Faik Özgür Erol, an Imralı delegation member, spoke with ANF about the continuation of attacks on Rojava at a time when debates on peace and a democratic solution are ongoing in Turkey. He said that the developments were linked to regional and international strategies, adding that, with the assessment that “this is a second February 15,” the process amounted to a serious provocation.
Debates on peace and a democratic solution are ongoing in Turkey, yet serious military attacks on Rojava continue. How do you interpret the fact that these two processes are unfolding simultaneously? What is your assessment of the attacks on Rojava?
The attack policies being implemented in Syria are closely linked to the shifting dynamics of the Middle East over the past two to three years. Abdullah Öcalan had already pointed this out when the initial dialogue processes began. Following the Gaza war that started on 7 October, he described the disintegration of the Syrian regime, namely the Baath regime, as the unraveling of the Sykes–Picot order. From that point onward, a wide range of regional and international strategies were activated and further developed across the Middle East. Whether framed through peace initiatives, alliances, or confrontation, many of these strategies placed the Kurds at their center.
This reality is plain to see. Kurdish existence, both in qualitative and quantitative terms, has become an undeniable fact in the Middle East. There is a strong Kurdish political dynamism, a substantial Kurdish population, and a well-established Kurdish political reality. It was therefore inevitable that this reality would become the focus of specific policies and strategies. Yet there is another dimension that goes beyond this alone, one that Mr. Öcalan has described as a “trap” spanning the last 100 to 200 years. Since the period of the Ottoman Empire’s dissolution, an imperial policy has prevailed in the Middle East, one that persistently incites peoples against one another, pushes them into confrontation, and fuels conflict. Over the past century, this policy has been pursued most intensely through the Kurds. This approach can be traced back to the Cairo Conference and to Churchill’s divide-and-rule strategy: governing the Middle East by keeping the Kurds perpetually wounded.
This policy does not aim to eliminate the Kurds outright. Rather, it prevents them from living a healthy life rooted in their own social and political dynamics. By keeping the Kurds in constant conflict with their surroundings, under continuous pressure from external forces while simultaneously locked in resistance, it ensures they remain weakened. In this way, the Middle East becomes more manageable, as conflicting actors are repeatedly driven to seek the involvement of outside powers. When such conflicts cannot be resolved internally, the parties are systematically pushed into engagement with external forces. This, I believe, is the essence of that imperial strategy. Mr. Öcalan recognized this imperial stranglehold long ago and articulated it clearly.
The core meaning of the current process lies precisely here: dismantling this trap and ending the deep-rooted hostilities that have been engineered between peoples. Today, the fundamental question is whether mutual enmity among societies will continue under this stranglehold, or whether a different path will emerge, one that allows for a democratic Republic of Turkey or a democratic Syria, where peoples can coexist within shared political frameworks. These are the two sharply opposing trajectories before us.
It was therefore no coincidence that the escalation of attacks in Syria coincided with the day immediately following the Paris Agreement. Mr. Öcalan described this by saying, “They took southern Syria; they took Sweida (Suwayda) and the Golan. They also promised the area between the Tigris and the Euphrates.” In doing so, he outlined what had been pledged to the Damascus regime. On this basis, a new phase of conflict was initiated. This process is also connected to the Iran operation that was announced last week but later postponed. It is linked to preparations for intervention against Iran, and in the next phase, to Iraq and all the forces operating there. From this perspective, what we are witnessing is not a short-term development, but the outcome of a much longer-term regional strategy.
Recent parliamentary records quote Abdullah Öcalan as saying, “Kurds’ demands for status are not separatist; they are a democratic right to self-government within the constitution.” In this context, there is a particular emphasis on “local administrations and autonomy.” Could you elaborate on this?
In fact, this has always been Mr. Öcalan’s solution proposal for Syria; it has always been framed in these terms. It must be acknowledged, however, that over the roughly 10 to 12 years since the previous peace process, the issue on which the gap between the parties widened the most was Syria and Rojava, specifically, the question of how to approach it. This was something everyone was aware of throughout the process, and Mr. Öcalan himself repeatedly underlined it. The divergence in approaches remained extremely clear. Even so, he continued to think about formulas that could, as far as possible, foster common ground and dialogue. The core thesis he developed was the need to establish a balanced relationship between the center and the local level. When such a balance is not achieved, either the center acquires overwhelming power over the local level, or, conversely, the local level can take on a role that destabilizes the center. He worked on a formula in which neither of these outcomes would occur. The most fundamental concept he put forward was a model of local democracy. This local democracy model makes it possible to develop many definitions and arrangements, but in essence it refers to the strengthening of local administrations. It can be described as a formulation adapted to domestic conditions from the European Charter of Local Self-Government, with its content shaped accordingly. It is a method that has been applied successfully by many countries around the world and has yielded results, with political systems increasingly evolving in this direction. There was no inherent obstacle to discussing or implementing such a model. Yet at the point we have reached, the process has evolved into something entirely different. Alongside a policy of attacks, a decree was issued in parallel with this assault-driven approach. In this decree, Kurds were told, “We recognize you as citizens.” There is a familiar narrative often repeated: that Kurds in Syria were previously not even granted citizenship. But at this stage, is this really what the requirements of the era demand? Or is the issue simply to brush aside a people by saying, “You were not even citizens before,” and now offering citizenship status as a substitute? The real problem here is this: citizenship is established through a social contract. To bind your allegiance to the state of which you are a citizen, there must be a legal and social framework, a constitution, setting out written rules.
