From 1 October 2024, the process that began with statements by Devlet Bahçeli and continued with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party’s (PKK) dissolution congress and the ceremony for the destruction of arms has been gaining concrete form, particularly with the establishment of a commission under the roof of the Turkish Grand National Assembly (TBMM).
Yet why have the steps taken in this process so far not been entirely equal? What meaning does President Erdoğan’s neo-Ottoman discourse, the developments in Syria, and, moreover, the establishment of the commission have in this process?
According to political scientist Dr. Zafer Yörük, the oscillations in Turkish foreign policy tied to the regional conjuncture will continue to directly affect the Kurdish peace process.
Yörük considers the establishment of a parliamentary commission for the resolution of the Kurdish question and the democratization of Turkey to be a positive development but stresses the importance of transparency and democracy.
Political scientist Dr. Zafer Yörük answered ANF’s questions.
The process gained momentum after 1 October with the PKK dissolution process and disarmament ceremony, and on the state’s side it took concrete form with the establishment of the commission. From the perspective of the state, however, the steps seem rather slow. How do you evaluate such an imbalance between the steps taken by both sides?
In order to speak about this, there must be a protocol between the PKK and the state representatives. Most likely, such a protocol exists, but it is not being shared with the public. As far as society can see, there are certain points at which the PKK has explicitly stated its commitments and taken concrete steps to fulfill them, but it is unknown what commitments the state has made in return.
What we do know is limited: the “state” wants to make peace, it is ready to recognize Kurdish identity, and it justifies this peace within a kind of neo-Ottomanist or “National Pact” imagination, in other words, within the framework of Turkey’s regional strategy. But these only provide a rough philosophical framework. Within this framework of will, we do not know which steps the state has committed to take in return for which steps by the PKK. Therefore, only assessments based on assumptions can be made, and these cannot be considered healthy evaluations.
Domestic peace is not something happening in Turkey for the first time. In almost every process, a preliminary agreement or protocol is made between the parties on a certain roadmap, and steps are taken reciprocally to move forward. In South Africa, the agreement between African National Congress (ANC) leader Nelson Mandela and President F. W. de Klerk was such an example. In the United Kingdom, the “Good Friday Agreement” reached in April 1998 between the representatives of the Irish Republican Army (IRA) / Sinn Féin and the government was another example.
Many more examples could be cited. If we continue with the Irish case, of course not all the details of the Good Friday Agreement were disclosed to the public. But the general outlines of the IRA’s commitments and the steps to be taken by the British government in return were announced to the press and the public on the very day of the agreement.
The most fundamental commitments were the gradual destruction of weapons under the supervision of international observers and the release of IRA prisoners. These were known and monitored by all relevant segments of society. One of the main reasons for the success of that process was adherence to this minimum principle of transparency.
In Turkey’s process, beyond general philosophical considerations, the roadmap containing the commitments undertaken by the state should at least be outlined publicly, so that it becomes possible to discuss which concrete steps have been taken on time, which have been delayed, or which commitments have not been fulfilled by which side.
Based on the limited information and assumptions available, it can be observed that fluctuations in regional politics, particularly developments in Syria, have led to shifts in the attitude of the Turkish state. It seems that the oscillations in Turkish foreign policy tied to the regional conjuncture will continue to directly affect the Kurdish peace process.
For the first time, a commission has been established in Parliament within the framework of the Kurdish question. Although it was not formed by law but rather through the initiative of the parliamentary speaker, it carries significance as the first of its kind. How do you evaluate this step, especially when you consider what has been reflected to the public about the commission’s functioning?
It is important in terms of the socialization of the will for peace. It is the right choice that the process is not confined to the ideas and actions of a political party or parties that control the state apparatus but is instead carried out by a pluralistic commission. This will also result in greater transparency in the process. However, there is, firstly, uncertainty regarding the commission’s powers. Is it the body that will direct the process? What is the binding nature of its decisions? Unless these are clarified, the commission carries the potential of being pushed into the position of a mere discussion platform or an “advisory” organ, rendering it ineffective.
