Prof. Dr. Janroj Yılmaz Keleş spoke to the ANF about the war between Israel and the United States and Iran, which has shaken regional and global balances, as well as the subsequent ceasefire process. He also shared his views on the unpredictable moves of the Trump administration, the global implications of the Strait of Hormuz, and the strategy and roadmap that the Kurds should pursue at this historic turning point.
Keleş stated that the war launched by the United States and Israel against Iran lacked a clear, comprehensive, and long-term strategic plan. Keleş said:
“While the operations were largely carried out as limited strikes aimed at weakening Iran’s military and nuclear capacity, it remained unclear what political outcomes these military objectives were intended to achieve. This situation revealed that the war was not guided by a pre-designed ‘endgame strategy’ but rather by a pressure strategy that advanced step by step and took shape throughout the process.
This picture also reflected the fluctuating and unpredictable nature of decision-making processes under the Donald Trump administration. Trump’s daily statements during the war and the contradictory messages he shared through social media created a disconnect between reality and rhetoric, while also reinforcing the perception of a clear dysfunctionality in United States foreign policy. Repeated claims that the war had been won, efforts to seek support from NATO, and the global economic fluctuations triggered by the potential closure of the Strait of Hormuz generated deep uncertainty and an erosion of trust among both the American public and the peoples of the region. During this period, Trump appeared to face a loss of support within the United States and even among Republican circles.
From Iran’s perspective, the large-scale social uprising that had been anticipated following the protests in January did not materialize. The primary reason for this was the regime’s rapid re-establishment of local control. At the same time, United States strikes on civilian targets and attacks resulting in significant civilian casualties created a profound shock within Iranian society. However, rather than strengthening anti-regime mobilization, this situation triggered, in the short term, a reflex of ‘consolidation in the face of an external threat.’”
Prof. Dr. Janroj Yılmaz Keleş stated that the crisis surrounding the Strait of Hormuz and the resulting economic pressure forced the United States to seek a ceasefire. He said:
“The Trump administration’s inability to articulate a clear regime change strategy, combined with its constantly shifting rhetoric, raised serious questions among different social groups in Iran regarding the true objective of the war. One of the most critical factors leading to the ceasefire was the Strait of Hormuz. Iran’s closure of the strait caused a rapid increase in oil and gas prices, creating significant economic pressure both within the United States and across Western countries. Despite seeking support from NATO, the United States failed to obtain the expected response, and the alliance’s reluctance to become directly involved in the conflict made Washington’s strategic isolation visible. This isolation became one of the key elements driving the administration toward a ceasefire. Indeed, within the United States public opinion, the perception strengthened that this war was ‘an Israel-centered conflict rather than a national necessity.’”
Keleş also emphasized that the current situation points to a highly fragile and fragmented balance rather than a lasting ceasefire. Although a two-week ceasefire framework has emerged, its sustainability depends on the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz and the containment of proxy actors on the ground. He said:
“Israel’s exclusion of Lebanon from the scope of this ceasefire demonstrates that the conflict cannot be geographically contained. Therefore, the likelihood that the war will continue indirectly through proxy actors is quite high. The inability to fully control structures such as the Popular Mobilization Forces (Hashd al-Shaabi), the Houthis, and Hezbollah creates a situation of ‘restrained escalation,’ in which the conflict could reignite at any moment. In this context, it is possible to define the current situation as ‘controlled chaos.’
The conflict has now moved beyond being a limited war between the United States–Israel and Iran and has taken on a regional character. Iran’s actions toward Southern Kurdistan (Başur) and the Gulf countries illustrate this expansion. At the same time, the fact that global actors such as China and Russia have not yet adopted a direct and explicit position has, for the time being, limited the transformation of the war into a global conflict. However, the pressure created through energy routes and the Strait of Hormuz continues to deepen the global impact of the crisis.”
Keleş also assessed the political positions of the Kurds in Eastern Kurdistan (Rojhilat) and their stance throughout the war. Keleş said: “At the beginning of the war, the United States sought to involve Kurdish actors in the process. Trump personally conducted telephone diplomacy, exerting pressure on both parties in Southern Kurdistan and Kurdish leaders from Rojhilat. However, the concrete conditions put forward by the Rojhilat-based parties, such as guarantees for a no-fly zone and a post-war autonomous status, were not met by the United States.
Iran, on the other hand, applied both psychological and military pressure on the Kurds during this period. By targeting Erbil, the headquarters of political parties, and even the residence of Nechirvan Barzani, Iran implemented a deterrent mechanism to prevent Rojhilat-based parties from entering the war against the Iranian regime. In the face of this intense pressure and dilemma, the Kurds adopted a prudent diplomatic approach and refrained from direct involvement in the war. Maintaining this distance despite pressure from the Trump administration represents a significant diplomatic achievement. At a time when even Western states struggled to formulate coherent policies in response to Trump, the Kurds managed to preserve a delicate balance.
The Iranian regime temporarily succeeded in consolidating society around itself through a ‘defensive reflex’ triggered by external attacks, particularly the bombing of civilian areas. However, this situation should not be misleading. Iran is facing severe economic difficulties, and this narrative of success is likely to be temporary. For the Kurds, the process created an opportunity to make their demands more visible on the international stage. In particular, the opening of representative offices by Kurdish organizations from Rojhilat in the United States and Europe, and the intensification of diplomatic engagement, constitute a strategic gain. Nevertheless, after the ceasefire, the regime may consolidate its power and initiate a harsh ‘punitive’ operation against the Kurds.
It should also be remembered that, historically, the relationship between major powers and the Kurds has generally been based not on a ‘principled partnership for status’ but rather on a ‘conjunctural security partnership.’ This reality makes it difficult for the Kurds to obtain lasting guarantees of status. To break this cycle, the Kurds have yet to fully develop the capacity to act as agenda-setting actors in diplomacy.”
Keleş emphasized the necessity of a realistic assessment of the current situation while evaluating the regional position of the Kurds in the post-war period, particularly the turbulence experienced by the autonomous structure in Rojava. He noted that the system in Rojava is under significant pressure and argued that it is transitioning from a semi-state structure to a phase in which the administrative weight of the central government is increasingly felt. According to Keleş, this development requires diplomatic and strategic self-criticism.
Keleş stated that the political losses along the line stretching from Kirkuk (Kerkûk) to Shengal are not coincidental and should be seen as the result of ideological and strategic mistakes. He said: “The Kurdish people no longer accept living without status in all four parts of Kurdistan. The demand for equal citizenship and self-governance is stronger than ever. However, the path to achieving this no longer lies in armed struggle; both in Northern Kurdistan (Bakur) and in Rojava, the era of armed struggle has come to an end. The scenario awaiting us in the future is a Kurdish position that is neither fully integrated into the center nor completely outside it. Periods in which central states weaken may provide greater opportunities for status demands to be addressed. Nevertheless, in order for these opportunities not to turn into risks, it is essential for the Kurds to unite around common minimum principles and ensure coordination among themselves.
In this harsh environment dominated by a regional ‘Kurdophobia’ and a security-oriented mindset, the attainment of status will only be possible through strong diplomacy and international support.”
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