For years, the Turkish state has worked tirelessly and relentlessly to eliminate the Kurdish people and their gains. Leaving aside the early history of the Republic, in recent decades it has done everything possible to prevent Kurds from even breathing. Thousands of villages were burned, tens of thousands of people were subjected to so-called “unsolved murders.” Diyarbakır Prison became infamous worldwide for its cruelty. When the Syrian civil war began, Turkey plunged in at full capacity, claiming it would not “repeat the mistake made in Iraq.” In this context, it even supported some of the bloodiest and most brutal movements humanity has ever seen, such as ISIS and al-Qaeda. In order to ensure that Kurds would never “see the light of day,” there was no power in the world it refused to engage with or cooperate with.
Yet the Turkish people, who have lived alongside Kurds for a thousand years, were not condemned to this policy. However, those who governed the state and held power chose not to develop new political approaches; instead, they repeated what already existed. This naturally came at a very high cost for Turkey. Kurds suffered the most, but the rest of Turkey also failed to live within a developed, prosperous, and democratic system. Turkish democracy steadily lost blood.
Those who ruled Turkey did not limit their hostility to Kurds within its borders. They also targeted Kurds living beyond its borders, in other states, constantly working to block their path. They coded Kurdish existence and identity as a security threat and transmitted this mindset from generation to generation. Successive governments and administrations have been unable to break free from these rigid patterns.
This mindset and policy have now placed Kurds in Syria under the grip of genocide. Yet neither the Kurdish population size nor their ideas pose any threat to Turkey. As a poor community whose identity and existence had long been denied, they were pushed to the very bottom. With the outbreak of the Syrian civil war, Kurds pursued no agenda other than protecting their own regions. Despite this, a force like ISIS was unleashed against them. Kurds fought to defend themselves at an enormous cost. The Iraqi and Syrian armies could not withstand ISIS. International powers were unsure what to do and did not want to deploy their own soldiers on the ground. They eventually chose to support the Kurds who were resisting and fighting. After the resistance in Kobanê, Kurds worked together with the International Coalition and played a leading role in saving humanity from the scourge of ISIS. Apart from this, Kurds did not wage war against anyone nor attack others.
Nevertheless, Turkey’s rulers never abandoned the policy that Kurds, no matter what they do or how great their service to humanity, should never prosper. Most recently, even when the Baath regime collapsed, their first move was to target Kurdish regions and attempt to eliminate the Autonomous Administration. At that time, because conditions were not yet ripe, they postponed the liquidation. In the interim, talks took place between the SDF and the Damascus administration through U.S. initiatives, and the March 10 Agreement was signed. This framework agreement covered unity and cooperation. Since then, neither the SDF nor the Autonomous Administration has put forward any new demands, but the Turkish government has continuously intervened in the process—always negatively. Had it wished, it could have played an accelerating and constructive role.
The Autonomous Administration wanted to take confidence-building steps and continue talks by starting with easier issues. However, due to Turkey’s impositions and HTS’s insistence on prioritizing “security,” the integration of the SDF was brought to the forefront. To avoid problems, the SDF accepted and continued the talks. Most recently, at the meeting held on January 4 under U.S. mediation, an agreement had been reached and only the signing remained. At the last moment, Şeybani’s intervention postponed the signing. Shortly thereafter, it became clear that this was the beginning of a conspiracy. Immediately after the Paris meeting involving Israel, the U.S., and Syria, the attack on Aleppo began on January 7.
Şeybani’s relations with Turkey are more or less well known. Moreover, whenever talks with Damascus take place and progress is made, Hakan Fidan and Yaşar Güler immediately step in. These interventions have increasingly taken on the character of a blow and provocation against the peace processes that had begun both in Syria and in Turkey. The agreement in Paris brought about a shift in political balances. There were also changes in the regional conjuncture. Powers such as the United States accepted supporting and legitimizing the HTS administration in order to keep control over Syria. Turkey, meanwhile, was trying to persuade Trump and push the SDF out of the equation. Tom Barrack, who was involved in this process, was considered the most suitable figure for the task. Barrack turned his back on the Kurds—who had fought ISIS as part of the Coalition and had suffered tens of thousands of martyrs and wounded—as well as on the SDF and the autonomous region. So much so that when Damascus and Turkey were making a massive military buildup to attack Dêr Hafir, he failed to play a constructive role. He did not prevent the path toward an even more destructive war. It must be said again: without U.S. approval, such a heavy attack on Aleppo would not have taken place. If the U.S. had wanted, it could have stopped a war that might have turned the region into hell starting from Dêr Hafir.
The Autonomous Administration and the SDF were unable to thwart or prevent this plotted conspiracy. Once again, destruction and suffering fall upon those demanding freedom and democracy—upon the Kurds.
Source: Yeni Özgür Politika