Özsoy: Liquidation-focused approaches would be a mistake

Attacks on Rojava have coincided with a parallel political process in which Kurdish actors have been active both internationally and in Turkey, particularly in relation to the report presented for resolving the Kurdish question. Dr. Hişyar Özsoy spoke to ANF about this intertwined process and the broader efforts of Kurds in both local and international politics.

Özsoy said that the visibility of Kurdish representatives on international platforms, especially at gatherings such as the Munich Security Conference, is significant at a time when clashes continue in Rojava and a new political situation is emerging.

Özsoy said: “It is important that daily negotiations and discussions about Syria take place there. Progress in talks on integration is also significant in this regard. The withdrawal of United States troops from Syria is now only a matter of time. Everyone in Washington thinks so. Therefore, before these troops withdraw, the aim is to advance discussions on integration and create diplomatic ground that would allow the Kurds to negotiate with Damascus from a stronger position.

However, I believe this should not be exaggerated too much. There are also serious criticisms of the Trump administration’s policies on Syria. In particular, there are strong criticisms in the United States Congress regarding Thomas Barrack. Recently, the United States House of Representatives held a major hearing on Syria. Almost all members who spoke there openly and strongly criticized the United States’ Syria policy because decisions were made entirely through Ahmed al-Sharaa (al-Jolani). In fact, Barrack did not appear at the Munich Conference. We have learned that he was seriously questioned by members of Congress.”

Özsoy added that there are serious criticisms suggesting that the United States administration has given al-Jolani a “blank check,” and that international public pressure has also played a role in balancing this policy.

Özsoy said: “Kurds were also mobilized across the world. Some responses were given at the Munich Conference, but this does not change the overall situation on the ground. It must be underlined that the United States administration is clear about working with the Sharaa administration. At this stage, it is not very realistic to expect any change in that regard.

However, there is a debate about the nature of the support given to Sharaa. In Washington, there is a general view that this support should be conditional, meaning it should be tied to certain conditions. In particular, it is argued that Kurds, Alawites, Druze, and other communities living there should be integrated into a federal system through democratic consensus, not by force or violence. We will see over time how much influence this view will have on the administration.”

Özsoy also said: “There is also a bill submitted to the United States Senate by two senators. Whether this bill will pass the Senate is another matter of debate. Expectations should not be set too high on this issue; hundreds, even thousands of bills are waiting in the Senate. However, this step shows that the Senate, like the House of Representatives, has begun to signal its position. The main purpose is not necessarily for the bill to become law, but rather to partially shift the Trump administration’s Syria policy, to encourage it to take a more distant stance toward al-Jolani and to push for more conditional support.

The Rojava administration also held high-level meetings during the Munich Security Conference, not only with the United States Secretary of State but also with politicians such as leaders from Germany and Emmanuel Macron. Diplomatically, this brought a certain level of recognition as part of the Syrian delegation. Everyone says that the 30 January Agreement, the agreement between Sharaa and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), must be implemented, but at the same time they see that the agreement remains highly fragile.

Therefore, one way to overcome this fragility is for the Kurds to gain legitimacy and support among the peoples through diplomatic engagement, which could provide them with greater leverage in the negotiations in the coming period.”

Özsoy said that the comprehensive struggle of Kurdish politics on the Rojava issue is both meaningful and important. He noted that the agreements remain fragile and that maintaining a coordinated political approach will be crucial in the coming period.

He said: “First, interpretations of the articles of this agreement may differ significantly in the coming period. Damascus and the SDF clearly interpret these provisions in different ways. These differences in interpretation could lead to tensions, even open clashes; there is no guarantee otherwise. The implementation of this agreement is fragile. At present, there are no international guarantors or monitoring mechanisms overseeing its implementation. There are certain individuals involved, such as Barrack, the French foreign minister or other intermediaries, but there is no formal guarantor or monitoring mechanism. Therefore, we should expect pressure and tensions during the implementation of this agreement in the coming period. However, it is important that these tensions lead to negotiations.

