Recent military and political developments on the Syrian front, including clashes centered in Aleppo, the postponement of integration talks between the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and Damascus, statements from Turkey and Damascus promoting “individual integration,” and the articulation of federal and decentralized governance demands by Alawites, following similar calls from Kurds and Druze, point to the beginning of a new phase in Syria.
Prof. Dr. Naif Bezwan, a faculty member at the University of Vienna Faculty of Law, spoke to ANF about the fractures emerging on the Syrian front, the positions of regional actors, and the possible scenarios ahead.
Turkey’s role for Syria is a model of dictatorship
Naif Bezwan said that Turkey’s threats against Rojava and the political structure it seeks to impose on Syria are oriented toward conflict rather than a solution.
Prof. Bezwan said: “The singular and exclusionary model that Turkey assigns to Syria is an extremely centralized and dictatorial one. It is a political approach that disregards the rights and freedoms of Syria’s core components, their future, their recognition, and the constitutional guarantee of their fundamental rights and liberties. For this reason, it concretely rejects a fair, inclusive, and negotiation-based political solution; instead, it is an approach indexed to war, conflict, and tension. This is because the ‘ideal order’ they envision for Syria is not a project that can be achieved or implemented without conflict, without generating tension, without imposing pressure, and without risking a new civil war. What exists is a political and security project that prioritizes war and conflict, therefore excluding negotiation and peace, and aiming to create spheres of influence.”
Aleppo and Tishrin are a line of defense
Naif Bezwan said that the fighting in Aleppo goes beyond a local confrontation and represents a regional struggle for existence, underlining the critical importance of the defense line.
Prof. Bezwan said: “What has been happening in Aleppo and Tishrin shows that even when there are temporary decreases in clashes, a de facto ceasefire, or even an agreement, the encirclement and attacks by the Ahmed Al-Sharaa (Al-Jolani) regime and Turkey-backed mercenaries have continued.
Perhaps this must be stated clearly: the defense of Aleppo is the defense of all Rojava.
The defense of Tishrin and Aleppo, even if it appears as a ‘line defense,’ is not merely the defense of a specific area; it is the defense of Rojava and of all Kurdistan. In this sense, defending the line and defending the entire area mean the same thing. Because this is a defensive line, and once that line is breached, all Kurdistan becomes threatened. The whole of Kurdistan would be deeply and negatively affected. Eastern Kurdistan (Rojhilat) would be affected, as would Southern Kurdistan (Başur) and Northern Kurdistan (Bakur). This is why pressure and siege are being sustained. How vital it is to prevent this has once again become clear for all of Kurdistan and for the other peoples of Syria.”
Prof. Bezwan said that attempts to impose centralist solutions would inevitably pave the way for new conflicts, and assessed the concept of “integration” as follows: “What they call a ‘central solution’ is nothing more than the construction of a new dictatorship regime that will be dependent on Turkey. ‘Integration’ is presented as so-called individual integration; that is precisely why it is being imposed. This is a regime design that denies the rights and freedoms of Syria’s historical and sociological components and denies the Kurds constitutional status. Therefore, if such a regime construction they have designed were to succeed, it would not produce any solution at all; on the contrary, it would pave the way for new conflicts and a new civil war. Its success would mean that a new civil war would once again be staged in Syria.”
There is an approach that denies political negotiation
Prof. Bezwan said that Turkey’s recent moves developed through the Damascus administration and Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) amount to a “search for legitimacy” aimed at expanding the war, referring to statements by Turkish officials that they would support an attack if the SDF were targeted by Damascus.
Bezwan said: “What is being suggested here is that instead of Turkey becoming directly involved, a proxy force should be used. The approach is this: encouraging the proxy in Damascus, provoking it, and producing pretexts and justifications to draw it into war and conflict. This is a policy that pushes the Damascus regime toward confrontation, imposes a new civil war, and denies negotiation and a political solution. Turkey is encouraging and provoking attacks by Damascus to manufacture justification and legitimacy for direct military intervention.
However, in the most recent statement by the Ministry of National Defense, it was emphasized that Turkey would be ready for all forms of cooperation if the Syrian government were to take concrete steps in line with the principle of ‘one state, one army,’ while the nature of these steps was left deliberately vague. On the one hand, provocation and encouragement of conflict are being brought to the fore; on the other, the negative political consequences that would arise from this and the responsibility for them are being placed on the Damascus regime.”
