ANF spoke with sociologist and Iran expert Prof. Abbas Vali, well known for his work on Iran and the Middle East, about the popular uprisings unfolding in Iran, the structure of the opposition, the position of the Kurds, the regime’s options, and possible future scenarios.
Part one of this interview can be read here.
What kind of structure do the Kurdish movements in the country have, and what are they aiming for?
The Kurdish opposition is, you know, there are at least seven parties in the Kurdish opposition. Most of these Kurdish opposition parties, the important ones, like the Kurdish Democratic Party, KDPI, and the three komalas, the three branches of komala, and also the pajak, the party of free life. They are all, in one way or another, autonomous parties.
That means that they have autonomous programs. They want to have an autonomous Kurdistan inside the sovereignty of the Iranian state. But some of them are federalists, some are not federalists.
But what is important is that they are autonomous. They are not independent-seeking nationalist organization in that sense. So the ground for their coalition is quite strong.
If they leave aside personal problems, leave aside leadership problems, and unite for the sake of the Kurdish people, there is a strong basis for coalition among them. Although they have very different conceptions of, you know, autonomy and democracy. For instance, pajak is, you know, using the conception of democratic autonomy, which is similar to what, yes, in Rojava and also in Bakur.
For years, the Kurdish Workers’ Party has asked for democracy. But the komalas and democrats are, you know, federalists. They want the Kurdish administration to use the Kurdish language and so on.
But they are quite happy to remain under the united Iranian sovereignty, be part of it, and follow, you know, in sort of big politics like foreign policy or grand economic planning for the country, they would follow the center. So they are looking for a kind of establishing of a kind of federal structure. But also, if we look at the situation in terms of, you know, Baluchi opposition, or the Arab opposition in Khuzestan, or the section of the Azeri opposition.
What position do the Azeris hold in this uprising, and what kind of relationship do they have with the Kurdish movement?
Azeri opposition, of course, is very, very difficult in this respect, because the part of it is very nationalist militant, and it’s very difficult to form any coalition with them. Another part is, so far, you know, completely quiet, and hasn’t joined the movement in that respect. And previously also, in the Jinnah, you know, movement, Jinjian Azeri movement as well, it was not very active.
Unlike in previous times, for instance, Azerbaijan, you know, in old days, in the previous uprisings, like in 1979, or in 1906, 05, 06, Azerbaijan has always been in the forefront. But at present, it is not the case. So, I would say that the Baluchi, the Arab, the Turkmen, and the Kurdish opposition, are all asking for autonomy.
They are asking for pluralist democratic rule to be represented in the center. And this creates a basis for them to, you know, form a coalition, when the regime falls, or even before the regime falls. And all in all, the non-Persian opposition is pluralist, and it is anti-centralist, it is for decentralization of power, either in the form of autonomy, or federalist autonomy, and so on and so forth.
But they are against re-establishing a central, unified, uniform power block with a uniform ethnic linguistic identity. This is, you know, not there.
So, what can you say about ethnic tensions and potential conflicts in Iran?
I must sort of refer to something which is very important at present, and it could be more important in the aftermath of the collapse of this regime, and that is the difficulties that exist between the Kurdish and Azeri communities.
And there are histories of animosity, there are histories of war and bloodletting, and so on. And now, you know, the intensification of Azeri ethnic nationalism, which is in certain ways supported by the government, Turkey and also Azerbaijan, is creating problems in the mixed towns, where Kurds, Azeris live, you know, side by side. So, this is a problem that I am referring to as a likely crisis that may open up after the collapse of the government in Tehran.
I think Kurdish political parties are well aware of it, and they are trying to bring about certain processes, negotiations, and so on, so that this will not turn to a war between ethnic and national communities, and so on and so forth. But at present, so far as I can say, the extremism comes mostly from Azeri nationalism. This is just the issue I wanted to refer to, so that people, your readers, should know that this is such an important issue, and it may become a cause crisis between the communities.
You said that the current popular movement needs to take on a democratic character. What are the democratic demands of this movement, and what are its limitations?
Aside from that, this present, you know, movement, although it is in terms of its spread and in terms of its number of participants, it seems to be more than the previous movement. But it also, as I said, in terms of its slogans and demands, is democratically a lot more limited. For instance, there are no slogans so far for women’s liberation.
