Although Ankara often prefers to remain silent in regional tensions due to its geographical position, economic dependencies, and political calculations, it cannot ignore developments in neighboring countries. The geopolitical tensions that began after the Al-Aqsa Flood and appear likely to last for years have recently entered a new phase with attacks by the United States and Israel on Iran.
These attacks, which began on February 28 and have now entered their fifth day, are shaking not only the economic balance but also Turkey’s internal political dynamics and President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s regional influence strategy developed over the past two decades.
Turkey is heavily dependent on energy routes passing through Iran and on the stability of regional markets. In the event of an open war, these vital corridors could become direct targets. While the Turkish lira is already under severe pressure, Iran has been supplying natural gas at relatively favorable prices, and Turkey has also generated revenue from transit trade and logistical passages. Trade between the two countries has a multi-layered structure, extending from energy to consumer goods.
Any disruption or serious interruption in energy flows caused by the war would place an additional burden on the Turkish economy, which is already struggling with high inflation and currency depreciation. In the short term, Turkey might gain limited profits from reselling energy as prices rise, but such gains would not be enough to offset declining investment, loss of confidence, and increasing transportation and insurance costs. Instead, they would further intensify the pressure of imported inflation.
Kurdish struggle experience
The hidden targets of the war also represent a serious source of concern for the Erdoğan administration in political and security terms. A weakening or collapse of the Iranian regime could have deep economic, political, social and military consequences for Turkey. Iran has a multi-ethnic structure: while Persians make up less than half of the population, Azerbaijanis account for about 25 percent and Kurds around 10 percent; Arabs, Baloch and Turkmen also represent significant portions. This diversity has long been suppressed through a rigid central authority and a uniform religious discourse, yet it has never been fully integrated.
The Kurdish struggle maintains geographic continuity with Southern Kurdistan (Başurê Kurdistan), providing both logistical and political depth. The last major wave of recurring protests in the regions of Kermanshah, Kurdistan and West Azerbaijan rose in 2022 from Eastern Kurdistan (Rojhilatê Kurdistan). If the regime were to collapse, it is likely that ethnic groups would take the stage with demands for freedom, and competition over resources and influence could create federal chaos. Such a scenario carries a greater risk of instability than the continuation of the current regime.
Dr. Kerem Said, an academic who researches Turkey, spoke to ANF and said that the war has once again placed the Kurdish question at the center of Turkey’s internal political calculations. According to Said, instability in Iran directly affects Kurdish dynamics in the Turkey–Iran–Iraq border triangle.
Said also recalled that the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) has played a role parallel to the Turkish army in suppressing the activities of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). He noted that if Iran becomes preoccupied with its own fronts, this function could weaken, increasing security pressure on Turkey along a border line stretching hundreds of kilometers.
Said also said, “This means Ankara may have to divert additional military and security resources to a front that already does not need new tensions, especially at a time when those resources are required for other priorities.”
At the same time, the Justice and Development Party (AKP) is facing serious pressure in domestic politics. The latest local elections revealed a noticeable erosion of the party’s support base in major cities. Erdoğan is confronting an unprecedented challenge in managing public expectations under increasingly difficult living conditions. The Iran war is pushing him into a rhetorical dilemma: on the one hand, he wants to present himself to an angry electorate as a “power-broker” leader; on the other, he is aware that being drawn into a direct conflict would carry heavy costs in domestic politics. The delicate balance between projecting influence and avoiding entanglement has become a real test for his party.
Turkey expert Dr. Abdulfettah Beşir also evaluated the situation and said Ankara has for years tried to build the image of a “mediator who can talk to everyone” in the files of Ukraine, Libya, the Caucasus and Syria. According to Beşir, the war involving Iran is testing that image in an unprecedented way.
Beşir said, “Taking an open side closes diplomatic channels, while prolonged neutrality is interpreted by Western allies as a ‘missed opportunity’ and an escape from responsibility,” and added that Erdoğan wants to appear as an architect of regional peace but that such a role requires acceptance by the parties involved and the leverage to exert pressure.
Beşir said, “Ankara does not possess these capabilities in this crisis. Because of its geography, it cannot remain completely distant, yet domestic political balances do not allow it to move forward decisively.”
As a result, the Iran–United States–Israel conflict is casting a heavy shadow over Ankara. While diplomatic efforts may intensify, the risk of regional instability is increasing and Turkey’s room for maneuver is narrowing. The Erdoğan administration appears likely to face the challenge of maintaining a delicate balance both at home and abroad.
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