The First World War was also a war in which major economic powers sought to divide the world among themselves. This division produced a new political order. Feudal empires incompatible with the nation-state system, such as the Ottoman Empire and Tsarist Russia, were dismantled, and nation-states were established across their former spheres of domination. Within this new system, Arab societies were fragmented into states under the leadership of tribal aristocracies, while the Kurds were subjected to a regime of denial and annihilation. Following the Soviet Revolution, the process culminated in the establishment of the Republic of Turkey; the monarchical regime in Iran followed a similar trajectory.
The Second World War, by contrast, was a war in which capitalism tested itself through fascism. Its primary objective was the destruction of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Although this aim was not achieved through the war itself, the postwar democratization that unfolded from Europe contributed to the internal collapse of the Soviet Union. During the war years, German fascism carried out the genocide of the Jews, followed by the establishment of the State of Israel. The Kurds, meanwhile, were subjected to a massacre centered on Dersim, and the policies of denial and annihilation imposed upon them were further intensified.
A critical difference between the First and Second World Wars lies in their historical functions. The First World War emerged from profound historical ruptures and gave rise to new political formations, whereas the Second World War sought to resolve the crisis of the nation-state within its existing framework. For this reason, the Treaty of Lausanne, signed in the aftermath of the First World War, represents a moment of historical rupture for the Kurdish people. The Dersim massacre and the events that followed, however, marked an acceleration of that rupture, under the influence of German fascism, aimed at completing the project of denial and annihilation. The failure of Kurdish political and military struggles after the Second World War, and the absence of any power willing to enter political or military alliances with the Kurds, stem from this same dynamic. Because the Second World War was the outcome of an internal crisis of the nation-state and not a moment oriented toward the construction of new social and political structures, it offered no opening for Kurdish aspirations.
A new historical rupture has been unfolding since the 1990s, accelerating over time. This phase has followed political and military trajectories distinct from those of the two world-war periods that preceded it. Within this rupture, destruction, transformation, and however contested, new forms of construction have unfolded simultaneously. Despite a system of denial and annihilation imposed upon them, the Kurds entered this period by asserting their existence. As a result, by the 1990s the Kurds had emerged as a democratic force in Northern Kurdistan (Bakur) and had developed a federated administration in Southern Kurdistan (Başur). Turkey entered this historical rupture in a state of deep crisis. Across the Middle East, nation-states entered the same period burdened by profound contradictions. States collapsed in Iraq, Syria, and Libya, while Egypt, Lebanon, and the Gulf Arab states experienced severe political turmoil and were pushed into partial transformations led by Saudi Arabia. Iran, meanwhile, has come under sustained pressure for systemic change.
These developments are examined here from the vantage point of the Kurds and Kurdistan. Just as the rupture following the First World War was shaped by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the third historical rupture will be shaped, commensurate with their social and historical capacity, by the Kurds and Kurdistan themselves.
At this historical juncture, the Kurds are advancing by strengthening their unity through the frameworks of the democratic nation and the nation-state. Because the Turkish state is built upon the denial and annihilation of the Kurds, it responds to advances in Kurdish nationhood with open hostility, accepting even the prospect of genocide. Every Kurd must recognize that Turkish state officials display less openness in acknowledging Kurdish existence than even Salafi Arab figures such as Ahmed al-Sharaa (al-Jolani) and must adopt a clear and appropriate stance in response.
The Turkish state seeks to eliminate the Kurds in Rojava through genocidal methods. No matter how many books are written, this sentence captures the lived reality. The international system has not moved beyond telling the Kurds: you may exist, but you will have no rights. The Turkish state approaches the Kurds with a policy that can be summarized bluntly, if Kurds are to have no rights, then they should not exist at all. Elements of this policy also draw strength from vulnerabilities rooted in the Kurdish people’s unfinished nationhood.
In Rojava, the Kurdish people are being targeted through what can be described as a “Turkish-style” war. By this, I mean genocidal attacks carried out by the state in ways that obscure direct responsibility, methods familiar from the Armenian and Assyrian-Syriac massacres and from the era of unsolved political killings.
Based on what has unfolded, the Kurds must pay close attention to several fundamental points. In this period of historical rupture, the Turkish state is waging a genocidal war in Rojava aimed at completing the denial of Kurdish existence through annihilation. Yet because the Kurds are resisting, this assault is simultaneously reinforcing their efforts at nationhood, addressing longstanding weaknesses, strengthening unity, and consolidating collective will. For this reason, every Kurd, regardless of ideological affiliation or party alignment, must take part in the resistance. Every segment must demonstrate its Kurdish identity by participating in the resistance in Rojava. Those who seek a democratic nation and those who aspire to a nation-state alike are bound by this necessity. All actors must deploy their alliances, political and economic resources, and military and political influence on a principled basis.
Sensitivity to Turkey’s special warfare operations is essential in this phase. Claims such as “the United States sold out the Kurds” are used to belittle Kurdish political reason and portray the Kurds as naïve. No one has sold out or deceived anyone. Setting aside tactical errors, the Kurds are fully capable of discerning who is who in their political and diplomatic relations. If there is any actor that has been sold out or misled, it is the Turkish state itself, evident in this rupture period by its choice to side with Israel after decades within a military system dating back to 1952.
The outcomes, positive or negative, emerging from Rojava will be shaped as much by the administration and people of Southern Kurdistan as by the support of Kurds in Northern Kurdistan. The responsibility of the administration in Southern Kurdistan must therefore be consistently underscored.
For Turkey and the Turkish people, whose fate is intertwined with that of the Kurds, history has left only two options: either to become perpetrators of Kurdish genocide, or following a path akin to Europe’s post–Second World War transformation, to undergo democratic change alongside the Kurds and reshape the Middle East together. Turkey and the Turkish state remain suspended between these choices. Consequently, the Kurdish popular resistance centered on Rojava does not only defend Kurdish existence; by compelling democratic transformation, but it also becomes a broader struggle for a democratic society.
In short, shaped by the genocides they have endured, the Kurds see and understand what is unfolding. As a people, they have grasped that unity and resistance lead to survival and victory, while the absence of resistance leads to genocide. This awareness, in itself, has become a victory.