Ivanov Stanislav Mikhailovich, a senior research fellow at the Center for International Security of the Institute of World Economy and International Relations of the Russian Academy of Sciences (IMEMO), a Doctor of History, and a Middle East specialist, spoke to ANF about developments in North and East Syria and Eastern Kurdistan (Rojhilat).
International analysts are skeptical that protests in Iran could lead to a change of power. Do you think the current regime can survive?
Without a doubt, the spontaneous protests now unfolding in Iran are taking place on a scale unprecedented in the entire history of the theocratic regime. However, I believe that the Iranian ayatollahs will once again be able to retain power. It is possible to share the skepticism expressed by international experts regarding the potential success of another wave of unrest in Iran. Because Iranian society is largely isolated from the internet, mobile communications, and global media, the role and influence of the external opposition are marginal.
Threats by the United States and Israel to protect the Iranian people from possible punitive actions by the regime are more symbolic than real, and they are unlikely to lead to direct military intervention in Iran’s internal affairs.
The domestic opposition is weakly organized in the face of a relatively large and integrated repressive state apparatus, including the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), with more than 250,000 personnel in peacetime and up to 400,000 during wartime when the paramilitary Basij volunteer forces are included. There is no single leader, political organization, or party. In addition, the security forces, the police, and the regular armed forces remain in place. How these forces respond in the current critical situation will be decisive: will they firmly side with the regime, remain neutral, or align themselves with the broader population?
It is also worth recalling the spontaneous protests that swept Iran in the autumn and winter of 2022–2023. Those protests lasted a long time, at least six months, but were ultimately all suppressed. In any case, the ruling regime has been shaken and will be forced to introduce reforms in the financial, economic, and possibly political spheres to remain in power. Adjustments in foreign policy are also possible.
Hundreds of billions of dollars spent on expanding the Islamic Revolution and Shiism across the region have been wasted. The puppet regime of Bashar al-Assad has collapsed, and the so-called ‘axis of resistance’ against Israel, represented by groups such as Hamas, Islamic Jihad, Hezbollah, Ansar Allah, Hashd al-Shaabi, and Kataib Hezbollah, has disintegrated. Strikes by Israel and the United States against strategically important facilities have significantly weakened the country’s defense and scientific potential. Iran is now facing a severe financial, economic, and political crisis.
Does Western media support for the “exiled prince” indicate an effort by Western actors to install a figure under their control, or is it a different tactic?
The West is supporting all political and social forces that oppose the Ayatollah regime, including the so-called ‘exiled prince.’ Western actors realistically understand that Reza Pahlavi has an extremely low chance of governing Iran after any possible collapse of the theocratic regime. He is being used by the West primarily as a tool to weaken the authority of the Ayatollahs and as a symbol for the protest movement. Who will ultimately govern the state or form a government will be decided by Iranians themselves.
What does the ‘crown prince’ figure represent for Iranians? Is there any real support for him?
A return to monarchical rule in Iran is highly unlikely. Prince Reza Pahlavi, the heir to the Shah’s dynasty who resides in the United States, advocates the violent overthrow of the current regime and presents himself as ready to lead a new Iranian government. Some protesters support his calls, but this political figure functions mainly as a symbol or an alternative to the rule of the Ayatollahs.
The younger generation of Iranians knows monarchy only in historical terms and has no intention of replacing a discredited theocratic regime with a monarchical system. Even if the theocratic regime were to fall, the most that could happen would be a restoration of Reza Pahlavi’s reputation and perhaps his return to the country as the leader of a monarchist party, nothing more.
What is the likelihood that Trump will try to draw Turkey into the crisis to increase pressure on the regime and allow troop deployments?
Turkey will stay out of events in Iran; there is no justification for Turkish troops to be present there. President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan is far more concerned with preventing his own population from taking to the streets, given that inflation and the depreciation of the national currency, although somewhat less severe than in Iran, have become constant and threatening problems.
After the explosion in Damascus, is al-Jolani’s “disappearance” and his silence over attacks on civilians’ part of a political “performance” by allies meant to show that the interim president is not “involved” in another mass bloodshed?
I know nothing about the so-called ‘disappearance’ of Ahmed al-Sharaa, the interim President of Syria. What is clear, however, is that several Syrian radical Islamist groups that were once his allies in the fight against the Bashar al-Assad regime are now operating beyond his control. These militants carried out massacres first in areas inhabited by Alawite Arabs, and later in districts populated by Druze Arabs.
Now, militias in Damascus that are acting as government forces are raiding Kurdish neighborhoods in Aleppo. I am convinced that al-Sharaa is carrying out these aggressive actions not as an independent representative of the Syrian people, but under pressure from the region’s notorious provocateur, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan.
As is well known, al-Sharaa spoke by phone with Erdoğan the day before, after which tanks, armored personnel carriers, and artillery units moved into Ashrafiyah (Eşrefiyê), Sheikh Maqsoud (Şêx Meqsûd), and other districts of Aleppo. According to reports, a punitive military operation against Kurdish militias was planned by Damascus forces and approved in Ankara.
Instead of focusing on uniting Syrians, forming an inclusive government, adopting a new constitution that would reliably protect the rights of all ethnic and religious groups, and preparing for genuinely democratic elections, the interim Syrian authorities are stoking new armed conflicts in their long-suffering country to satisfy Erdoğan.
Erdoğan and his proxy al-Sharaa aim to drive Kurdish militias out of Aleppo and to carry out ethnic cleansing in Kurdish neighborhoods, like what happened in Afrin (Efrîn) district of Aleppo province during the Turkish Armed Forces’ Operation Olive Branch in January 2018. During that ‘operation,’ hundreds of civilians were killed, and thousands of Kurds were forced to flee to other parts of Syria and to neighboring Iraq.
It now appears that Turkish authorities are planning a military operation against the Kurds in Aleppo through their proxy forces, Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) and the Syrian National Army (SNA), whose fighters are attempting to disguise themselves as government troops.