Gang formations that have recently come to be known in public discourse as “motorcycle gangs,” and that are presented as if they emerged suddenly, have in fact existed for a long time in Kurdistan and parts of Turkey with state backing. One of the most striking features of these gang structures, particularly in neighborhoods known for their revolutionary, socialist, and patriotic identities, is that they did not arrive from outside. Instead, they were formed by local youth within the neighborhoods themselves.
These formations, promoted as part of a long-term strategy of the Turkish state’s special warfare apparatus, gradually expanded their influence among young people, also drawing strength from the shortcomings and missteps of revolutionary movements. The phenomenon has reemerged before society as a problem far deeper than a simple desire for more money or a more comfortable life.
How did gangs emerge?
The emergence of gangs effectively took shape toward the late 1990s. Did they not exist before then? They did. However, prior to the 1990s, gangs did not have the conditions to emerge as independent structures. Instead, neighborhoods were largely subjected to attacks by fascist groups. Many of the problems that had not previously appeared in areas with a strong revolutionary presence began to surface gradually in the mid-1990s and became clearly visible by the end of the decade.
These neighborhoods, already impoverished and openly neglected by the state, had, until the mid-1990s, been shaped by a significant revolutionary presence and the gains secured through that influence. Following the Gazi Massacre in Istanbul in 1995 and the large-scale attacks and killings that occurred in other neighborhoods afterward, the state began entering these areas not primarily through armed force, but through alternative methods.
The first step involved gangs introduced as “groups of young people protecting the neighborhood,” composed of local residents themselves. Before the initial emergence of these gangs, a series of measures were imposed that pushed residents toward open frustration in their daily lives. Theft increased sharply in neighborhoods where police presence was virtually nonexistent. When residents sought help, police openly refused, dismissing complaints with remarks such as, “Let the revolutionaries protect you.”
As theft escalated on one hand, and revolutionary forces were rendered incapable of effective intervention amid mass killings and repression on the other, the first gangs began to take shape in these neighborhoods. One of the most widely known examples was the “Arap Emrah” gang that emerged in Gazi neighborhood. While Arap Emrah appeared in Gazi, similar gangs, large and small, began to surface in other districts as well. Their common feature was that they lived in the neighborhoods themselves and were well known to local residents.
On the surface, these gangs did not carry out direct attacks or exert pressure on neighborhood residents. On the contrary, they often put an end to theft. Indeed, theft incidents, initially encouraged under police oversight, came to an abrupt halt once the gangs emerged and gained a degree of strength. By the late 1990s, public discourse had begun referring to these groups as “Kurdish gangs” and “Alevi gangs.”
While the special warfare apparatus facilitated the organization and strengthening of gangs in these neighborhoods, it simultaneously pursued policies that increasingly isolated them through racist rhetoric. To a certain extent, this strategy proved effective. Yet despite numerous raids, killings, and mass imprisonments, the state failed to reduce revolutionary influence to the extent it desired. As a result, the gangs that emerged during this period were unable to grow significantly in line with special warfare planning.
Revolutionary forces persistently resisted these gangs, seeking to block their attacks and in particular, their efforts to corrupt and draw in young people.
Not “new-generation gangs,” but a special warfare practice
The late 1990s marked a strategic shift within the special warfare apparatus. The first experiments shaping what are today described as “new-generation gangs” began during this period and continued into the early 2000s. Unlike earlier formations such as the Arap Emrah gang, the special warfare apparatus opted to test a different organizational model.
In the early 2000s, new gang structures were formed largely through individuals who had taken part in revolutionary struggles in neighborhood areas during the 1990s but later withdrew from that struggle. The primary objective behind this shift was tied to the rapid expansion of Istanbul. Neighborhoods that had once been far from the city center were now being absorbed into it. As the city grew, these areas became part of the urban core, and the state no longer wanted impoverished populations living there. Properties and land were expected to be sold, while poorer residents were to be pushed once again toward the outskirts of the city.
It was in this context that new gangs began to emerge, composed of former revolutionaries who continued to live in these neighborhoods. One of the earliest signs of this process, emerging toward the end of the 1990s, was the sudden appearance of so-called “Turkish folk bars” in neighborhood areas.
