.
The women’s liberation paradigm and the dynamism of youth are the most visible elements of this transformation. And of course, there is also a fundamental change in social, political, and organizational mentality.
You particularly emphasize the change of mentality. Why do you see it as so critical?
History has shown us that even if regimes change, if the mentality does not change, oppression continues. Saddam Hussein was overthrown, but oppression in Iraq continued under the Shiites. In Syria, the regime weakened, but other forces carried on the same repression. In other words, changing the name of the system does not matter; what truly matters is changing the mentality. The Kurdish Freedom Movement has aimed at this and has demonstrated it in practice.
Can the KCK system, as the concrete expression of the paradigm, function as a common democratic society model linking the four parts of Kurdistan?
The KCK embodies this approach as a transnational umbrella system. The KCK is not a state; it is a network of democratic communities. By avoiding the traps of nationalist privileges, it can function as a unifying structure across Kurdistan.
From now on, what opportunities and challenges will arise as the PKK shifts its focus from armed struggle to social and political struggle? And how can this be aligned with the vision of a democratic society?
An important issue is the PKK’s gradual shift from armed struggle to a broader political and social struggle. Guerrilla warfare gave the Kurds visibility and bargaining power; however, Abdullah Öcalan’s paradigm emphasizes that lasting freedom will not be achieved through military conflict but through democratic organization.
This situation creates both opportunities and challenges. The opportunities lie in mobilizing broader society and gaining international legitimacy. The challenges, however, come from confronting states that still rely on militarized repression.
For North Kurdistan, this requires rethinking guerrilla struggle not as an end in itself but as a defensive element of the broader democratic project. Guerrilla warfare may continue, but it must be aligned with the vision of creating democratic spaces within civil society rather than pursuing a classical military victory.
Is today’s peace process, the talks between Abdullah Öcalan and the Turkish state, merely the result of a political development, or is it connected to the PKK’s ideological transformation?
The peace process is not merely a tactical ceasefire; it is a reflection of the PKK’s move toward Democratic Confederalism. Abdullah Öcalan framed peace as inseparable from democratization; and this applies not only to the Kurds but to Turkey and the entire Middle East.
How does the implementation of the Democratic Confederalism paradigm in Rojava provide an example for other peoples in the region and the Middle East?
The Democratic Confederalism paradigm emerged as an alternative to the oppressive and failed structures of nation-states and developed rapidly in practice in Rojava. This model, embodied through democratic autonomy, women’s liberation, and youth participation, has offered new hope to the peoples of the region. Rojava presented a concrete example of how the paradigm can function in practice.
In a region dominated by authoritarian regimes, sectarian politics, and constant war, an alternative model emerged from the grassroots, through women’s co-leadership and the inclusive participation of Arabs, Assyrians, and other minorities. This has resonated beyond Kurdish society, offering a vision of peace and coexistence in a fragmented Middle East.
What is the impact and role of Democratic Confederalism in a peaceful solution?
If Turkey truly wants peace, and if peace is achieved across all parts of Kurdistan, then a solution can develop. In other words, if peace is realized in Kurdistan, the century-old Kurdish-Turkish issue can be resolved. Such a development would also create significant and positive results in Rojava.
In Rojava, the People’s Protection Units (YPG), the Women’s Protection Units (YPJ), and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) have emerged not only as defenders of the Kurds but also of the Syrian peoples and all communities in the region. In this context, other ethnic and religious groups, such as the Alawites in Syria’s coastal areas and the Druze in Sweida (Suwayda), are also drawing inspiration from the Democratic Confederalism model to establish their own autonomy.
This shows that the movement has created profound and positive effects not only on the Kurds but also on non-Kurdish peoples. In short, we see that the theory of Democratic Confederalism has found important expression in practice in Rojava and is steadily gaining momentum in every respect.
How can the distrust caused among Kurds by the frequent failure of peace processes in Turkey be overcome? What concrete steps should both the state and the Kurds take?
The processes largely failed due to the Turkish state’s security-centered approach. Distrust arose from years of unsuccessful negotiations, broken promises, and violent escalations. The state must recognize Kurdish identity, provide legal protections for cultural rights, and implement reforms that make decentralized democracy possible. On the Kurdish side, it is necessary to maintain defensive capacity while strengthening non-violent democratic organization. International actors must also stop viewing the PKK solely as a terrorist organization and instead recognize its ideological transformation and encourage democratic negotiations.
How do you assess Abdullah Öcalan’s role in this process?
The charisma and ideological leadership of Mr. Öcalan are highly decisive. Without the concepts he developed, such as ‘democratic society’ and ‘positive integration,’ it would not be easy to bring peace discussions to the agenda in this way today. Moreover, Öcalan’s faith in his people and his comrades gives great strength to the movement.
Today, the people of Kurdistan, the movement, and Öcalan have become inseparable. Neither the people can be separated from the movement, nor the movement from Öcalan, nor Öcalan from the people. Although the Turkish state and international powers have tried to sever this bond, they have not succeeded. This triad (people, movement, and Öcalan) is the greatest achievement of the fifty-year struggle.
So, will this process succeed, and how does it differ from previous ones?
We are at a different point than the peace attempts of 1993 with Turgut Özal or the initiatives of 2013. The peace to be achieved now is a societal peace. If there is no societal peace, the price the Turkish state will pay will be greater than in previous periods. The desire for peace is important not only for the people of Kurdistan but also for the Turkish state.
The character of Abdullah Öcalan is of great importance in the continuation of this process and in maintaining both moral and practical support. This wholeness, meaning the process carried out collectively by Öcalan’s comrades, from Europe to the mountains to the cities, together with the people of Kurdistan, has already made it successful. In other words, the bonds between the people, the movement, and Öcalan have not been broken. From my perspective, this is a very significant and remarkable success. The key to concluding this fifty-year movement and struggle with peace lies here.
Within the framework of the women’s liberationist paradigm, communal society, and the confederal system, what opportunities does the Kurdish Freedom Movement offer for future social and political transformations?
Women are not merely participants; as co-leaders they shape both ideology and practice. This has redefined gender relations within Kurdish society and inspired feminist movements worldwide. Combined with the social spirit of Democratic Confederalism, this approach guides the way toward new political structures beyond both patriarchy and nationalism.
The Kurdish experience shows that freedom movements can evolve ideologically, that structures based on grassroots democracy can develop even in hostile environments, and that peace can be achieved not only through negotiations but through deep social reorganization.
Finally, a campaign titled ‘I want to meet with Abdullah Öcalan’ has been launched. Would you also like to meet him?
Of course. There is something that truly pleased me. In a statement this June, Mr. Öcalan said something striking: ‘I am waiting for you with all my heart and soul, to share my criticisms and to offer my advice on how we can collectively advance the peace process.’ In other words, Öcalan does not see himself merely as an individual. That is why he is a genuine human being.
As an individual, as a university professor, I would be deeply happy to have the opportunity one day to meet Mr. Öcalan. I would like to learn from him and also share our own criticisms. Because this movement does not belong to one person or to a single party. The people of Kurdistan are both the owners of this movement and those who shoulder the burden of this struggle. To see Mr. Öcalan one day would make me very happy, and I hope for that day.