Second, the future of this agreement will largely depend on the stance taken by the SDF after the 18 January Agreement, namely their willingness to resist when necessary. The Syrian Democratic Forces say: ‘We are open to all kinds of negotiations, but if you try to impose surrender on us, you leave us no option but resistance, and we will carry that out strongly.’ This determination to resist has created a sense of national feeling, solidarity and unity among Kurds across all four parts of Kurdistan and within the diaspora. This spirit must be strengthened.

Alongside the local decision to resist in Rojava, Kurds must strengthen their sense of national unity and solidarity. We can already see this particularly in diplomacy and in the streets. Kurds across the world have mobilized for Rojava, setting aside ideological and political differences. This must continue, because an approach such as ‘an agreement has been reached and it will naturally be implemented over time’ would be extremely risky and dangerous. It is necessary to remain constantly vigilant, to stay active on the ground and, when necessary, to reflect this national sentiment in the streets.

However, another point just as important as street protests is the need for coordination in diplomacy and in the media. The coming period will involve difficult negotiations and tensions, and preparations must begin now.

Third, this local determination to resist and the spirit of national unity must be carried into the international arena. Diplomacy must be pursued intensively and in multiple dimensions with regional and global actors that hold power in Syria. If these three elements come together, the gains of Rojava can be protected and the ground for implementing the agreement will become stronger.”

Özsoy also assessed the report announced by the commission established within the Turkish parliament and continued: “Various political parties have already submitted their own reports to the parliamentary commission. To be frank, those party reports were completely disappointing. It was already clear that combining those reports would not produce a very positive outcome. In that sense, it is not surprising that the report came out this way; but it is still negative. At this point, it does not even create a new disappointment, because it follows the same line as previous approaches and fails to seriously address any dimension of the Kurdish question.”

Özsoy stated that the Turkish parliament has, for the first time in its history, had an opportunity to address the Kurdish question, but said the report prepared by the commission failed to meet these expectations. He said: “I want to emphasize this in particular: a commission on the Kurdish question was established in parliament and an initiative was taken. In my view, however, both the commission and the reports have rendered parliament ineffective. An initiative was given to parliament; the political will encouraged, indeed pressured, the formation of this commission (I am referring to the initiatives of Devlet Bahçeli).

Yet parliament as a whole failed to make use of this ground and has abandoned, for the first time, the opportunity to say something meaningful about the Kurdish question. Both the political groups and the commission chair did not approach the issue with the seriousness and courage it required. Unfortunately, we are faced with a parliament and a commission that were unable to take initiative and ended up undermining themselves. In fact, expecting too much from these reports was another mistake. Ultimately, what is required to resolve this issue is political will, namely the will of the government and the state.”

Özsoy also said: “Parliament was expected to act more boldly, but in this case it has even fallen behind the government and state institutions. Frankly, this was not a good test. The report fails to address even a single core dimension that forms the ‘heart’ of the Kurdish question, instead proposing indirect and insufficient steps (for example, the implementation of European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) decisions or the dismissals of elected mayors). Considering the historical dimension of the Kurdish question and the steps taken so far by the Kurdish side, such proposals are insignificant and unserious.

In practice, unfortunately, it will not be parliament that determines what kind of law will emerge, but the Presidential Palace. Teams consisting of Erdoğan, Devlet Bahçeli and the military bureaucracy will draft the framework of the law and send it to parliament, and those in parliament will approve it. This is a regrettable situation. Once again, the perception has strengthened that the will of the people is not truly present in parliament and that decisions are made under the shadow of the government and state institutions.

The Peoples’ Equality and Democracy Party (DEM Party) supported this report with strong reservations; it is clear that they are not satisfied. In the end, what has emerged is a minor report that does not match the seriousness of the Kurdish question.”

 

 


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