An important issue that will be reflected in the commission is the demand for the peace process to be carried out alongside a political normalization across the country and a return to the rule of law. This demand will primarily be voiced by delegates from the Republican People’s Party (CHP). On the other hand, the Justice and Development Party (AKP)–Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) bloc seems intent on replacing democracy with promises of expansion rooted in the “National Pact” or an Islamist ummah discourse. Under these conditions, a distortion of meaning may emerge in which opposition to AKP politics and its anti-democratic actions that trample on laws and the rule of law becomes conflated with opposition to peace. The CHP and the democratic opposition must, of course, remain cautious in this regard, but the primary responsibility lies with those in power. Without peace there can be no democracy, and without democracy a sustainable peace is impossible. In this context, the stance of the Peoples’ Equality and Democracy Party (DEM Party) will gain importance.
In your last article, you likened the role of Devlet Bahçeli, who, since 1 October, has been seen as the figure who initiated the process through his calls and various statements, to that of Turgut Özal. Yet you also pointed out the differences and noted that peace now appears more possible. Where does this similarity come from, and why is the possibility of peace higher today?
The Irish peace process was successful because it was carried out as a state policy and practice based on consensus among the bureaucracy, the military elites, and the politicians. In contrast, I had previously stated that the greatest problem of Turkey’s opening period between 2009 and 2015 was the lack of such consensus. In Özal’s 1993 opening, this problem was even more obvious and resulted in an open conflict within the state. The cadres, apparatus, and institutions within the state who opposed peace undermined Özal’s initiative. In the 2009–2015 process, it was the “hardline nationalist” and unitary statist cadres who resisted. This peace-hostile tendency, represented in the politics of the MHP and the CHP of that period, coincided with a mass confusion of perception. Opposing the transition to an authoritarian Islamist regime and rejecting the Kurdish opening came to be seen as the same thing.
Today, however, there appears to be a consensus for peace among the military, the bureaucracy, and the ruling politicians. The fact that Devlet Bahçeli, who has always been a chronic opponent of the very idea of peace, has been assigned a role in this move is itself an important indicator. For this reason, peace seems far more possible today than in the past. But as long as the government’s unlawful practices and authoritarian pressures against the political opposition continue, disruptions in the process will be inevitable. The tendency to present and perceive peace as an element of the AKP’s anti-democratic politics may once again spread among social opposition. The consensus that seems to have formed within the state must overlap with a broad social agreement. The condition for this is a return to the rule of law and democratization across the country.
You also mentioned at the beginning the possibility that the Syrian front could influence peace here. Meanwhile, in Syria, there have recently been tensions, sometimes escalating into open conflict between the Kurds and Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS). How do you assess the balance there? And how do President Erdoğan’s neo-Ottoman discourses resonate both in Turkey and in Syria?
Throughout the Syrian civil war, the Turkish state fought not against the Assad regime, but against Rojava. In the end, ISIS, which it openly supported with the slogan “Kobanê is about to fall,” was defeated. Yet foreign powers, instead of Assad, installed a derivative of ISIS, HTS, thereby making a major gesture to the Turkish state. This advantage has been, and continues to be, used against the Kurds’ bid for status. But all indications show that the collapse of this strategy is inevitable.
In fact, the will for peace emerged from the recognition of this collapse. But powerholders who have still not digested the final defeat in Syria alongside ISIS remain in charge. Devlet Bahçeli’s “ventriloquist,” Mümtazer Türköne, interprets this as an obsession of political Islam. At the top of the state, the dream of building an Islamist unitary state through a total genocide against Alawite, Druze, Christian, and Kurdish identities, together with Abu Mohammad Al-Jolani [Ahmed al-Sharaa], has not yet ended. The faction clustered around President Erdoğan harbors ambitions of expansion through the unity of the ummah and the Caliphate. For them, making peace with the Kurds can only be legitimized within the context of an Islamist unitary state and the unity of the ummah.
In Syria, attempts at reconciliation between the administration of Al-Jolani and the Kurdish regional administration of Rojava are thwarted each time by this political Islamist mentality. Most recently, this was evident in the cancellation of the Paris meeting under pressure from Turkey. The breaking of al-Jolani and the political Islamist Turkish state support behind him appears as a precondition for peace in Turkey itself. In the near future, we may witness an intensifying conflict within the state between the tolerant secular stance reflected in the mentalities of the MHP and the CHP, and the political Islamism within the AKP, laden with dreams of Sharia and the Caliphate. The outcome of this conflict will determine not only the shaping of Syria but also the fate of peace with Kurdistan.