Turkish folk bars and social decay
The emergence of so-called Turkish folk bars should be understood as a step within a special warfare policy aimed at corrupting revolutionary neighborhoods. These venues primarily sought to undermine collective life and conscious forms of organization within neighborhoods by targeting and disrupting shared social bonds. Those who established the folk bars were largely individuals who had been part of revolutionary structures in the 1990s but later broke away from them. For this reason, they knew precisely whom to attract and how to draw people in.
Alongside the spread of Turkish folk bars, neighborhoods also saw the influx of drugs and a surge in individual armament. With almost no oversight by state institutions, these venues proliferated rapidly, opening on nearly every street in some neighborhoods until the early 2000s.
At the same time as folk bars were being established and pressure on revolutionary circles intensified, the state also moved to alter the demographic composition of neighborhoods. Turks were settled in predominantly Kurdish areas, while Sunnis were placed in Alevi neighborhoods, marking the first steps toward dismantling existing social structures. This policy was not new. In the early years of the Republic, similar practices had been implemented in Kurdistan, where Turks were settled in Kurdish cities to promote the narrative that these areas were Turkish settlements. The same approach was now being applied at the neighborhood level. As demographic structures shifted, the state simultaneously began consolidating its own power within these areas.
While these developments were unfolding, a parallel policy was being implemented toward these neighborhoods across different regions of Turkey. Neighborhoods with a strong revolutionary presence, along with Alevi and Kurdish areas, began to be criminalized through the media. At regular intervals, reports started appearing under headlines such as “Turkey’s most dangerous neighborhoods.” The fact that these reports, some of which still appear from time to time, focused almost exclusively on areas inhabited by Alevis, Kurds, Roma communities, and districts where revolutionary movements were strong cannot be dismissed as mere coincidence.
Gangs that emerged during this period initially exploited the poverty of residents, beginning by taking control of their homes. Numerous houses and plots of land were seized through gang networks and sold to third parties. Although it did not attract widespread attention at the time, the fact that buyers had no social ties to these neighborhoods would have visible consequences in later years.
In neighborhoods with a predominantly Alevi population, large numbers of homes and plots were sold to Turkish and Sunni buyers, most of whom held fascist tendencies. In the majority of cases, residents did not sell their property at gunpoint; rather, poverty and social exclusion forced them to give up what they owned and relocate to other parts of the city.
In places such as Gazi neighborhood, 1 Mayıs neighborhood, and Okmeydanı, particularly in areas of informal housing, ownership changed hands during this period, passing to entirely different groups.
This process continued into the 2010s. As many residents were pushed out to other districts, newcomers from outside began settling in these neighborhoods. Because the transformation unfolded in line with state planning, the state simultaneously built extensive intelligence networks through these incoming residents, while also laying the foundations for the gang structures that would later become entrenched. As the demographic composition shifted, changes that eroded the social fabric of these neighborhoods began to take hold.
The re-emergence of gangs
The concept of “new-generation gangs” is itself nothing more than another special warfare practice. Serving to romanticize earlier gang formations, this label also fosters a sense of sympathy toward past experiences. The process that extended into the 2010s was disrupted as revolutionary structures began to regain strength. As revolutionary forces reasserted themselves in neighborhoods, gang activity declined. In particular, Turkish folk bars, along with venues linked to drugs and prostitution, were shut down, and revolutionary influence in neighborhoods steadily increased.
The special warfare apparatus began pushing gangs back into the field following the internal power struggles that emerged after the July 15, 2016 coup attempt. Until that point, revolutionary interventions against existing gangs had increasingly narrowed their room for maneuver. After July 15, however, the authorities appeared to seize an opportunity. Pressure on revolutionaries and patriots intensified in neighborhoods such as Gazi, Okmeydanı, 1 Mayıs, Hacı Ahmet, and Kanarya. With the launch of sweeping waves of detention and arrest, gangs were once again given broad space to operate.
