A fundamental characteristic of Iran is its composition of multiple ethnicities and religious communities. In Iran, the Muslim Shiite and Sunni sects, along with Judaism, Zoroastrianism, and Christianity, are officially recognized religions. Although the Baháʼí Faith has a considerable number of adherents, it has not been officially recognized and has been banned due to its separation from Shiism, often framed by the authorities as a “betrayal of the sect.” The persecution of Baháʼís is significant in illustrating the regime’s approach to freedom of belief. Beyond the officially recognized religions, a very small number of individuals adhere to other belief systems such as Manichaeism and Buddhism. However, these communities are numerically limited and do not possess officially recognized places of worship.
Article 12 of the Iranian Constitution states that “the official religion of the Islamic Republic is Islam and its official sect is Shiism,” thereby excluding the Sunni sect from official recognition. At the same time, parliamentary representation provides quotas for non-Muslim minorities, taking into account both ethnic and religious identities. These quotas allocate two seats to Armenians and one seat each to Zoroastrians, Jews, and Assyrians, totaling five representatives. However, Sunni Muslims are granted no such quota, neither as a religious group nor as communities sharing this belief, effectively excluding them on both counts. In its governance practices, the regime has demonstrated greater tolerance toward Shiite Muslims, fostering a perception of advantage over followers of other sects and religions and seeking to secure their allegiance.
Additionally, Sunnis in Iran have often been regarded as occupying a lower status within Shiite society. Shiites have referred to themselves as “khassa,” meaning the elite, while labeling Sunnis as “amma,” meaning the common people. This perspective was clearly reflected in Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini’s early writings. In his book Kashf al-Asrar, Khomeini argued that Sunnis were responsible for the “Karbala sedition,” referring to the killing of Hussein, the son of Ali, in 680. He described this event as the greatest tragedy in Islamic history and claimed that it altered the course of historical development. In the years following the Iranian Revolution, Khomeini and the clerical establishment attempted to relatively soften their approach toward Sunnis. They made statements such as, “Our Qur’an is one, our Kaaba is one, we observe the same religious obligations, and our prayers are the same; the minor differences between us should not prevent our unity.” Despite these conciliatory remarks, the identity of Shiism continued to be upheld as superior across various spheres of political and social life.
Alongside discriminatory approaches toward Sunnis, another significant issue is that Sunni Arabs reside predominantly in Khuzestan Province, where approximately 90 percent of Iran’s oil resources are located. The presence of Arab communities in this region, often described as the heart of Iran’s oil industry, constitutes a strategic vulnerability for the country. The United States and various Arab states have sought to expand their influence through these Arab populations. Should they gain access to this region in the event of a potential ground conflict, they could seize control of Iran’s oil resources and effectively cut off the country’s economic lifeline.
The primary orientation of Iran’s foreign policy has been “full independence” and the export of Iranian Shiism. At the same time, Iran has aimed to counter the anti-Iranian policies of the United States and Israel, while prioritizing regional strategies in the field of international relations. Within this framework, the so-called “Khomeini world” has sought to enhance relations and cooperation with the Persian Gulf region, the Caspian–Central Asia and Caucasus regions, as well as countries in the Pacific region, a united Europe, East Asia, and the African continent.
It is possible to characterize Iran as the “second occupying power” in Iraq after the United States. In order to understand Iran’s role in Iraq, it is essential to identify its strategic objectives. First, Iran has viewed Iraq as the initial step toward assuming leadership of the Shiite world. Iraq is also regarded by Iran as a natural strategic depth, serving as the first line of defense against any potential attacks or regime-change attempts directed at Iran. Furthermore, Iran has aimed to use Iraq as a leverage tool in international negotiations related to its nuclear program.
Iran’s political structure
Although Iran officially has a presidential system, as an Islamic Republic the ultimate authority rests with the country’s Supreme Leader. In the Islamic Republic of Iran, the doctrine of Velayat-e Faqih and the clerical establishment have assumed powers that no individual or social group has possessed, exercising them regardless of public consent. In addition to these authorities, regime oligarchs have elevated security forces that are not directly accountable to the formal structures of governance into primary centers of power, placing them above legitimate state institutions. When challenged, the regime relies on these elements to contain growing public discontent. As a result, unlike the prevailing understanding of law in many parts of the world, Iran operates under the principle of the “rule of power” rather than the rule of law. Elected officials remain under the supervision of appointed authorities, and the legal system functions in service of power.
Iran’s administrative structure is divided into two main groups: those elected by popular vote and those appointed to office. The first group includes the President, the Parliament (Islamic Consultative Assembly), and the Assembly of Experts, all of whom are chosen through public elections. However, the actions of these officials are subject to the oversight and supervision of institutions composed of appointed authorities. The cabinet, or Council of Ministers, is selected by the President and must be approved by Parliament.
The second group consists of institutions that shape and control the administrative system through appointment. These include the Supreme Leader, the armed forces, the judiciary, and the High Council of Justice, all of which wield significant influence over the governance of the country.
One of the most distinctive features of Iran’s administrative system is its dual power structure. Alongside the Ministry of Justice, there exist the Revolutionary Courts; alongside the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, there is the Foreign Propagation Committee; alongside the national police force, there are the Basij, the militia associated with the clerical establishment; and alongside the regular army, there is the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), also known as the Pasdaran.
For example, Iran maintains embassies in many countries around the world. In addition to diplomatic staff, representatives of the Supreme Leader are also present. These religious representatives report embassy officials directly to the Supreme Leader when necessary and can facilitate their dismissal. They do not operate within the embassy buildings but function independently from separate offices. In this capacity, they effectively serve as supervisory authorities over Iran’s diplomatic missions.
Key institutions shaping Iran’s political structure
Velayat-e Faqih (Supreme Leader): The concept of Velayat-e Faqih, which literally means the guardianship of the Islamic jurist, refers to the authority and governance exercised by a qualified expert in Islamic law. The Supreme Leader is the highest political authority in Iran and is elected by the Assembly of Experts to serve for life.
In the 1970s, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini systematized the theory of Velayat-e Faqih in his book Islamic Government, arguing that political authority should be vested in religious scholars who are regarded as the spiritual heirs of the Imams. In Twelver Shiite belief, faith in the Imamate is one of the fundamental principles of religion. This belief holds that the institution of the Imamate, like prophethood, is determined by divine will and appointment. The concept of Velayat-e Faqih, centered on the Imamate, is enshrined in Article 5 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran. According to this provision, during the occultation of Imam Mahdi, the governance of the state and the leadership of the people in the Islamic Republic of Iran are entrusted to a just and pious jurist, recognized and accepted by the majority of the population, who possesses courage, prudence, and administrative capability, and who has attained the rank of mujtahid, a scholar qualified to exercise independent legal reasoning.
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