Today, Syria has no constitution. In a country without a constitution and a social contract, what kind of bond of citizenship can truly be established? For nearly a year now, the government in Syria, the regime itself, has changed hands. Within that year, they have not even begun, let alone completed, the drafting of a constitution. Yet during this same period, there has been no community left untouched by attacks or interventions, from Druze to Alawites, from Kurds to others. This shows that priorities lie elsewhere. It also shows that the actors shaping or directing this process have different objectives. A country that genuinely intends to establish a democratic order and include its citizens accordingly must first form a constitutional drafting committee, a constituent assembly, lay the foundations of a constitution, consult all stakeholders on this basis, and bind the process to that framework. It has become clear that the current trajectory in Syria is not moving in this direction.
The fundamental issue, therefore, is this: the matter should not be reduced solely to the Kurds. It is not only about how Kurds will be integrated into the Syrian regime or how they will live in Syria. No legal framework has been established to regulate how Druze, Turkmens, Christians, and Alawites will live together in that country, or what their rights and legal protections will be. Where there is no legal order, there can be no democratic regime or democratic ground. This is the core of the issue, and it is precisely what Mr. Öcalan has consistently emphasized.
Despite all the efforts of Abdullah Öcalan and the Kurdish movement, denial and attacks continue in many areas. On the one hand, there is denial and violence; on the other, talk of a peace process continues. Given the anxiety and pessimism in Turkey, where do you see this process heading?
Where this process will lead is something we will all experience and see together. I believe that Mr. Öcalan remains exactly where he stood at the very beginning of this process. That said, during our most recent meeting, developments in Rojava had not yet escalated to this extent. At that point, there had been an attempted attack around Der Hafir, and it was being claimed that any assault would be limited to areas west of the Euphrates. From the moment the meeting began, Mr. Öcalan made it clear that he did not want to discuss any other subject. There had been numerous visits to political parties over the previous month and various outcomes from those meetings, but he did not want to hear about them either. He believed that, in the face of what was unfolding, these developments no longer carried much meaning, because he viewed what was happening as a genuine provocation. He warned that this provocation carried the potential not only to pit Kurds and Arabs against one another, as in Syria, but in a next phase to set Kurds and Turks against each other as well. He described this as an international conspiracy and explicitly likened it to 15 February, saying, “This is a second 15 February.”
He was fully aware that the process unfolding from this point carried the potential to poison a very long period ahead, and he was focused on preventing that outcome. So, what, then, was the way to stop it? For many years, Mr. Öcalan has been the one who articulated the Kurdish reality in the clearest terms, especially in its most dramatic dimensions. Fifteen or sixteen years ago, in his written defenses, he spoke of “a people trapped in genocide,” expressing this reality with striking clarity. From the position he has occupied for years, he has waged a sustained struggle to block this trajectory, developing strategies aimed at peace and coexistence. Today, I see clearly that he continues that struggle, and he will not abandon it.
The only way to prevent this escalation is to stop the deepening of the conflict by developing a shared rational ground. That common ground must be built through negotiation and dialogue. Only in this way can a viable living space be secured for all peoples there, including Kurds. Asking where Kurds will live and where other peoples will live makes no sense. To create such a shared living space, it is necessary to develop a collective approach and produce a solution on that basis. Any alternative leads only to societies being consumed by deepening fanaticism, and it serves no other purpose.
The model functioning in Rojava and now under attack is the product of the paradigm Öcalan has defended for 25 years. Why has this paradigm been systematically targeted by states and armed groups at every stage?
The fundamental reason this paradigm is under attack is simple: it does not serve the interests of the forces and structures attacking it. That is the core issue. From the outset, we have said this clearly. After the Sykes–Picot order in the Middle East began to unravel, many global and regional powers developed their own strategies. Alongside these, however, there was another strategy, one did not tie to imperial designs, that focused on the possibility of peoples living together. That alternative took the form of Mr. Öcalan’s Peace and Democratic Society Initiative of 27 February. This initiative represented a position in favor of the peoples of the region, articulated in response to the interventions and the complex, chaotic conditions imposed on the Middle East. In essence, the attacks now being carried out against Kurds through Rojava are a response to this initiative. This must be read correctly, not only by Kurds, but also by Turks and by the Turkish state itself.
The intervention we are witnessing has been carried out with the aim of blocking a possible Turkish–Kurdish peace and preventing the emergence of a peace process in Turkey, along with the broader impact such a peace could have across the Middle East. That objective has not changed, and it continues to shape the course of events today.