Asymmetric negotiation arises when the parties are not equal in terms of power, means, or legitimacy. In such negotiations, the stronger side sets the table according to its own interests, while the weaker side often acts out of concern for preserving its existence. As a result, what determines the outcome at the table is not truth or justice, but the will to dominate.
The main characteristics of asymmetric negotiation are as follows:
1) Power imbalance: One side holds superiority in military, economic, or diplomatic terms.
2) Pursuit of dominance rather than truth: Negotiation becomes not a search for resolution, but a tool for the stronger side to impose its position.
3) Rhetorical maneuvers: As highlighted in Schopenhauer’s book ‘The Art of Being Right,’ distortion of the issue, imposition of false dilemmas, and questioning the legitimacy of the other side are frequently observed.
4) Turning demands into bargaining chips: The weaker side’s demands are not recognized as rights but are instead treated as concessions to be granted by the stronger side.
Many examples throughout history confirm this logic. In the negotiation processes following the Second World War, a statement attributed to Stalin, “What is ours is ours, what is yours is negotiable”, summarized both the reality of the past and that of today, representing the clearest expression of asymmetric negotiation.
The most recent reflections of this can be seen at the Alaska summit held on 15 August between the United States and Russia, where Russia controlled the table without making any concessions, or in Turkey’s processes with the Kurds, where the issue was constantly reduced to the framework of “security.”
Asymmetric negotiation does not produce peace in essence, because peace presumes equality, while asymmetry rejects equality from the outset. For this reason, in the Kurdish question as well, simply sitting at the negotiation table does not mean a solution; what truly matters is how the table is set and under what conditions the parties sit at it.
The phrase “What is ours is ours, what is yours is negotiable” expresses not only a style of diplomacy but also the language of power and the unequal nature of negotiation. Russia’s deepening policies through the war in Ukraine today reflect precisely the contemporary version of this understanding.
Although Moscow may appear weakened in today’s multipolar world order, it is building an alternative model within a long-term strategy against Western sanctions and encirclement attempts.
This model rests on three main pillars:
1) Geostrategic corridors: From the White Sea extending through the Baltic and the Black Sea to the Azov and Caspian, the “Five Seas line” strategy, along with the North-South Corridor that opens through Iran to the Indian Ocean and has become vital for Russia. First planned in the seventeenth century by Pierre Le Grand and later expanded during Stalin’s era, this strategy today constitutes one of Russia’s most significant defense and economic lines.
2) Energy and economic networks: As its ties with Europe loosen, Russia is establishing new markets and dependencies through China, India, Iran, and Turkey.
3) Asymmetric diplomacy: As seen at the Alaska summit, sitting at the table and steering the negotiation process without making any concessions, dialogue in appearance, but in essence the imposition of a fait accompli.
This model is less an open challenge to the West than an attempt to erode and weaken it, building a parallel order. The annexation of Crimea, interference in the 2017 United States elections and the election of Trump, as well as the explicit support for the far right in European Union elections, stand out as defining events of this strategy.
Turkey’s balancing act
In this new geopolitical equation, the Turkish state is both a member of NATO and Russia’s partner in energy and security. By drawing closer to Moscow without severing its ties with the West, the Turkish state strengthens its hand. This policy of balance functions not only in foreign policy but also in its strategy of suppressing the Kurdish question domestically.
With the maneuvering space Russia has provided in the Syrian arena in the past, the Turkish state has consistently used the leverage of increasing military and political pressure on Rojava. As long as it aligns with Moscow’s interests, Kurdish demands for status are suppressed, while Turkey turns this into a “balance” card against the West.
Kurds: the object of strategy
Overall, the situation carries serious risks for the Kurds. They are not positioned as subjects in the strategic projects of either the West or Russia. Instead, they are consistently treated as a bargaining element in energy routes, regional security equations, and the conflicts in Syria. Even though the chaos in the regions surrounding Kurdistan may appear to present serious opportunities and new possibilities for alliances, it does not diminish the potential risks.
At this point, Edward Mead Earle’s book ‘Makers of Modern Strategy’ is a reminder. Following Sun Tzu’s ‘The Art of War’, this work became an important study addressing strategies of war in a comprehensive way. In it, Edward Earle emphasizes that modern strategy has been created by states and great powers. These actors establish their own strategic horizon by linking vision, military capacity, and diplomacy.
The Kurds, however, for centuries have been attached to the strategies of others, and often victims of those very strategies. Although the balance of power has shifted today and the Kurds have become more organized, the overall picture has not changed significantly. The attempt at democratic autonomy created in Rojava may be seen as the nucleus of a strategic vision, yet it remains vulnerable under the pressure of regional and global powers.
