The system of special war in Turkey has continued to exist as a mechanism that organizes society along the lines determined by the state, a structure whose roots stretch back to the Ottoman period. The special war apparatus is not only built upon the assimilation and cultural destruction of Kurds; it also seeks to transform Turkish society itself into a corrupted community shaped by fascist and racist approaches.
The attacks carried out by the special war apparatus against Kurds, Armenians, other peoples, and revolutionaries are widely known and frequently exposed. However, the system of thought imposed on Turkish society must also be carefully examined, as it reveals why the revolutionary struggle today has remained so shallow and limited.
Perhaps the greatest “success” of the special war apparatus, which intervenes in and attempts to shape everything from the organization of daily life to the language people speak, lies in its ability to culturally assimilate the Turkish people and reshape their everyday lives. A society that naturally carries a reaction against ruling powers has instead been molded into the form desired by the state. Everything that influences and shapes Turkish society today appears as the product of a long-standing effort carried out through the mechanisms of special war.
The acceleration of these long-running attempts to transform and corrupt the peoples of Turkey dates back to the years when the Kurdish Freedom Movement emerged and began to influence not only the Kurdish people but also other peoples across Turkey and Kurdistan.
In Turkey, where a strong revolutionary base existed in the 1970s, the aftermath of the 1980 military coup marked a striking transformation. Areas that once had powerful revolutionary traditions rapidly became places where fascist and right-wing tendencies grew into mass movements. Regions that had once been centers of major resistance gradually shifted into positions defending the ruling authorities. This transformation is closely connected to the policies implemented through the apparatus of special war.
Attacks that began with the Kurdish struggle
In the atmosphere of the 1970s, when the Kurdish Freedom Movement first emerged, Turkey had a strong revolutionary base. Despite internal divisions, the influence of revolutionary socialist organizations was steadily growing across the country. Until the 12 March military memorandum, the state attempted to eliminate this revolutionary base through coercive force but failed to do so; the strength of revolutionary socialist structures continued to expand. The frequent rhetoric of fascist formations at the time, such as “the orphaned Turk” and “a pariah in one’s own homeland”, was in fact closely linked to this growing revolutionary momentum.
Particularly under the influence of rising revolutionary struggles across the world, the demand and longing for a socialist way of life were increasing in Turkey. However, with the emergence of the Kurdish Freedom Movement under the leadership of Abdullah Öcalan, the state’s approach toward eliminating socialist movements began to change. While repression through force had previously been the dominant method, signs of intervention into everyday life started to become increasingly visible.
After the 1980 military coup led by Kenan Evren, the strategy shifted further. It was no longer based solely on repression; policies aimed at intervening in daily life and reshaping society began to widen the gap between the Turkish people and socialist revolutionary forces. One of the first steps was the attempt to create the perception that revolutionaries formed an elite layer disconnected from the people.
In the years following the coup, television and newspapers became the most significant instruments of intervention. Through series and broadcasts, particularly on the Turkish Radio and Television Corporation (TRT), themes emphasizing the importance of the Turkish family structure, conservatism, and religiosity were promoted. At the same time, certain programs began to convey the narrative that revolutionary activists in Turkey were “good young people who had been deceived and ultimately defeated.” One of the most striking examples during this period was the program “Anadolu’dan Görünüm,” presented by Ertürk Yöndem.
While persistent propaganda claimed that Kurds were in fact Turks and descended from the Turkish lineage, another narrative portrayed the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) as a cruel and barbaric organization filled with murderers. Many of the views that racist and fascist circles still insistently defend today first began to take shape through such broadcasts.
The Black Sea: From a revolutionary base to racialization
Along with the program “Anadolu’dan Görünüm,” a narrative was also promoted about how other peoples and communities living in Turkey could be embraced by the state as long as they did not “rebel” against it. In this approach, where particular attention was given to the Black Sea region, known for the strength of Turkey’s revolutionary movement, the Greek and Armenian communities were largely ignored, while the perception that the Black Sea population represented the “true Turks” was systematically cultivated. This narrative later formed the first foundations of the fascist growth that can be observed in the Black Sea region today.