Including Alawites, components in Syria are calling for a federal solution
Prof. Bezwan said that Syria’s historical and social reality requires a federal structure and peace, noting that these demands also strengthen the legitimacy of the SDF and continued: “It cannot be emphasized enough that a monist regime based on ethnic and sectarian supremacy will produce no outcome in a country like Syria, one that is multi-faith, multi-religious, multicultural, and multinational, other than programming a new civil war and a dictatorship. Different components of Syrian society are becoming increasingly aware of this reality. They are experiencing it by paying very heavy and painful costs. That is why there is broad support for a federal solution and a project of unity. In other words, the Kurds are not alone in these demands. In fact, some social segments and belief groups, now including Alawites, are voicing their demands even more clearly, at times going beyond those of the Kurds. This is an important development.
At the same time, reducing all Sunni Arabs in Syria to HTS is a major mistake. The clearest and most concrete proof of this is the experience and reality of the SDF itself. We know that more than half of the SDF consists of Arabs who adhere to the Sunni faith. Across Syria, there is a strong will toward a decentralized and federal peace, and with each passing day it becomes more evident that there is no other way to hold Syria together.”
Turkey is siding with HTS in the March 10 agreement
Prof. Bezwan described Turkey’s approach to the March 10 Agreement as a “colonialist policy” and offered the following assessment and said: “The March 10 Agreement is a founding partnership agreement concluded between two constituent forces. Turkey is not a party to this agreement. The agreement represents a framework signed on an equal basis by two founding leaders. Its foundation rests on an ‘integration’ that is to take place through a political solution and constitutional rights. Declaring non-compliance with an agreement to which you are not even a party as a reason for war, by advancing an integration concept based entirely on arbitrary interpretations, will produce no outcome other than disintegration.
This is an exceptional situation rarely encountered in diplomatic and political history and one that, in itself, warrants serious reflection. I invite everyone to think together. You take a single concept from an agreement to which you are not even a party, strip it entirely of its context, subject it to a self-serving interpretation, and then declare it a casus belli if it is not complied with, doing so in a way that works against one of the actual parties to the agreement. This is truly a case that would be hard to find even in the history of colonialism.”
The possibility of Russia returning to the field
Naif Bezwan assessed the possibility of Russia re-entering the Syrian arena through a distinction between strategic and tactical considerations, stressing that such a move has a deep historical background.
Prof. Bezwan said: “The issue of Russia returning to the field needs to be examined carefully. Russia’s approach toward Damascus is highly strategic. Since the Tsarist era, including the period of the Soviet Union, Russia has pursued a strategy of reaching the Mediterranean, that is, warm waters, and maintaining a permanent presence there. For the first time in the past 150 to 200 years, Russia has secured the opportunity in Syria to obtain bases at such a critical point in the Eastern Mediterranean and to gain strategic depth together with the Assad regime. Therefore, Russia is approaching this issue from a long-term perspective.”
Bezwan said that other actors on the ground seek to draw Russia into the process for tactical reasons rather than as part of a genuine political solution, and added:“Actors such as the Damascus regime, Turkey, and Israel approach Russia’s return to the field in a largely tactical manner. They view Russia not as a partner in a negotiated political solution, but as a backup plan or a balancing element. For example, Damascus sees Russia as a ‘lifeline’ against the possibility of the United States withdrawing its support. Israel’s and Turkey’s expectations differ according to their own agendas. Russia’s presence on the ground stems not from the pursuit of a real and lasting solution, but from the need of these actors to activate their Plan B or Plan C options.
I do not believe that Russia’s increased activity on the ground will produce positive results for the Kurds in the medium or long term. Russia currently legitimizes its presence in Syria through its relationship with the existing regime in Damascus. Even so, Russia may pursue multiple tracks simultaneously, activate covert options against the interim authorities to strengthen its position, and generate counter-forces if necessary. Nevertheless, Russia’s return to the field does not represent good news for a lasting and democratic political solution in Syria.”
Prof. Bezwan also referred to remarks by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu regarding the Damascus government and said: “This is a striking statement. If half of the army is radical, then every strategic move you make carries a fifty percent risk of producing the wrong outcome. In other words, this points to the near mathematical impossibility of making a strategic and political investment in the regime.”
Prof. Bezwan said the SDF remain a decisive actor on the Syrian front, stressing that the coming period leaves the SDF with no remaining territorial or political margin for bargaining. He said: “In the coming period, the most critical point is that the SDF no longer has any territorial or political margin for bargaining. From the Kurdish perspective, the SDF entered the negotiation process with a highly reasonable and minimal proposal, a decentralized model and this narrows its bargaining power, because it is not possible to go below that.
The same situation applies to Aleppo and Tishrin. There is no possibility of retreating behind this line, either territorially or politically. For this reason, strengthening cooperation between Kurdish forces and the other components of Syria will be the central task and challenge of 2026.”