There are no slogans which will satisfy the Z generation. There are no slogans which will take into account the ethnic diversity, national diversity of Iran, linguistic diversity of Iran, religious diversity of Iran. And this shows that the right-wing opposition, represented by monarchies, are basically trying to direct this movement towards their own objectives, which is to re-establish a centralized government, a centralized rule in Iran, which is basically a rule with uniform identity, uniform language, at the expense of suppression of other identities in Iran.
This is a danger which is threatening. So that’s why I am emphasizing that the objective at present should be for the democratic forces to fight, to take control of this movement. And once they take control, they change the slogans, bring in democratic slogans and deepen and diversify the objectives of this uprising and guide it towards more democratic objectives.
This is very important at present. So the democratic opposition in Iran at present has a very crucial task, a very important task. On the one hand, it is fighting the Islamic regime in Iran.
It is fighting the security apparatus of the Islamic regime. On the other hand, it is fighting against suppression and marginalization by the right-wing royalist forces in the movement. So this two-pronged opposition, politics is going on there, which is making the situation much more complex than it was before.
What are the strategic risks between the forces you describe as monarchist opposition and the democratic forces?
I think also that there is an issue here that I want to mention. Strategically, it is a very, very important issue. And that is that if the monarchist opposition feels that it is losing the ground and cannot stand the force of the democratic opposition, then this will be a danger not only to the right-wing monarchist opposition, but also it will be a danger to the government, to the Islamic Republic.
So the expansion of the democratic forces and marginalization of right-wing forces may create a condition for the alliance between the right-wing monarchist forces and sectors of the power bloc in the Islamic Republic. Objective conditions for such an alliance is the political and economic rent, which basically that sector of the power bloc is enjoying. They are basically, these economic and political rent is so important that they would be quite happy, sorry, they would be quite happy to sacrifice their loyalty to the Islamic Republic for an alliance of right-wing royalist forces in order to keep their privileges going.
This kind of coup d’etat from within the regime with the cooperation of the royalist right-wing forces is a threat. It is a threat threatening the democratic forces inside this movement. I always warn the democratic forces against such an eventuality and I think democratic forces know that and they are trying to take control of this movement before it leads to such an eventuality.
After the recent Israeli attacks, where does the Iranian regime stand militarily and strategically? Is it weaker than ever?
Yes, that is right. The Iranian regime, particularly after the 12-day war in last June with America and Israel, has lost the bulk of its military security power. It has also lost its, if you like, ability to control this situation.
Largely because its tactics and its strategies prove to be wrong. You see, the leader of the Islamic Republic always had this strategy of no war, no negotiations with America, no war. But this strategy was based on the idea or on the assumption, it was based on the assumption that there are differences of view, objective and interest between the United States of America and Israel.
Israel wants to attack Iran, but America doesn’t want to attack Iran. But in this strategy it did not take into account that there may be a situation where America and Israel agree on this point that they should punish the Islamic Republic and that in this situation Israel will play a double role. On the one hand, it will act as Israel as an independent country with its own interests.
On the other hand, it will act as the proxy power of the United States of America. Israel attacked Iran in this double capacity, both as a sovereign state with its own interests and also as a proxy military power of the United States of America. And once the objectives of the United States of America were achieved, America stopped the war.
Israel was not happy with stopping the war because its objectives as an independent sovereign state had not been achieved. Its objectives as the proxy power of America had been achieved. But this kind of mistake that the Iranian regime made, this strategic mistake, strategic calculations about aims and objectives of America and Israel led to this massive military defeat in Iran.
The massive military defeat in Iran came when Iran had already been in a deep crisis of legitimacy, crisis of sovereignty, and it has above all. There is a vital need for economic recovery and taking control of the economy to control the daily, everyday life of the people to pay for it. But that needs economic resources.
That economic resources is dependent on negotiation with America after the war. And the negotiation with America depends on the acceptance of American conditions. Accepting American conditions in reality means disarming Iran.
In reality, it means basically reducing Iranian military power to minimum and also forcing Iran to accept the strategic objectives of America in the Middle East and also the way that these strategic objectives in line with strategic objectives of Israel is being pushed at present in the Middle East. That is something which means the end of the Iranian regime. That’s why the Iranian regime knows that although negotiation in America may be a way out, but it can only be a way out if it accepts to, if you like, become a third-rate power in the region.