The Rojava deadlock
Today, the heart of the Turkish–Kurdish conflict lies in Rojava. For the Turkish state, Rojava is coded as a threat to national security; for Russia, though less visible, it serves as a bargaining ground against the West; and for the West, it functions as a limited card. For the Kurds, however, Rojava is both the site of historical sacrifices and the center of the search for a new future. Rojava is the heart of Kurdistan.
Yet as long as a Stalinist style of negotiation persists, namely the approach of “What is ours is ours, what is yours is negotiable”, no genuine ground for peace can be established. Therefore, the solution must not be sought solely in the strategies of great powers. What is truly needed is for the Kurds to shape their own strategic horizon and bring forth their own “makers of modern strategy.” Otherwise, both Rojava and the Kurdish question will remain files shaped on the agenda of others.
What does strategy mean for the Kurds?
As Edward Mead Earle underlined, modern strategy is not merely military planning; it is the integration of military, diplomatic, economic, and social instruments within a vision. Strategy is a people’s horizon toward the future and its capacity to build its own path. When states and powers establish this capacity, they become “creators” and leave their mark on history.
For the Kurds, the need for strategy is today more urgent than ever, because their political existence is still shaped under the shadow of great power rivalries and remains exposed to grave risks. Rojava is the clearest example of this: a military partnership with the United States that now appears weakened, a bargaining card for Russia, and a security threat for Turkey. Everyone’s strategy contains a place for the Kurds, yet in the Kurds’ own strategy there is no binding place for others.
A genuine Kurdish strategy must rest on three fundamental pillars:
1) Becoming a diplomatic subject: The Kurds must cease to be a “bargaining element” at international tables and instead become an actor that speaks in its own name and puts forward a binding will. This requires multifaceted diplomacy not only with the West but also with regional powers.
2) Economic and institutional infrastructure: Strategy cannot be sustained solely through armed struggle or political demands. Strengthening their own economic networks, cultural institutions, and social organizations will be the guarantee of long-term existence. The present period offers immense opportunities.
3) Social vision: Practices partly experienced in Rojava, such as democratic autonomy, women’s leadership, and communal organization, contain the nucleus of a strategic vision and hold great value in the midst of Middle Eastern chaos. However, unless these are carried beyond fragmented experiences into a comprehensive national-strategic horizon, they cannot be lasting. The government and administrations of Southern Kurdistan (Başur) must apply the Rojava model in their own free geography and open greater space for the formation of a more integrated strategy.
For the Kurds, a comprehensive strategy means no longer being the object of calculations at others’ tables of “what will be given, what will be taken,” but instead establishing their own tables and their own principles. Escaping the fate of a Stalinist style of negotiation is only possible in this way.
Schopenhauer: The art of being right and the deadlock of peace
In his work ‘The Art of Being Right’, Schopenhauer notes that debates are often conducted not to seek the truth but to defeat the other side. According to him, the stronger party resorts to rhetorical tricks in order to appear right: distorting the issue, discrediting the opponent, creating false dilemmas, shifting the subject elsewhere. Thus, the debate becomes less a process of uncovering truth and more a stage for reinforcing the superiority of the powerful.
This pattern is equally valid in interstate diplomacy today. Russia’s stance at the Alaska summit was a typical example: it sat at the table but concluded the negotiation in its own favor without making any concessions. In this instance, it was not truth that prevailed, but dominance. The logic of the Stalinist phrase finds renewed life in Schopenhauer’s rhetorical analysis.
The so-called peace processes pursued by the Turkish state with the Kurds followed a similar mindset. The negotiation table was not an equal space where the rights of the Kurds were discussed; rather, the state constantly narrowed the issue to the heading of “security,” questioned Kurdish legitimacy, and imposed false dilemmas such as “either our line or chaos.” This is the political application of the tricks Schopenhauer described. The negotiation strategy applied in Rojava mirrors this symmetry.
The conclusion is clear: when the Kurds’ strategic positioning remains limited to fragmented experiences, each part faces the risk of being attached to the agenda of different powers. This is why building strategic-level ties between Rojava, Southern Kurdistan, Northern Kurdistan (Bakur), Eastern Kurdistan (Rojhilat), and the diaspora is of vital importance.
The strategic horizon of the Kurds must not be confined solely to military or diplomatic balances of power. What makes it distinct is that it is shaped by the principles of democratic autonomy, women’s freedom, and social participation. These values will strengthen the legitimacy of Kurdish strategy not only regionally but also universally.
Strategy must not consist merely of creating de facto power balances; it must also encompass the capacity to establish an intellectual ground that will render the other side’s games of appearing right ineffective. Unless this capacity, which separates truth from rhetoric, is established, negotiation will always remain a deadlock in which the powerful appear “right.”
For the Kurds, the material and moral means to create this comprehensive strategy are preserved in the century-long legacy of struggle inherited from the Kurdistan Freedom Movement.