The assimilation policies developed in the Black Sea region were especially concentrated in areas historically known as the Pontus Greek region. One of the first steps was the suppression of the Laz language and the promotion of a “Turkified” version presented as Laz. Right-leaning artists from the Black Sea region were used for this purpose, and the Laz people were portrayed as Turks who merely spoke in a regional dialect.
Following this wave of assimilation, the Horon (traditionally known as a Greek folk dance) was Turkified. The melodies of regional folk songs were taken and new lyrics with racist undertones were written and frequently broadcast on channels of the TRT. One of the most widely known examples is the song “Çırpınırdı Karadeniz,” which is still used today by fascist and right-wing circles.
A poem and composition belonging to the Black Sea Armenian artist Sayat Nova were also altered and presented through an official historical narrative as if they told the story of Azeri Turks fleeing Armenian oppression. This approach was later persistently expanded throughout the Black Sea region.
The Black Sea region, once known for its strong revolutionary base in the 1970s, gradually became a political stronghold for right-wing governments after the 1980 military coup. The defeat of revolutionary organizations and the mistaken strategies adopted afterward also played a role in this transformation. Today, the Black Sea region, often seen as a social base for racist and right-wing organizations, reached this position through a long and intensive process of assimilation.
Arabesque culture as the first step in creating discouraged masses
After the military coup, the special war apparatus adopted a different approach toward the population living in poor neighborhoods, communities that possessed strong revolutionary potential, and manifested itself through the spread of arabesque music. This genre, which carried feelings of rebellion and dissatisfaction with existing conditions yet ultimately preached patience as the only solution, was widely promoted in neighborhoods where revolutionary movements had been particularly strong following the 1980 coup.
The current aimed to dull the anger within society, and its influence continues to this day. Symbolized by figures such as Orhan Gencebay, Ferdi Tayfur, and Müslüm Gürses, this musical style did not encourage anger toward poverty or inspire resistance against the system; instead, it promoted patience and submission. The recurring theme in Orhan Gencebay’s songs, that “in fact, everyone is right”, also became one of the steps toward rendering society increasingly apolitical.
Through figures such as Orhan Gencebay, Müslüm Gürses, Ferdi Tayfur, and Ibrahim Tatlıses, the oppositional anger that had developed among poor communities gradually transformed into an attitude of gratitude and, in some cases, even into a sense of rebellion directed toward fate rather than toward the system itself. The outcome of this transformation was the erosion of a once-strong culture of resistance.
Although arabesque culture reached its peak in the 1990s, it was forced to change shape in the 2000s. New figures replaced those who could no longer adapt to the changing world, yet the fundamental logic remained the same: hostility toward organized rebellion, hostility toward organized social life, discouraging resistance against the state, and encouraging acceptance and submission.
The 1990s and the narrative of the “defeated revolutionaries” and “barbaric, ignorant” Kurds
In the 1990s, revolutionary movements in Turkey began to regain strength. While revolutionary organizations across Turkey were growing again, the Kurdish Freedom Movement was experiencing one of the most decisive phases of its transformation into a mass movement. In Northern Kurdistan (Bakur), large popular mobilizations were emerging, the guerrilla forces were developing into a more organized army, Kurdish communities in the diaspora were returning to the political stage through their own structures, and most importantly, Kurdish women were taking their place in political and social life through their own organizations.
This period also encouraged many among the peoples of Turkey to turn once again toward revolutionary movements. At the same time, the long-standing narrative of “barbaric Kurds,” which had been promoted for years through programs such as “Anadolu’dan Görünüm,” began to lose its influence. The first signals of this shift appeared once again through television series. In Turkish cinema, a new theme started to emerge: the story of the “defeated revolutionary.” Films portrayed revolutionaries who had lived through the 1980 military coup, whose dreams had been shattered, and who were attempting to hold on to life.