The first step in this renewed phase was the practice of illegal betting, which is now widespread in Kurdistan. Through illegal betting, the special warfare apparatus opened up a source of income for unemployed youth who had drifted away from revolutionary circles, while openly allowing this field to expand. By ensuring that illegal betting operations were largely run through individuals who had once been part of revolutionary environments but later broke away from them, the state was able to reestablish its influence within neighborhoods.
Alongside this, the state, having pursued policies aimed at altering the demographic structure for nearly four decades, began to reap the first results of these efforts, paving the way for the strengthening of circles aligned with it within neighborhoods.
The drug trade and prostitution problem visible today in Turkey and Kurdistan marks a phase in which the long-term consequences of special warfare practices have become increasingly apparent. The specific targeting of Kurdish youth clearly demonstrates that the aim is to prevent young Kurds from engaging with the Kurdistan Freedom Movement and from taking part in revolutionary struggle.
Following July 15, illegal betting practices expanded in Turkey, particularly in areas with a dense Kurdish population, with the support of law enforcement. Over time, those running illegal betting operations organized into gangs, laying the foundations of structures whose names are now widely known. Throughout this process, obstacles encountered along the way were systematically neutralized through special warfare mechanisms. On one side, these obstacles included structures rooted in revolutionary struggle; on the other, they involved older gang formations that had previously been protected by the state but had acquired a deeply negative reputation among the public.
As pressure on revolutionary circles intensified and arbitrary practices targeting neighborhoods became more widespread, such as cuts to public transportation and the withdrawal of municipal services, poverty deepened. At the same time, residents were increasingly criminalized in the wider urban narrative through labels like “dangerous neighborhoods” or “children pushed into crime.” As a result, these encircled areas, once located on the outskirts of expanding cities, found themselves at the very center. This transformation turned neighborhoods into zones of rent and speculation.
The state, which has never wanted the poor to live in cities, launched an urban transformation process to reshape impoverished neighborhoods that had become central locations. Through an intense media campaign, it sought to convince society that this process was “inevitable.” The structures now referred to in public discourse as “new-generation gangs” emerged precisely as a functional requirement of this phase.
In the late 1990s, gangs that had appeared to block revolutionary struggle by altering the demographic makeup of neighborhoods, often dispersing residents by forcibly or coercively purchasing homes and land, were replaced by new formations. Today’s gangs are tasked with pressuring, exhausting, and ultimately displacing residents in the name of urban transformation. And that is exactly what occurred.
This time, rather than applying direct and sudden coercion, methods that also foster social decay were put into play. Instead of forcibly removing people from their homes, a comprehensive process was initiated to render neighborhoods unlivable, carefully laying the groundwork for displacement.
Gangs run by former “revolutionaries” using organizational rules
As gangs advanced along the path opened to them, the presence of individuals who had previously taken part in revolutionary struggle among their founders led these structures to organize themselves through a form of cell-based system. In many neighborhoods, there are individuals operating within the same gang who do not even know one another. Each small unit functions within its own area of responsibility and carries out tasks assigned to it. In most cases, no single group ever encounters or sees the gang’s leading cadre.
T.S., who spent many years involved in gangs in Okmeydanı, said their connection with these groups began through social media, noting that gangs initially approached young people by claiming they were “protecting the neighborhood.” T.S. recounted:
“I was sharing clips from TV series that portrayed gangs on social media. When they first contacted me, I was 16. I grew up in a poor family. Both my mother and father worked, and I went to school, but what they earned was only enough for us to survive. I saw my peers living in luxury, buying whatever they wanted, spending money freely. I couldn’t even afford to drink a cup of tea outside. Someone from the neighborhood, an older figure whom I knew had once been involved in revolutionary circles, asked to speak with me. They called me to Sibel Yalçın Park. I went. There, they told me that the revolutionaries were no longer around, but that outsiders were coming into the neighborhood selling drugs and deceiving young women. They said that, as a young person from the neighborhood, I should stand with them, and that together they would protect the area.”
The discourse of “protecting the neighborhood,” used by the special warfare apparatus as a means to deepen social decay, particularly in impoverished areas, has also become increasingly visible in gang-themed television series over the past decade. These shows, set in poor neighborhoods and depicting young residents defending their areas against “bad elements,” have influenced many youths. With revolutionary movements no longer visibly present in these neighborhoods, young people are drawn toward such gangs. The fact that those recruiting them often had past ties to revolutionary circles further accelerates this process.
A young person who was once involved in a gang led by Emrah Sever, known at the time as “Arap Emrah,” in Gazi Mahallesi, described how they first encountered the gang and became part of it:
“My family did not want me to be close to revolutionaries. They were afraid something would happen to me, that I would be detained. That was when I met Arap Emrah and his gang. They were people from the neighborhood, and they seemed to want what was best for it. They said they were protecting local youth and taking them under their wing. After I started moving with the gang, they gave me a weapon and money. I could buy whatever I wanted. We chased away outsiders coming into the neighborhood. Some evenings, we even patrolled certain areas so that things like theft would not happen. Arap Emrah would find drug dealers, beat them, and drive them out. Despite all this, I could never understand why he was not arrested for such a long time.”
After witnessing clashes between the Arap Emrah gang and revolutionary groups, the young person said they later saw Arap Emrah informing the police about the whereabouts of revolutionaries and helping in their arrest. This prompted them to cut ties with the gang. During this period, they also realized that the gang, which publicly claimed to oppose drugs and prostitution, was in fact acting as enforcers for larger criminal networks and once paid, turned a blind eye to drug sales.
The Arap Emrah gang maintained its presence in Gazi neighborhood for a long time despite repeated interventions by revolutionaries. Later, as pressure on revolutionary groups intensified and they were rendered almost unable to operate in the area, the state moved first to dismantle Arap Emrah and similar gangs. In their place, it allowed the expansion of new gangs it deemed more functional.
Karker, who directly witnessed this transformation and was involved for a period in the Patriotic Revolutionary Youth Movement, described the process as follows:
“The name Arap Emrah had become almost synonymous with Gazi neighborhood, and people were deeply disturbed by what this gang was doing. Allowing this gang to grow would not actually serve the state’s interests; on the contrary, it would open space for revolutionaries, whom the state had tried to suppress through force, to regain strength. Instead, it seemed more rational to clear the way for those whose growth had already been tolerated through the illegal betting operations introduced into the neighborhood. These were new formations, and almost all of them were children of the neighborhood. They were making money, yet appeared not to be involved in drugs. They could attract Kurdish youth much more easily. And that is exactly what happened. Gangs that the public now widely knows, such as the Daltons and the Caspers began to emerge during that period. At first, these gangs did not extort money from anyone; they even helped the poor and paid people’s debts. By presenting themselves as being on the side of the people and giving the impression that they kept their distance from the police, they gained acceptance. Once they fully embedded themselves in the neighborhoods, however, they revealed their true face. This is how the foundations of decay, such as drugs and prostitution, were firmly laid in places like Gazi, Okmeydanı, and 1 Mayıs neighborhood.”
The existence of gangs is not a new phenomenon, nor is it likely to disappear. Through gangs, special warfare seeks on the one hand to exert pressure on communities, and on the other, to bind them to itself. By presenting gangs as the only available option to populations left without alternatives, the aim is to completely sever people from revolutionary movements.
E.S., who was involved in gangs for a period in Okmeydanı, described the state’s role as follows:
“All gangs are, in fact, cooperating with the police. This cooperation cannot be explained merely through financial exchange. While gangs spread fear in neighborhoods, the lack of revolutionary activity, due to intense repression, leads people to see the police as the only savior. Those who go to the police to complain about gangs are openly offered the role of informant. Those who accept are left untouched by the gangs. Gangs are used as instruments of pressure to ensure that outsiders and revolutionaries entering the neighborhood are reported to the police.”
On one side are neighborhoods demolished, or slated for demolition, under the banner of urban transformation; on the other are residents targeted for recruitment as informants, even before demolition takes place. This is the core function and purpose of the structures described as “new-generation gangs.” Treating gangs solely as a criminal issue means failing to grasp the true scope of special warfare.
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