During the same period, the transition to an era of multiple television channels introduced different depictions of life and culture to society. In many of these series, Kurds were portrayed as ignorant, while Turks were depicted as educated, civilized, and often as saviors. As Turkish identity was praised and glorified, Kurds and Laz people were frequently reduced to caricatures in television narratives.
Television series and programs that entered almost every household and achieved record levels of viewership repeatedly depicted Kurds as ignorant and barbaric. Through various distortions, these productions also implied that Kurdish society was associated with immorality. At the same time, propaganda shaped by the dominance of a Turkish Sunni tradition portrayed Alevis as a “deviant” and immoral community associated with the slanderous myth of “candle-extinguishing” rituals. The widely known “Güner Ümit incident” remains one of the clearest and most prominent examples of this discourse.
The 2000s: Changing faces, the same aim, keeping society away from resistance and struggle
The 2000s also brought certain changes to the plans of the special war apparatus directed at the peoples of Turkey. The “barbaric Kurds” narrative of the 1990s was replaced by the image of “members of a separatist organization,” while the “anarchist leftists” were recast as “older brothers with good intentions who were defeated because they chose the wrong path.” After the 2000s, the themes of cinema films and television series began to be constructed around these narratives.
In the television series “Yeditepe İstanbul,” broadcast on the TRT, the revolutionary figure of the 1970s was portrayed as a defeated but romantic character. Meanwhile, the series “Deli Yürek,” which aired in the mid-2000s, promoted the narrative that “Kurds are good people, but there is an organization that sows discord among us and acts as a tool of foreign powers.” At the same time, organized struggle, particularly through the Kurdish Freedom Movement, was portrayed negatively, while opposing figures were presented as heroes who “love their homeland, reject organizations and organized life, and individually fight traitors.” In this sense, “Deli Yürek” became an important transitional stage. Although similar examples had appeared before, this series marked the point when vigilante-style characters were systematically introduced to Turkish audiences through television screens.
Another production that stands out as one of the most successful examples of the special war apparatus in this regard is the series “Kurtlar Vadisi,” which still has a following in Turkey today. The storyline centers on an intelligence agent who infiltrates the mafia to dismantle it yet gradually becomes entangled in the same criminal world and is responsible for the killing of hundreds of people. Despite this, the character is portrayed, without serious questioning, as a “hero who sacrifices himself for the homeland.” This narrative continued throughout the later seasons of the series. From the first episode to the last, the Kurdish Freedom Movement and organized struggle were consistently depicted as enemies. In addition, characters presented as “leftists” were completely caricatured, reinforcing the perception that socialists were people engaged in meaningless or futile pursuits.
Liberation on the ideological line drawn by Abdullah Öcalan
Another dimension of these attacks has targeted words and definitions themselves. The term most frequently used, and most emptied of its meaning, became “revolution.” A word that once referred to profound social transformation began to be used for almost every novelty or change, gradually stripped of its real definition and reduced to an empty expression. Words matter; they are among the most powerful tools through which ideas can be expressed. When their meaning is diluted and made ordinary, the seriousness and significance of what they represent is also diminished. The special war apparatus pursued exactly this method. Words such as revolution, rebellion, struggle, solidarity, and collective life, along with many others, were gradually emptied of their meaning and turned into commonplace expressions.
Today, the peoples of Turkey face an intense bombardment of information. Television series and films frequently depict weapons and violence in nearly every scene, while even daytime television programs attack the idea of organized social life, attempting to distance society from reality. This detachment from reality weakens people’s ability to confront the hardships they experience and undermines the awareness that these problems can be addressed through collective struggle. The growth of individualism, and the persistence of negative perceptions toward revolutionaries, Kurds, and Alevis, largely stems from this process.
The projects repeatedly emphasized by Abdullah Öcalan, “democratic coexistence” and the “union of democratic communes”, are therefore presented as essential frameworks aimed at overcoming the assimilationist attacks that the special war apparatus has placed between the peoples.
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